The Power of Reason
The POWER of REASON
A Kind of an Autobiography by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
The New Benjamin Franklin House Publishing House, Inc.
BY LYNDON LAROUCHE
All rights reserved.
For information address the publisher:
The New Benjamin Franklin House Publishing Company, Inc.
04 West 58th St.
In Memory of Richard Sober (1943-1979)
Although Richard will be identified most readily with his important contributions in connection with the study of Friedrich List, we who knew him best will remember both the personal qualities and self-development which made those specific contributions possible. If the world survives the deadly crises now threatening us, he must be remembered as part of that tiny, dedicated elite of 1966-67 who gave so much in offering a troubled world a pathway to security for itself and its posterity.
1. From Discovery to Realization 3
The most powerful adversary presently available to anyone in the "Western World" has not only expressed his wish for my early demise, but has visibly deployed a coordinated force of slander and physical harassments, and has set into motion specialized capabilities of an assassination-relevant sort. Although certain measures have been and are being taken to discourage such an undertaking, only the adversary's desire not to have my "martyred" body laid on his political doorstep will probably deter him from completing his wish through the adequate means at his disposal.
In this circumstance, I am well advised to consider what chores I would not leave unfinished by an early demise. In reviewing that matter, I have the advantage of an unusual organization, which could effectively duplicate in effect, either presently or in the foreseeable future, most of the kinds of things I would accomplish. The tasks made pressing by the assassination-threat are thus reduced to a manageable quantity. Axiomatically, any autobiographical sketch to be written is among such special chores.
A certain kind of autobiographical dissertation is required. An autobiography, organized according to the usual requirements of such a literary form, is not. Should my adversary elect to avoid beckoning a "martyrdom" to his political doorstep, the sort of dissertation required will serve its proper purpose just as well as if I survive, if serve differently.
During the past several years, it has become increasingly evident that I have gained some degree of importance in respect to processes shaping current world history. How much? In such matters quantity is virtually meaningless; it is the quality of the influence that is decisive. This importance is of two aspects. There is the matter of influence, and then there is that kind of importance which is to be attached to crucial scientific discoveries even before they secure influence among more than a few. Both elements are to be considered.
If I survive the months immediately before me at this moment of writing, it will become reasonable— at a rapid rate—that I might be inaugurated President of the United States in January 1981. Certain facts must be expected to come into public knowledge at a rapid rate, once the implications of the new European Monetary System begin to be understood. What might appear incredible at this moment would not be viewed as such under the conditions of a spring 1979 in which the new monetary system had developed at the pace presently projected by its principal sponsors. If, under that circumstance, I did not become President in 1981, I would be in a position to significantly determine the selection and the policies of an appropriate alternative nominee.
Under such circumstances, the presently increasing demand for written autobiographical information will expand considerably. This demand would inevitably reflect some morbid sort of curiosity, but would also represent a proper political concern. The electorate of a republic has a right to know to whom it has granted, directly or indirectly, significant influence over the shaping of policies.
Either way, assassination or active political life before me, a single sort of autobiographical dissertation best serves all proper requirements. Either way, what need be known are those features of my life which have enabled me to accomplish things of a special quality which few in this century have been able to match.
I have been instructed: when hunting ducks or geese, aim the shotgun properly at one bird, and you might get two as well as one; aim at the flock as a whole, and you will more probably bag none. Pointing to one function of the dissertation given in the following pages, I emphasize to parents, educators, and policy-makers generally that the kernel-policies of the Grootean teaching-order, the Brothers of the Common Life, are most appropriate for today.
During the span of the several years of a child's life preceding his or her fifteenth or sixteenth birthday, there exists an opportunity one properly dare not miss. If the child has the proper preparatory development of intellect, will, and interest prior to that period, then during that period the child can assimilate a rigorous philosophical foundation in Neoplatonic method akin to that reflected in the mature accomplishments of a Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, an Erasmus of Rotterdam, an Hieronymous Bosch, or France's "Spider King," Louis XI.
If I adopt that point-of-reference for presenting what is significant in my life to date, then I have said all that truly wants saying. The rest I leave to my biographers, if and when their efforts might be.
New York City
September 14, 1978
1. From Discovery To Realization
Apart from those accomplishments which are as much an organic product of the U.S. Labor Party as of my own efforts, my principal accomplishment is that of being, by a large margin of advantage, the leading economist of the twentieth century to date. That distinction can be most easily defended, since it is not quantitative, but qualitative.
During the 1951-1952 period, occupied with solving the principal systematic error in Karl Marx's Capital, I found a parallel to my own approach to a solution in indications available to me of Georg Cantor's development of the conception of the trans-finite. This enabled me to understand what had previously eluded me concerning Bernhard Riemann's famous habilitation dissertation. This connection enabled me also to see the way through my nagging suspicions concerning the Einstein-Weyl program. *
The discovery that my approach to the problem in economics concurred with the adduced Riemann-
* For a further discussion of this subject see Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Preface: Physics and Economics," and Uwe Parpart, "Introduction: The Concept of the Transfinite," Campaigner, Jan.-Feb. 1976, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2.
Cantor approach to relativistic physical space in this way had two determining effects on the result. First, it encouraged me to persist in an approach I might otherwise have abandoned. Secondly, the new insight I gained into Riemannian conceptions provided heuristic aids.
Arriving at a basic solution to the problem in this way, I digested the result, letting the implications trace their way through relevant portions of my acquired knowledge. In 1953, recovering from a nasty bout with hepatitis, I occupied myself with a light management-consulting assignment, and in the subsequent elaboration of events, arrived in New York City and my first marriage in late 1954.
Beginning mid-1955, I settled back in New York as an executive for a consulting firm. After an extended period in field-assignments, I found the circumstances and time to focus seriously on testing the new economic methods acquired during the intensive ferment of several years earlier. This occupied increasing portions of my time, ranging to about six to seven hours a day into early 1957.
At the close of 1956, there were some ominous trends showing in the operating statistics of the firm with which I was associated—nothing ugly at that point, but serious warnings. The notion of applying my approach to this immediate problem coincided with my sense that the time had come to take the research out into the open and begin applying it to some suitable challenge.
My findings were not popular ones. Some pertained to flaws in company operating policies and that sort of thing. More significant was my insistence, in February 1957, that the U.S. economy had turned into a recession, and that this recessionary trend was aggravating the consequences of cumulative errors in operating policies. The official view, based on company financial advisors, was that there was no recession and would probably be none. This "bullish" view coincided with the firm's pushing ahead with marginal-revenue policies which were contraindicated by my analysis.
In April of 1957 I resolved simply to make the best of my position in the firm, and increased my attention and efforts on what was at this point the concept of an "economic model." As I concentrated on such parameters as the proportion of industrial and related operatives, capital-formation rates, and an indicated overhang in the post-1954 credit-expansion, it was clear to me that the deepening recession was going to be a bad one.
By the end of November, events had corroborated the "model." I then undertook the development of a longer-range projection. In regard to my employment with the firm, I shaped the development of the projection in a way oriented to company needs: forecasting trends in capital-expenditures rates, which, with adjustments considered, is the base-line for predicting the potential market for all but the desperation cost-cutting sorts of consulting activity.
It became evident, by late February 1958, that under existing monetary structures the U.S. economy would be stagnant in its basic rate of growth in tangible domestic production following the 1957 outbreak of the recession, and that European and Japanese expansion rates would tend to level off to a constant rate of growth by about the middle of the 1960s. Under existing monetary structures, this meant that at some time following the middle 1960s, the international monetary system would suffer a succession of monetary crises which, failing a drastic alteration in the monetary system and economic policies, would lead into a new general depression deeper than that of the 1930s.
My principal concern at that point of discovery was to find a vehicle for propagating this analysis, and through that to secure institutional means through which to intersect the coming monetary crises with an appropriate set of alternative monetary and economic policies.
The various socialist organizations first appeared the only probable vehicle suited to this purpose. The procapitalist political and corporate institutions were "Not having any, thank you."
The socialist organizations were "Not having any, thank you" either. Any potential of that sort they might have possessed in earlier times, had evaporated. The 1958 "Regroupment" euphoria among various professedly socialist entities, mixed with the "civil rights" ferment, and, later, the Cuban Revolution euphoria, represented prospective "gate receipts" to console withered, long-isolated sectarians. Under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the sects flocked to the prospective largesse of the Office of Economic Opportunity and allied social-work projects; by 1964, they were shifting toward hot pursuit of the "New Left." What the nation or the world required was no longer of concern to them: "Where can new gate receipts be obtained with the least effort, and what do we have to be overheard saying to attract those gate receipts?"
By mid-1964, I was resolved to hasten to build an organization pretty much from scratch. The first project to that purpose failed because it depended too much on what proved to be unsalvageable odds and ends from the spoiled youth strata of existing socialist groups. In the spring of 1966, I launched a new approach, aiming my efforts at selectively gathering a certain quality of graduate or undergraduate from the vortex of "New Left" ferment.
The vehicle for this approach was a one-semester course in "Marxist economics," using Marx's work as a background and foundation on which to present the elements of my own economic science and method.
As soon as this approach had attracted an accumulation of about a dozen individuals as a core, and some secondary participation around that, the Columbia University campus was targeted, in the fall of 1966. The aim was to intersect the organizing effort being launched there by Students for a Democratic Society, to draw out persons who would be selectively attracted or repelled from our organizational process by the variously attractive-repelling influence of a rigorous one-semester course more demanding than is customary for a graduate curriculum. Only persons of unusual intellectual motivation and stamina were suited to build the core we were committed to developing.
Our effectiveness in briefly taking control of the 1968 Columbia student strike leadership away from the neo-Fabian controllers of the "New Left," followed by an effective delaying of the effort of the neo-Fabians to develop a "Jewish versus black" race riot scenario around the fall 1968 New York City teachers' strike, attracted most-hostile attention from those "New Left" controllers and their backers. Some of the backers obviously pulled some strings in the Department of Justice, producing the curious result that the New York FBI office ran a Cointelpro operation in support of Mark Rudd's group, against our efforts to frustrate a race riot, during the spring of 1969.*
From the fall of 1968 on, every noticeable "left" and related grouping in the United States conducted a slander-and-containment policy against our organization.
The attempted containment was broken during the late spring, summer and fall of 1971. Since the associated central feature of the slander campaign against the organization (apart from the teachers' strike issue) was a ridiculing of our emphasis on the fundamental importance of the monetary crises, the August 1971 devaluation of the U.S. dollar caused the slanders to backfire. This backfiring effect gave us the enhanced position on a number of campuses to immediately and successfully challenge a sampling of leading economists and others to debates.
* This was revealed in Cointelpro files released to the Church Committee and then the public in 1976.
The most significant of these debates occurred between the writer and Keynesian Abba Lerner at Queens College in New York City. In the course of that debate, I emphasized to Lerner—and the audience—that his analysis and proposed remedies were essentially identical with those Nazi Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht had imposed upon Germany during the 1933-1936 period. Lerner angrily defended Schacht.
Shortly after that debate, Lerner's associate Sidney Hook offered the paradoxical observation that since LaRouche had won the public debate with Lerner, LaRouche, therefore, had really lost the debate. What Hook meant was that he and others had resolved to work to close off all further opportunities for the writer and his associates to find debates with leading academic economists. The occasion of Hook's remark was the writer's public debate with Oskar Morgenstern at New York University. The ensuing period's general lack of public debates coincided with Hook's prediction.
The Lerner debate institutionalized the fact that the issue between the writer's approach to the crisis and that of a growing number of economists besides Lerner was the issue of an economic-growth solution versus a fascist, Schacht-echoing "fiscal austerity" solution. The recruitment to and further development of the organization was centered around the form of the issue defined by the Abba Lerner and related debates during fall 1971.
The other principal determining development of late 1971 was a change in the internal structure of the organization that September. On the basis of the August 1971 devaluation crisis, this writer proposed to his National Committee at that time that we were entering a period of intensifying political crises in which we required an independent political-intelligence capability, independent of mass-circulation and specialist media. This must determine the reporting of developments nationally and globally in our publications, and provide the organization and its leadership with the informational basis for shaping policy and ordering field deployments by the organization as a whole.
So, within weeks of the adoption of the policy, two intelligence units were established. One was a regular political-intelligence unit, organized along the lines of a major newsweekly. The other was an operations intelligence unit, which correlated qualitative and statistical information concerning results of field activities with political-intelligence findings.
Later, during 1972, after recurring assaults by Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party and other groupings, a security section was added to the intelligence organization.
The next qualitative phase in the character of the organization's development emerged during January 1974.
During late December 1973, known operatives of British MI-5, in collusion with the management of British Caledonia Airlines, were caught red-handed in a drugging operation against a British member of the organization en route to the United States. The operation involved an elaborate scenario with respect to the result accomplished. It was subsequently discovered to be directly linked to an attempted destabilization operation involving elements of the networks of the Institute for Policy Studies and allied entities in the United States. This included positive indications of, and information received concerning a mooted assassination of this writer to be undertaken by a known Puerto Rican armed group. FBI Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) releases concerning information received by an agent planted among leading Communist Party USA circles later corroborated the indications of a mooted assassination at the same time as the attempted destabilization operation.
Since the domestic forces deployed against the U.S. Labor Party coincided substantially, at the command level, with the forces leading the attempt to oust President Richard Nixon, we reexamined the Nixon-Watergate case from this vantage-point, arriving at an operational assessment which has been massively verified by subsequent findings. The information developed from investigation of a costly and elaborate international deployment of "black operations" against our small organization was matched with investigation of the Watergate case. The results, in the light of our monetary and related political intelligence estimates, indicated to us that it was in the vital interests of the nation to attempt to prevent Nixon's impeachment or resignation.
This effort, begun at the close of January 1974, brought the organization's work into close and sustained contact with what we later categorized as "Whig" currents within the Republican Party. Our assessment of these forces, and of the social strata they reflected, prompted us to commit ourselves strategically to bringing key elements of the labor movement into collaboration with those "Whig" strata which were open to our own alternative programmatic solutions to the monetary crises.
This policy was first reflected programmatically in a "golden snake" proposal we introduced as the thematic feature of our European cothinker organization's work in the spring 1974 Lower Saxony election campaign in the Federal Republic of Germany. It was, essentially, a proposal that West Germany take the initiative in seeking immediate new agreements with the Soviet Union, such that commitments to a gold-based Comecon ruble would be matched by putting the Western European Economic Community currencies into a common, gold-based reserve arrangement.
The further elaboration of this proposal was the occasion for launching the writer's 1976 Presidential campaign in February 1975, and the subsequent issuance of the "International Development Bank" proposal* during the spring of 1975, following an April 1975 Bonn press conference to announce this new policy proposal.
* Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., How the International Development Bank Will Work, Campaigner Publications, Inc., New York, April 1975.
The subsequent developments are current history. Four institutional agreements now constitute the chief pieces which integrated represent a new gold-based world monetary system. They are the May 1978 twenty-five-year agreements between Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and President Leonid Brezhnev, the development of the Arab Monetary Fund, the establishment of the Tokyo capital market, and the July 7, 1978 European Community agreements establishing the European Monetary System and its included European Monetary Fund.
These four pieces are to be integrated around a policy which projects the forward valuation of the U.S. dollar to rise to approximately 3.00 deutsche-marks. At that dollar valuation, the open-market price for newly-produced gold purchased for mone-tary reserves should level at a competitive price of production for world market sale of about $240 per ounce. As other currencies are brought into stable relative values, through issuance of new hard-com-modity credit to bring up world trade volume, the key currencies can be tightly pegged to a system of fixed parities, based on a dollar worth about 3.00 deutschemarks and on $240 per ounce gold.
On the basis of such a link between debt instru-ments of the new monetary system and gold, a yield of significantly less than 4 percent on long-term debt instruments is far more than competitive with rates on the order of 10 percent yields on monetary speculations in a market undergoing double-digit infla-tion. This means both a "sopping up" of speculative Eurodollar and related holdings for conduiting into low-interest, long-term loans and capital formation, and the basis for increasing the credit available for developing-sector high-technology industrial, agricultural, and infrastructural investments on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars annually.
The object of such a new world monetary system is not original to this writer's design. Most notable is the 1967 Populorum Progressio of the late Pope Paul VI. The Atoms-for-Peace policy of President Dwight Eisenhower, the Rogers Plan under President Nixon, and the French initiatives, notably those influenced by the late Jacques Rueff, all aim at the same objectives. The writer's designs thus coincide in general purpose with preexisting and parallel proposals.
Furthermore, a school of political economy in Japan has, in recent years, published an analysis of growth policies coinciding on a number of crucial features with the economic science of this writer. This parallel is not accidental. The leading forces of the Meiji revolution based their economic-policy thinking principally on Alexander Hamilton, Henry C. Carey, and American-trained Friedrich List. The writer and the Japanese currents associated, as a rule of thumb, with the Mitsubishi forces proceed from the same historical grounding respecting the notion of the source and nature of wealth.
What this writer supplied to the effort was principally the programmatic and policy benefits of that qualitative breakthrough in economic science he effected under the influence of his Riemann-Cantor thesis of the 1951-1952 period.
The assimilation of the "golden snake" and "International Development Bank" proposals into the policy-making processes leading into the July 1978 Bremen summit was not through regular channels normally shaping policy. It was certainly not through any direct political power commanded by the U.S. Labor Party. It was not through any powerful sponsor—we had none. We have been consistently shameless in our independence—of allies, funds, and sponsors. If, during the period since October 1976, and especially following the events of November 1-3, 1976, we have enjoyed increased collaboration, this occurred because we had first established ourselves as an important, if marginal, political force in the domain of policy-thinking and political-intelligence work.
The agency which is responsible for the realization of a conception born in an isolated individual of 1952 into the imminent realities of 1978-1979 is the power of reason.
Two, interconnected questions properly arise from that fact. What, in the first place, enabled the writer to develop such a qualitative breakthrough in economic science, and to persist to the end of accomplishing what was usually ridiculed as "impossible" along the quarter-century intervening between discovery and realization? Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa would know the nature of the answer. France's Louis XI would know. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz would know. Most probably, Benjamin Franklin would know. Let us now proceed to inform the reader.
2 A New Physics
Apart from his central achievements as an economist, this writer has done significant work in psychology, in philosophy, in aspects of military strategy, and has had an influence on the shaping of methodological issues of physical-scientific method—among other matters. In British usage, the writer appears to be a polymath. He is not a polymath, except perhaps to observers who are unable to see the matter from the inside. There is a coherence determining these varied facets of activity, to the effect that if all are understood properly, as facets of a unified body of thought-processes, the true character of the central work in economic science is better exposed.
To focus attention, for the moment, on issues of methods of physics, it is already reported that the key to the 1952 initial breakthrough in economics was the writer's viewing Cantor's notion of the transfinite from the vantage-point of his own insight into the necessary form of hypothetical solution to the indicated, crucial problem of economics. That connection goes two ways. It leads from physics (Riemann-Cantor) into a solution to a crucial problem of economic science. A successful solution to the problem in economic science, by showing how the lawful ordering of the universe is successfully mastered by man through technological advances in production, proves a crucial point respecting the characteristic features of lawful ordering of the universe in general.
How can we be certain that we know anything in any field? In the final analysis, there is but one fundamental premise of certainty in any branch of human knowledge. That proof is that the ordering of our powers of judgment for practice is in correspondence with the successful improvement of man's powers over nature, to the effect of enculturing man to produce a more numerous population, in which each average individual expresses an increased potential power over nature by the same, self-reflexive criteria.
If we can discover what ordering of the creative processes of mind predictably leads, as a method, to repeated advances in productive technology, then that discovered ordering of creative processes is in the "world-line" of perfectible agreement with the laws of the universe. If economic science can pose the problem in those terms of reference, then the characteristics of the universe as they are reflected in the knowledge of economic science reflect the characteristics of the kind of relativistic physical space in which we exist. Indeed, there is no other approach but such a form of economic science which can settle this matter.
Contrary to commonplace miseducation, there are no simple "facts" in the universe. There are "sense-impressions." However, the "sense-impressions"
which impinge upon us are not the direct determinants of what the ingenuous consciousness perceives as "facts." All "facts" are constructs (in a manner of speaking); they are judgments, conceptions. There is nothing self-evident in them. The mind orders the domain of sense-impressions into "facts" according to the way in which the mind has been developed and informed. We naively call a "sense-perception" a "fact" because we have directly correlated sense-impressions with a Gestalt which our mind "believes" best fits such sense-impressions.
Correspondingly, ordinary, "unphilosophical" knowledge, however sophisticated the experimental work attached to it, however sophisticated the mathematical or related apparatus we employ in connection with experiments, has no intrinsic absoluteness about it.
Quite the contrary; all formal mathematical knowledge, as current practice defines such knowledge, is inadequate on two grounds. First, it is intrinsically inadequate just because it is mathematical; it depends upon axiomatic assumptions which are intrinsically paradoxical in such a way that no mathematical formulation, as we presently define pure mathematics, could be in true correspondence with the ordering of the universe. Second, mathematical physics presently pertains inherently to the least complex, in assumed form, of three qualities of physical reality of our known universe, to what we term inorganic physics. It does not determine living processes (organic physics), and does not determine the noetic processes specific to human creative processes.
Without the sort of crucial tests which only a certain form of economic science can provide, the self-evident authority of other fields of knowledge is merely pragmatic. In economic science properly defined, the primary datum is the noetic processes of the human mind. It is the creation of qualitative advances in science and technology which enables man to supersede the limits of the marginal resources implicit in a previous level of technology.
Since—we shall merely assert the point here, for purposes of convenience—the supersession of preceding levels of technology exhausts the value-producing potentialities of the powers of labor at preceding, lower levels, all value is derived from progress in the development of the (technological) powers of labor— as U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton demonstrates in his 1791 Report on Manufactures*
It is this progress, and also the rate of such progress, which is the primary datum of a competent economic science—which is the gist of the qualitative advance in economics effected by this writer. It is an approach to economic processes based on that conception which, uniquely, measures the "efficiency" of the human noetic processes. It measures this in respect to the realized advances in science and technology resulting from the development of mental powers of individuals to discover, transmit and assimilate new qualities of knowledge for practice.
* Alexander Hamilton's "Report to the Congress on the Subject of Manufactures," December 5, 1791. The core of this report appears in Spannaus and White, The Political Economy of the American Revolution, Campaigner Publications, Inc., New York, 1977.
From such a standpoint, a proper economic science is the "King and Queen" of all scientific knowledge.
Insofar as this writer recognized among members of his organization promising young, scientifically trained persons, and as such persons had adequately, first, proven reasonable mastery of his economic science, he urged those persons to recognize in physics and certain aspects of biological and related research those crucial problems of method and experimental knowledge which corresponded to the discrepancy between first, the actual ordering of the universe, as proven by economic science, and second, the -assumed ordering of the universe prevailing in existing organizations of the specific other branches of knowledge.
This persistent sort of encouragement had three, overlapping project aspects.
First, since 1947, the writer had been dedicated to fission and, later, fusion energy development as the known, indispensable directions of forced-draft basic research and engineering development upon which the future existence of our species depends. This effort was therefore pushed as a major correlative of the organization's economic policy.
Second, after repeated efforts, he succeeded in motivating the completion of a research project he outlined, showing the negentropic character of both human species development and general biospherical development, when those processes are studied as negentropic thermodynamic processes.
Third, he found in Uwe Parpart a person suited and motivated to effect a preliminary, broad presentation of the Riemann-Cantor conception of the actual ordering of relativistic physical space.
The scientific work of the organization, in the sense of the physical sciences, is based on the interaction of these three efforts, on the resulting common basis for coherent organization of continued such work as a whole. There were no wild assumptions on the author's part in this process.
The most crucial phase of his own development had been realized between his twelfth and sixteenth year. During that period, he set out to resolve which of all the known philosophers he had been perusing should be his choice. Ordering these in calendar sequence, he proceeded, rejecting Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Rousseau, in favor of, first Descartes, and then preferring Leibniz to Descartes. Continuing from Leibniz (The Monadology and the Clarke-Leibniz correspondence chiefly) he continued to Immanuel Kant, and spent about two years with The Critique of Pure Reason.
That was his essential educational grounding, which has shaped his development ever since.
It was on the basis of Leibniz, Kant and then Riemann and Cantor that the writer's development of epistemological rigor was principally premised. The crucial points of knowledge must lie precisely where Leibniz, Riemann, Cantor, et al. have prescribed them to be situated in respect to the processes of thought and experimental knowledge. The solution to the problem in economic science was the crucial breakthrough, the crucial proof that the Rie-mann-Cantor form of relativistic space was the suitable one, and not the program of Einstein and Weyl.
The Development of The Child
The thing a child must do, if that child is to develop as an adequate scientist for the period immediately before us, is to emulate this writer's adolescent study of philosophy. The choice of titles is not the point of the business. There is a much better overall selection than I studied during my adolescence. It is the principle of the thing, not the titles, that is decisive.
What must a child do to develop his or her mind? He must study the way in which the greatest minds of each age have effected transformations in the quality of human knowledge in the Neoplatonic line of progress leading through Leibniz. He or she must, at the same time, contrast success with failure, progress with retrogression. By working to replicate the concept-evolving processes of the greatest minds in his or her own mental processes, and comparing that with a replication of the processes of failure and retrogression, the child gauges his or her own mental processes in development with the greatest minds.
This approach to education is directly opposite to the inductive method, or the pragmatic method. If one educates a child all the way to the college undergraduate level by piling up successive approximations of knowledge, by the inductively or pragmatically ordered approach, the child enters the university with a certain learned accumulation of a knowledge and so-called cognitive skills, but without mind in the proper sense of that term. In point of emphasis, the child has been learning, not developing his or her mind.
The only sort of writings which confront the child with the workings of the mind in an immediate way are the philosophical and related works of the Neoplatonic writers. With such writers as a mooring-point, the Aristotelean and irrationalist-empiricist writers can be studied for clinical contrast. Pragmatist education, or "value-free" educational methods, must necessarily destroy the mind's capacity for epistemological rigor. "Every important writer has something useful to say; sort it out when you're old enough"—Madam, if you permit that sort of education, you are destroying your child's mental potentialities.
In my own experience, I was ready—even hungry—for the indicated sort of educational process by approximately my twelfth year. The case of the Brothers of the Common Life, and the instruction programs of Hassan ibn al-Sabbah, are among the sources of encouragement which suggest my estimate of age-range to be approximately correct. There are supporting indications for this in the emotional and related shifts normally succeeding one another in childhood. It is also clear that postponing such discipline to a later age is hazardous.
The central paradoxes of physics and other branches of formalized knowledge concur with this estimate for age-range.
From the underside of scientific knowledge, from the vantage-point of the "silver souls" of Plato's "Phoenician myth," the central internal, formal paradox of knowledge centers, in all its familiar manifestations, around the "field-particle paradox" or something epistemologically equivalent to that. It might therefore be adduced—mistakenly—that some brilliant stroke of formalist's insight might ultimately put the whole matter right. The problem is not however a formal one at root; the problem is that the viewer of the paradox in that form is no more developed than to be a "silver soul." To solve the "field-particle paradox," one must first become a "golden soul."
At first approximation, the methodological problem causing the "field-particle paradox" is that the mind appears to be unable to conceptualize processes as primary realities, as the elementarities of the ordering of the universe. Instead, the mind seems to insist on locating primary (elementary) reality in discrete things. Yet, written evidence shows beyond any doubt that there are at least three minds among scientific and philosophical writers who overcame that specific difficulty: Ibn Sina, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, and Leibniz. In these instances, existing writings show this to be the case directly. In other instances, we have evidence of the same competence through crucial circumstantial evidence. Ibn Sina's necessary existent, Cusa's non-other and the corresponding conceptions in Leibniz are direct evidence.
Cantor's reflections on the development of the notion of the transfinite are directly relevant to the same point.
In all cases, the ability of the mind to conceptualize processes as "elementarities," and to derive the determination of discrete existence from processes, is developed in only one way, in the only possible way. This is accomplished by becoming willfully self-conscious of the ordering of the creative processes of one's own mind, initially through gauging those processes against the processes one attempts to replicate for suitable writings of Platonic and Neopla-tonic writers—and also by contrasting, clinically, the anti-Platonic, anti-Neoplatonic arguments of Aris-totelean and irrationalist-empiricist writers.
The writer's solution to the crucial problem of economic science exemplifies the same point.
The "trick," without which an effective economic science is impossible, is to abandon all scalar notions of elementarity for any and all of the discrete constituents of economic processes. By a process of negation, transforming the quantities of the whole social division of labor in production into their per capita thermodynamic equivalents, and studying the economic process solely in terms of increasing negen-tropy for the condition that the caloric throughput per capita of productive labor and capital costs is rising, an exponential function derived from a ratio [S'/C+V] is the primary parameter of the economic process of technological progress. This parameter is in direct correspondence with the realization of the self-development of the creative-mental processes of the population.
It is this self-development which is in perfectible correspondence with the lawful ordering of the universe, and also the sole source of value in the creation of wealth.
The ontological features implied by that description of a self-developing process exemplify the notion of processes. So processes must be conceptualized to break free of the inherently paradoxical view of the universe to any but a "golden soul." In other words, break free of the fundamental antinomies of the Kantian schema.
Thus, the assimilation of Leibniz's world outlook, the intensive confrontation with Kant, and the solution of the Kantian antinomies from that standpoint is the precondition for conceptualizing—as an original conception—the solution I developed, with aid of Riemann and Cantor, to the fundamental problem of economic science.
The Last Preparatory Step
The rounding-out of that development was not quite fully completed with the 1958 perspective. One more experience was crucial for completing this outlook.
I was first attracted to the general idea of computers through Leibniz, of course. My first concrete interest in the subject came ingenuously to me in 1940. Looking at the equations required to solve circuitry, it immediately occurred to me that it would be better to build the circuits to solve the equations. A late 1940s immersal in the texts of biophysicist Rashevsky, and ploughing through the sources given in Rashevsky's texts,* intensified and broadened the character of my interest in problems posed by control
* E.g., N. Rashevsky, Mathematical Biophysics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938; current editions available from Dover Press, New York.
devices. I should emphasize that the interest was emphatically philosophical, a matter of exploring various kinds of process-conceptions, rather than an interest in electronics as such. It was in the midst of this that an acquaintance introduced me to the French edition of Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics.
During 1958, conjecturing proper alternative long-term corporate policies for the consulting firm to which I was still attached, I became convinced that computer technology would be potentially at a premium because of the after-effects of the 1957 recession.
The social composition of firms prior to 1957 had tended to become top-heavy with engineering and management personnel for reasons of actual and anticipated growth. The diversification of product-lines in a growing number of fields was moving production management ever further away from the "model T" assembly line's administrative economies, fostering growing bureaucracies. Hence, if capital-formation rates turned upward under conditions of continued trends toward stagnation in employment of skilled operatives, then capital would flow partially toward technological improvements in replacement of obsolescence-ridden capital stocks, and toward proportionately greater stress on improvements in technology for coping with the explosion of administrative bureaucracies.
The sorts of computer systems available in 1958 did not represent a solution to this problem, except in unusual cases. However, the continuing development of the computer did portend feasible applications on a significant scale. Hence, on condition one projected abstract types of computers becoming available beginning the early 1960s, a consulting firm in 1958 could launch a pilot division applying and perfecting its competence on a limited scale. For the consulting firm in question, this would have meant moving toward the kinds of applications which coincided with the coming emergence of suitable computers, into a premium-dollar zone, rather than the marginal-dollar zone toward which the firm in mind was mistakenly oriented in its efforts to maintain gross volumes.
During 1959 I did launch such a firm, which firm underwent a series of mergers, and plugged on into the middle 1960s after I had separated myself from the entity. In management consulting, as in life generally, if one wishes to do a competent job, stick to the proposed course of action you know you can cause to succeed. Harebrained compromises, made for fear of losing the assignment, benefit neither the client, nor, in the long run, the consulting firm.
During this period, I was unable to avoid the issue of "artificial intelligence." An amusing incident, harmless to report in respect to those involved, illustrates my state of mind during that period—to a double purpose—and affords something of that anecdotal color readers demand from biographical literature.
It was during the fading phase of my first marriage, somewhere between a former real marriage and that bitterness which characteristically supplies couples with the self-mobilization to terminate the relationship. It was a time in my adult life when acquaintanceships were largely determined by par-en ts-and-children encounters in the park. One such acquaintanceship, an agreeable couple, he a stage and TV writer, lived in the adjoining apartment building. My preferred location at home was in my study, with my books and work-papers, screening out unwanted sounds and moods with music. Yet, liking the couple, I went, not unamiably to the house party to which we had been invited.
There was another neighbor-couple there and otherwise chiefly writers of the same circle as my host.
One of the writers—I do not know whether he had taken a dislike to me within the first moments, or whether that was his usual style—was spoiling the atmosphere. My host informed me that he was assigned to work up a TV documentary on computers, with Massachusetts Institute of Technology cooperation scheduled. He professed to be uncertain what sort of computer capabilities would represent a workable and yet meaningful topic for TV treatment.
There was some irritating side comment afoot during my host's and my own review of the matter. Perhaps this contributed to my proposal that potentially a future computer could simulate the quality of pulp fiction or analogous TV productions. I explained the two levels of programming required—the non-verbal and then the verbal programming. Someone caught the point at about that phase of the discussion: "Like Plotto!" and an agreeable, productive discussion of the matter unfolded.
Some time later, I witnessed the documentary, which included a simulation of the non-verbal aspect of the programming, as we had discussed it. It is probable that the MIT duo of Chomsky and Minsky directly or indirectly did up the simulation. After viewing the broadcast, I was informed by the writer that our discussion that evening had been the source of the usage. (If Chomsky were involved, as is probable, I am amused to wonder how he would receive this minor bit of intelligence.)
I have a special reason for including this anecdote. The significance I will identify later.
It was in that mood, living day after day with this matter principally occupying my mind, that I halted such peripheral considerations as the spur-of-the-mo-ment Plotto simulation exemplified, and resolved to go directly to the crux of the matter of "artificial intelligence."
It was simple enough for me to do. A knowledge of both analog and computer principles, philosophical rigor, and my competence in economics: it was a simple matter to lay out in my mind a worldwide network of task-oriented, linked computers performing production of all human needs, including the building of task-oriented computers like themselves.
Such an array is the precondition for supposing that "artificial intelligence" in computers might be approximated, at least in the form of conscious powers of deduction. Since human consciousness and intelligence depend upon what Kant terms the synthetic a priori processes, and since there is no configuration of the indicated sort of model which could accommodate such synthesis, there is no way in which any form of computer could become willful in a human sense of willful intelligence.
It was obvious, on less rigorous grounds, that no computer could synthesize intelligent behavior in the manner Minsky and others were approaching this. That was the simple case to prove. Minsky's problem was that he proceeded in ignorance of even a Feuer-bachian model of the determination of intelligence.
It was the more sophisticated case with which I had to settle accounts, if I were to define the principled limitations of all computers into the indefinite future; if I were to define the principled character of the man-machine relationship—for example, in the management of a firm—for the condition all routine management-administrative functions were performed by computers.
The problem up to that point was not that I did not know the answer to the problem I posed myself. The point was that I had not put myself through the process of transforming what I knew on the matter into an utterable conception. It was my recognition of this aspect of the process, more or less at the moment I completed my model-centered formal proof of the case, which was the important result. This business of bringing the preconscious processes into consciousness by making those processes utter-able through predicated, communicable images, and so forth, corresponded entirely to my earlier (1952) comprehension of the Cantor transfinite. This, in turn, was related to my work on the principles of Neoplatonic poetry.
In that moment and during the night I sat and paced, alternately, sleepless, going through the matter repeatedly, each time with a fresh view of the point. I completed the whole development of my life up to that point, so marking a juncture between what had gone before and what was to come. In that moment, I saw clearly, for the first time, the nature of the solution to the "particle-field paradox"—not as something I understood, as I had understood the matter before, but as a solution I could "see."
Now to the implications of the anecdote.
As I gauged myself against great minds during my adolescent philosophical project, and have done so in reading and related experiences constantly ever since, and as I have had the opportunity to gauge myself against key figures of this century, including leading figures in various parts of the world among my contemporaries, I know the measure of existing men and women, those who are considered outstanding as well as others. In my own work, I know that my experience is that which on a relative scale of things is one of greatness. I know what the realized pinnacles of human personal development are in our time and, to large measure, in earlier times. I have, essentially, matched them.
Thus I can address a concerned parent, or a child, and inform them of the nature of greatness as it is experienced from the inside.
Apart from those exciting moments in which a valid new discovery of some exceptional usefulness, or any successful problem-solving involving the exercise of comparable mental powers, there is no melodramatic glory in the process of greatness.
Mostly, from moment to moment, greatness has outwardly an ordinary, homely appearance.
Greatness is reflected in particular in small decisions made from moment to moment. It is not seen often as capacity for occasional "big and important" acts of melodramatic potential. It proceeds in a succession of little, moment-by-moment decisions, whose cumulative effect is to steer one's development and the cumulative effect of one's actions in a certain way, so that after a passage of time, something important, something cumulatively important has happened.
For me, this is associated with steering, in the balance, a constant course from a 1952 decision, through 1958's developments, into the commitment to solve the problem of the world monetary crisis with aid of founding a new organization from scratch in 1966, and so forth. It is a course leading to the present moment, when the most powerful adversaries of humanity plot my destruction, viewing me as significant enough a "potential danger" to deploy slander, harassment, and other disagreeableness so massively against my feared potentialities. It is the persisting, growing dedication to stubbornly pursuing a determination to reach that which may be seemingly impossible, yet necessary—as a mountain-climber keeps moving step-by-step, denying the demands of exhaustion. That is the form of effecting greatness.
Greatness is a quality of concentration span which is sustainable across decades, which can alter its steps without changing its course or objective.
At many points, from childhood on, there were always persons who seemed to be walking the same sort of homely steps I walked. Yet, in most cases, they have fallen behind somehow along the way. The steps I took beyond them were, in each step, homely, seemingly ordinary steps. The nominal difference in steps was manifest in the way my course obliged me to step just so slightly differently than they, to add what they regarded as something slightly egregious, "not practical," to my course. From my standpoint, there was not egregiousness in my course, but a taint of pragmatism in theirs. That inherent egregiousness of mine is aptly typified by the anecdote given above.
The difference in self-government has been essentially that they decided on steps, each step a thing. I was governed by a sense of course, a process. From moment to moment, the two movements appear much the same, the one relatively egregious in overtones, the other relatively pragmatic in overtone. It is not the particularized differences which cause, aggregately, the ultimate difference in destination. It is the difference between the process-view of reality, and the thing-view of reality, between the person whose steps are governed by a commitment to a course and a destination, and one whose course and destination are usually the unforeseen consequence of decisions one at a time concerning individual steps.
From moment to moment, both person's steps are usually equally ordinary, equally homely in overall character.
3 A Christian Childhood
I was born a birthright member of the Society of Friends, on September 8, 1922. Note of this occurrence was duly recorded in the minutes of the Friends Meeting in Gonic, a suburb of my family's residence,
the city (pop. 10,000) of Rochester, New Hampshire. In due course, the momentousness of my birth was
imparted to me. I was instructed to be conscious of the fact that my first known ancestor to arrive in English-speaking North America had set foot in Pennsylvania about 1670, and that Great-greatt grandfather had organized against slavery in the Carolinas, in company with John Woolman, and was, in most parts, a firm Clay Whig.
Apart from that repeated intelligence concerning my ancestry I knew little more about the Society of Friends until I was ten years old. Except for visits to Meaderboro Friends Meeting, where I knew the Meaders and the patriarchal Reverend Niles, and less frequent visits to Gonic Meeting, where I knew the Jenness family, Quaker Sunday meeting was a barren, chill or cool (according to the season) small shedlike building, where one sat for hours listening to the pendulum-clock tick.
In Rochester, our activities centered around the Baptist Church, and occasionally extended to the Congregational Church. My father liked to sing in Church, and was still taking regular voice lessons in those days, which meant for me occasionally trips to visit a Mr. Gorman in the most impressive metropolis of Dover, a drive, door to door, of about eight miles. My mother was principally occupied with "church work" of one sort or another from my earliest recollections until the recent onset of her final illness. As I have noted, I knew little about Friends, except for family traditions, until I was ten, when we moved to Lynn, Massachusetts.
In Rochester, my father worked for the United Shoe Machinery Corporation as what was called a "road man," deployed, for purposes of accountability, out of the Haverhill, Massachusetts United Shoe Machinery Corporation office. Although his father was not merely frugal, but well-to-do, my father's mother had urged my father out of school and to work when he completed the eighth grade. He had compensated for that by working his way up to making-room foreman by the age of sixteen, and paid for his own secondary education and other tutoring, chiefly in Boston.
In those days in Rochester, United Shoe roadmen were pretty much the kings of the shoe industry, installing and maintaining the machines in the factories on their itinerary, handling the emergencies, and often instructing workmen in the finer points of shoemaking. At the time I was born, my father earned $40 a week. After one nasty job, repairing a United Shoe Machinery Corporation leveling machine, he threatened to quit the company unless he was raised to $45 a week, which they awarded him.
In those days, in Rochester, that was a comfortable living. In 1949, the General Electric Company was starting aerospace department testers at $40 a week, raising them to about $50 in steps. My parents rented a four-bedroom cottage on 3 Coxeter Square from Mrs. Bradley, who was otherwise in the coal business, and lived in a larger house across Portland Street. Our cellar included a brick room about the size of the parlor upstairs, which was used to store a fall's canning of produce, jellies and jams through the winter and spring as well as large crocks with eggs stored in waterglass.
There was a memorable, fruitful cherry tree in the front yard, and crab apple and apple trees in the side yard. Over our back fence, one of the neighbors raised chickens and noisy roosters, and occasionally appeared there to decapitate one or two of the fowl, using a regular axe and a chopping-block.
Shortly before my third birthday, I acquired my first sibling, a sister who was no trouble as an infant. Her greatest cause of annoyance to me later was a fear of strangers, which prompted her to break out in tears, for which I seemed never to discover a remedy, and who, if embarrassed in public, could manage the most hostile facial expressions against those she blamed for leaving her in such predicaments.
Shortly before my fifth birthday, my mother had a second, sickly infant girl, and was for a time in poor condition herself.
Perhaps the most mischievous thing I did as a child was to use the garden hose one afternoon in an effort to hydraulically force the large mole population in our front yard out into the light of day. I did an excellent job, but my father was not pleased with the net result.
The troubles began with the first grade. Before being delivered to the School Street School—on School Street, not far from a lumberyard in which I later enjoyed playing (contrary to the rules), I was called into the dining room for one of the rare, solemn sessions of that sort in our household. I was instructed that I was a Friend, and that under no circumstances was I to engage in fights with other boys. I understood nothing of the significance of this, but I had a stout pride in my given word, and there began years of hell in school, largely on account of adhering to that injunction.
I suppose it did me some good. I was bound by the injunction never to strike another person—until I was well into the sixth grade. I learned to take the abuse, which was good, except that this itself became a challenge to those who speculated on exactly how much I would tolerate.
There was a second problem.
Rochester was not a particularly intellectual community. It was chiefly a farmer's center interfacing an industry which was chiefly shoe factories. In different ways both parents were intellectual . . . barring the explosions of rage my father emitted occasionally, especially when repairing his automobile.
Before I was nine, my father warned me, quite soundly, against the specific immorality of H. G. Wells's Mr. Britling Sees It Through, but generally kept me well supplied with books from his study library upstairs, supplementing my access to the principal hoard of reading material down in the parlor. I had begun to read at about five, beginning with puzzling through a period piece set of the times called the Book of Knowledge, and extending the seriousness and scope of this activity as I progressed through the first grade. My father subscribed to Travel, an illustrated magazine I especially enjoyed, and there were parts of the Sunday School Times, to which my mother subscribed, especially the "Little Jets," which I studied thoroughly each issue. Before we left Rochester, in 1932, I had exhausted the potentialities of the children's collection of the Rochester Public Library, and was foraging in adult fare.
Among my age-peers, I was caught between slow-speaking farm boys and quick, restive youngsters quick of speech and short of attention-span. I was dubbed "Big Head," and was a semi-outcast, the latter because I didn't fight and had different interests than either the farm boys or what passed locally for the city boys.
The third grade was particularly hellish. The teacher, for her own—undeciphered—reasons, chose to make me her special goat, and put me in the back of the class, where my myopia prevented me from seeing much of anything but blurs in the front of the room. The next year, the fourth grade teacher, a Miss Taylor, was a decent sort and a far better teacher. The teachers in the first, second, and fourth grades were as I recall quite tolerable.
I was by no means helpless before a sea of oppression. I was quite self-confident, unconquered, and learned how one's wits can be used. The worst part of the school situation was not the harassment, but the boredom.
About the time the second sister was born, the conflict between my mother and my father's mother not only became obvious to me, but was a focal point of intensified disturbances within the family order itself. It became worse after my grandfather, my father's father, died in 1931.
"Joe LaRouche," as I heard him referred to even more than twenty years after his death by those who had known him, was short, wiry, tough, witty, and both sly and brilliant. For me, he was fun in a'special way.
He was in his sixties when he died. I had driven down to visit him with my father that day. I had spent a few final minutes with my grandfather; I took his hand and he quietly blessed me. Then, we drove back to Rochester; by the time we returned my grandfather had died. My mother served my father grapefruit, a dish he particularly liked. He started to eat. "Jessie," he said to my mother, "I can't touch it. Everything tastes like my father's body," and then he went into the dining room and cried. I stood there, quietly crying, anguished that I did not know what to do for him.
After that, things in the family grew progressively worse. The hostility between my mother and grandmother deepened, with my father caught between, sometimes left with only rage. It grew worse.
The day, my father attended his father's funeral, the promotion he had been about to receive in the United Shoe Machinery Corporation went to another person. By the time my father returned to work from the funeral, the change was an accomplished fact. The depression was on, and the rules had changed. My father resigned from United Shoe that day.
A decade and a half later, as an expert witness for the Department of Justice against the United Shoe Machinery Corporation, he showed the Justice Department where some of the crucial sort of evidence was to be subpoenaed. He hadn't forgotten the day of his father's funeral. During the war, he had designed a device which undercut the moccasin-vamp stitching on United Shoe's Outsole Rapid Lockstitch machine (ORL), forcing the company to cut their royalties substantially. He hadn't forgotten. There, my father and I always differed; grudges were not my predilection. Probably, I would have resigned from United Shoe, as my father did, but I would not have carried a grudge.
The family moved to Lynn, Massachusetts after the school ended in Rochester that year—1932. My father, meanwhile, had bought up businesses in New Hampshire, basing himself in Manchester, New Hampshire. In those days, fifty-odd miles was more than a two-hour trip. He never drove above thirty-five miles an hour and often nearer thirty, in those days. To my knowledge, he has had only one minor scraping accident in the time I have known his driving.
Thus, he was home Friday evening late in the evening, and usually off again Sunday night or Monday morning. This continued until he went back to the shoe industry, as a technical consultant, five years later.
Except for my reading, adolescent life in Lynn, Massachusetts was chiefly bitterly boring and gray. It wasn't until 1938, when I began working in a shoe factory during summers, that the gray ugliness of personal life apart from books seemed in the process of coming to an end.
It is merely an apparent, false paradox that my studies in philosophy aggravated my distance from the schoolroom. The integrity of my mind, which had been my principal joy since the first grade, refused to bend to the dictate of any learning or learning-requirement unless the concept was reached for me by a process which agreed with the sort of rigor I associated with Descartes, Leibniz, and so forth. To swallow and regurgitate a point offered as learning on the basis of authority or faith I rejected like poison. In the Lynn public schools, the temper of the overwhelming majority of the students tolerated learning, but not the sort of concentrated attention-span I demanded as the condition for working through notions which carried evident epistemologi-cal flaws in the initial manner of their presentation.
The evolution of my views on this matter is fixed in date for my recollection by my first year in high school, which began, in that system, with what was called the sophomore year.
I had found myself in an impossible situation with a teacher in the eighth grade, which led to a battery of psychological and related tests, and then a transfer in mid-year to the ninth grade at a school on the other side of the city. That half-year had gone well, but somehow this prompted a manifest widespread resentment among students from the neighborhoods associated with the school from which I had transferred. The first year at high school, back among students from the old neighborhoods, was the worst harassment I had met up to the time: Black chick and white chicks.
Still, despite bitter resentment in the clinches of that situation, I was pleased that I carried no grudges away from the experience understood them.
The only relief I secured was from a history teacher who taught a better course than most of my teachers that year in any subject, and a Mr. Tom Whelan, the school gym teacher. Tom later turned against me in a way which would have been warranted had I been guilty of what he suspected, but I avoided the unsatisfactory remedy of informing him of the guilty party in the matter.
Tom's daughter had been in the eighth grade class from which I had been rescued by the promotion a year earlier. Tom approached me at the high school, expressing reserved but definite awareness of the circumstances I was suffering, confiding that his daughter had told him of the eighth-grade matters of particular relevance. He offered to help if I sensed a need to ask for his intervention.
I never exercised the option, but the fact that it had been given immensely improved the tolerability of those premises at the time.
The incident involving Tom Whelan's daughter in the eighth grade exemplified that general students' problem which I understood.
The teacher in question had passed out slips to the end that each student would thus have a designated classmate for which to buy a present for a Christmas event in the classroom. It was Christmas 1935, with the United States just rising above the depths of the Depression, and many of the families of students clinging to the edge of self-sufficient appearances of financial respectability. Some just didn't have it to spend.
One boy had asked me to participate in a three-way swapping of names, arguing that he didn't know what to buy for the person whose name he had been given. I saw no problem, and made the exchange. There was a three-way swap of papers involved. Came the day, one of the persons involved in the swap—and I am certain in full good faith at the time—had failed to produce the present. Hence, one of the students, Tom Whelan's daughter, was without. The teacher covered the omission with a hasty dispatching of a student with a mission to a nearby store.
In the midst of the celebration, the teacher broke in to announce the problem which had arisen, and then ordered me to stand up and tolerate a protracted string of her abusive monologue. The classmate who had not made the purchase remained silent. Could he report publicly that his parents had declined to provide him with the means to make a purchase? After the protracted abuse, her questions to me came. I stated the fact of my participation in the swap, and under pressure indicated for whom I had purchased a present.
Tom Whelan's daughter, innocently drawn into a prominent, if silent part in the business, later satisfied her own sense of justice by reporting the facts to her father, perhaps adding a few general remarks on the overall situation as background.
The teacher in that incident was generally oblivious to the reality of the circumstances of the students' households during that period. Some might call it cruel callousness. It was in effect; but it was also clear that the motivation was the particular teacher's effort, manifest on various points, to maintain her romantic delusions. She oozed the kind of self-consoling refusal to face reality which prompts a person who refuses to believe in a depression, to explain away factory-closings as products of individual bad management, case by case, and depression unemployment as case-by-case eruptions of shiftless-ness. There, in that 1935 classroom, in a city whose employment was substantially shut down, this particular teacher's whole bearing and sentimentalities of expression emphasized a secondary-school English teacher who had visited importantly relevant places in Europe, and who believed in keeping up appearances on all fronts no matter what the reality.
Through the thirties, and into the years of the war, it was commonplace for youth to identify their self-image with the employment or business their father had had before the Depression, or the status their family would have had but for the Depression.
Exemplary of the circumstances partly hidden behind the classroom surface was the bit of wide sidewalk before the big Huntt's Cafeteria in downtown Central Square. During the 1930s as one passed the restaurant there were often a few men, trying not to look down-at-the-heel and slowly poking a toothpick between their teeth. They were trying to create the impression that they might have just eaten inside. Real education, the development of the powers of mind, is future-oriented. During the 1930s in the sagging industrial city of Lynn, there was only the past and no future in sight but keeping up just the right front to stay one step ahead of one's fellows for whatever job was a nickel an hour more. Learn; get a grade; get better marks and maybe there's a clerical job.
In my own household, we managed to get by. Keeping father's business functioning was the priority. "Hold down the bills" was the watchword.
I remember one day. I was in the seventh grade, and regularly received a few coins to buy milk for lunch, I skipped the purchase whenever I decided I didn't have to buy milk that day, keeping the coins in a small hinged can. One morning, hearing my father speaking quietly downstairs to my mother: "I need money," referring to the need to step up his income for combined family and business expenses,
I hurried downstairs with my hinged can of saved coins, announcing, "I have money!" and opened the can, explaining the source of this accumulation. They cried softly, and then I cried too.
I was quite aware of money and the Depression, but I was not victimized by equation of personal status with money. My father's father had been prosperous, but also frugal. My mother's father had been a minister assigned to more poor than solvent parishes in Ohio. The important thing was the long Friends tradition. We were very religious—and we defined our sense of status in that way.
Apart from the general hellishness of that first year in high school, the principal issue for me that year was the poisonous influence of John Dewey on educational policy. I had read some Dewey and was enraged by his doctrines. I was quick to associate . with Dewey whatever learning my Leibnizian conscience refused to tolerate. I suspect I exaggerated the frequency of cases in which Dewey's influence was the causal agency, but I was on the right epis-temological track. Being both a Leibnizian and religious at the point, I defined Deweyism as a form of sneaky wickedness. I was not really wrong.
4 Quaker Youth
As I emphasized in the preceding chapter, I was not conscious of what it meant to be a person in the tradition of the Society of Friends—as distinct from Baptists or Congregationalists, for example—until after the family moved from Rochester, New Hampshire to Lynn, Massachusetts during late June 1932. Not long had I settled into the Silsbee Street Friends Meeting, before I discovered that a bitter issue divided that Meeting, with my parents included principals of one of those factions.
The issue was the American Friends Service Committee. The pivotal, practical issue was a trust fund which had been created for an East Lynn Friends Meeting, a Meeting which had been subsequently consolidated with the older, Silsbee Street Meeting. The trust fund had been created jointly by my mother's uncle, a prosperous shoe-box manufacturer in his day, and the parents of close friends of both of my parents. In the course of the merger, the fund had come under the administration of persons belonging to the pro-American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) faction within the Silsbee Street Meeting, and had essentially vanished over the 1929-1931 period—part of a pattern of events which brought the 1932 Meeting into reduced straits.
The general form of the issue, which this case exemplified, was the AFSC's drawing on the funds and sources of contributions of the Society of Friends for use by the AFSC, a secular organization with no accountability to the Society itself. The AFSC was defending its desired interest in the matter by proselytizing and factionalizing within the Society. The AFSC was associated in this respect with the substitution of a doctrine of social works for the Friends' faith and theology.
In my first acquaintance with the issues of the division, I found the issue of trust funds beyond my comprehension—perhaps something had happened, but was it still important in 1932 or 1933? The religious issue I recognized independently; although my views were not exactly those of my parents, I broadly concurred with them in defining the lines of division.
The religious issues became clearly defined for me in the course of my assimilation of Leibniz's influence. Where my parents tended to accommodate to Old Testament scriptural authorities, my Christianity became New Testament, Neoplatonic, "New Dispensation" in emphasis. As the factional issues and their correlatives made sorting out the Society of Friends' role in the world of deepened concern to me, I selected out of the spectrum of "authentic," past doctrines and policies those currents which best coincided with what I wished the Friends to be.
On condition that we take into account the way in which a doctrinal outlook is variously adapted to the dispositions and outlooks of its nominal supporters, one can select out of those variations a principal current as that which characterizes and principally shapes the body as a whole over certain extended periods. With the Society of Friends, that characteristic outlook is typified by William Penn and by the common ground between "orthodox" Friends and "Free Quakers" during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the distinction being between those who absolutely prohibited and those who accepted military service by Friends).
Penn was a leading member of the transatlantic Commonwealth Party forces, a function assumed by Penn's secretary, Logan, after him, and the principal feature of the patronage and collaborators Benjamin Franklin found in and around Philadelphia. These circles were closely associated in fact with networks of Commonwealth Party figures throughout the English-speaking colonies, and were closely allied with the networks of Mazarin, Colbert, and Leibniz throughout Europe, as well as with Commonwealth Party networks in England.
For the currents of the Society which directly intersected the Commonwealth Party, or concurred with it on all policies but military and certain other special questions, the kernel of the Society's faith was essentially Neoplatonic..The Society was essentially a religious-Utopian variation within the Neoplatonic Christian spectrum generally, the Friends' anti-Presbyterian, anti-Calvinist notions of the "Inner Light" a Logos doctrine, in the vein of the consubstantiality of the Trinity as that doctrine was understood among such figures as Plotinus.
The leading strata of Friends served as a collective elite, who were obliged to embody Reason, and through teaching and the manner and fruitfulness of . their work in secular life were obliged to mediate the uplifting of persons in the society around them. A Friend was presumed to be, typically, a prosperous, industrious, and technologically progressive farmer, an industrious entrepreneur in manufacturing, or an industrious, prosperous, and innovative figure of commerce. This mode of existence, whether as workman or entrepreneur, must serve Friends' purposes.
The social work performed by the Society, except in the course of specialized missionary work, was that of bringing others into the sort of fruitful, industrious way of life Friends accepted as proper secular practice, and to conjoin that assimilation with the religious correlatives. In other words, to the extent that Friends practiced what might be deemed "social work," this was a secular means to a religious end, not a simple matter of acts of charity.
In Lynn, the Silsbee Street Meeting had, in former times, engaged in housing projects on its lands, conjoining this contribution to the development of the community with an approach to assimilating the residents of those premises into Friends' ways and into Friends' life.
If not all "orthodox" Friends viewed this process in that specific way, as a derivative of Neoplatonic Christianity in the strict sense of that term, their views tended to that effect, and generally agreed with that direction in practice—whatever varied theological constructions were placed on the outlook and practice.
Admitting that the short-hand account I have given is only the central historical thrust of the Society of Friends in America, it is sufficiently representative of the spectrum of predominant eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Friends' views to serve our immediate purposes here—to underline summarily the "nature of the conflict between "orthodox" Friends and the American Friends Service Committee.
In effect, the AFSC substituted the asserted "good" of social-work practice in itself for a religious view. During the 1930s, the leading spokesmen for the Committee within the Society represented a secularized (anti-religious) "Quakerism," whose rationalized connection to "Quakerism" was an irration-alist's libertarian interpretation of the range of content of the "Inner Light."
The background to the establishment of the American Friends Service Committee is directly relevant to the point, and to the way my father's view of the Committee—in particular—had developed beginning the close of the First World War.
The British sponsorship of the International Red Cross during the nineteenth century had the leading included purpose of employing humanitarian activities as a most suitable cover for espionage and for various sorts of intelligence operations, including "social control" varieties. This was an old practice before the establishment of the Red Cross, and centers around the widespread Maltese Order practice as a Hospitaller agency. The patronage provided to Daniel Cohn-Bendit during the 1968 Paris riots, including Cohn-Bendit's "miraculous" escape from French police arrest, is exemplary of the widespread contemporary use of the Red Cross and other Hospitaller organizations for espionage and intelligence-operation deployments under cover.
The British intelligence services' use of pacifist "covers" prior to and during World War I led to the exploitation of related potentialities in and around those religious bodies which had a doctrinal prohibition against both war and military service by their members.
The creation of secular "service" organizations, independent of but closely associated with the Society of Friends and other antiwar sects, not only provided extended cover-potentialities for British-coordinated intelligence activities, but enhanced the color of credibility for those pacifist "covers" whose profession of special conscience was overtly secular. This extension of the program had the further advantage of passing some of the financial and related burdens of the intelligence operations to, the religious groups whose reputations were employed in this fashion.
The American Friends Service Committee was exemplary. Although a secular organization outside the Society of Friends, it was nominally constituted by persons otherwise members of the Society and associated itself with the Society by professing to be
the Society's de facto arm in social-work enterprises. Inevitably, it turned to the Society's own sources of funding for its financial support.
The name my father referred to in this connection, with special stress on the several occasions he mentioned the experience during the late 1920s and during the 1930s, was "Ben Gehrig." He identified his perception of the AFSC at the close of World War I with this person's pro-Bolshevik presentation in appealing for volunteers. My father drew the wrong particular conclusion from this and related experiences of that period, but that was merely a matter of giving the wrong specific attribution to a general condition which my father—and others like him—accurately perceived. The AFSC was serving as an intelligence cover ... as a study of the composition of the Swarthmore College faculty tends to corroborate rather prominently, and not only in the case of Frederick C. Pryor.
Apart from the religious issue, my complementary, secular antagonism to the AFSC and the Committee faction during the 1930s experiences was its "liberalism." I do not mean that I saw liberalism then in the broadly informed terms I view it now. Rather, I reacted against the same moral horror of empiricism which bitterly estranged me from most of my school classrooms.
At the time, my first year at high school, I confided to my history teacher that the school's pedagogy was corrupted by Dewey's influence. Dewey's pragmatism, which I profoundly hated, was identical in my view with the way in which AFSC factions within the Friends thought. The philistine shallowness, fragmented prejudices, and short concentration-spans which aroused enmity toward teachers and compassionate regret toward many age-peers, was the same hollowness which offended me among the pro-AFSC faction.
In such a social setting, I felt—and often acted— like a fish out of water. I wished to be someplace else, usually having a particular book or some private project in mind.
In general, my home life during the 1930s was increasingly unsatisfactory. Except for a very few close childhood friends, my social life—apart from religious activities—was a total failure: I was a fish out of water. Apart from social life and religious activities—including school, properly so, under "social life"—there was family life, and my private life. My private life was variously intellectual life, withdrawal to my room or some other isolated spot, or long walks through adjoining woods, walks focused on such projects as studying tadpoles in the spring or simply "exploring." My play life—as part of my social life generally—was usually poor, and frequently left me with a bad taste in my image of myself afterward.
During the 1930s, after 1932, my life was organized in a well-defined hierarchy. Top-down, these were private intellectual life, religious activities, school activities. Family life overlapped religious life and social life. For me, in most of the periods family life overlapped obligatory social life I was bored, miserable.
My two siblings, my younger sisters, rapidly developed a different hierarchical ordering. Apart from the fact that my parents raised them as girls, in a way which weakened their stamina for fighting in behalf of principles, I estimate that it was the bitterness of the situation in the Friends' Meeting which contributed the most to the reversed hierarchy they adopted. For them, especially the younger, a deep hatred developed not only against the religious side of family life, but against everything which, in her view, differentiated her school friends and their families from the distinguishing common features of my parents and myself. For both sisters, the younger most emphatically, the school-life peer group became the dominant point of reference for accepted values. Accordingly, a distance between me and my siblings developed and grew, with this issue and its reflections the principal feature. Except in respect to matters of individual personalities, I never noted either sister to show then any form of insight into the issues of the Friends' Meeting. To them it was a personal matter, and, predominantly, very unpleasant.
I acquired only two acquaintances who could be termed friends in grammar school. One later informed my mother of how one of these had come to like me as a friend. I recall the incident to which he referred—but only because he called my mother's attention to it, and she had asked me about the incident subsequently. It captures something of my social setting and self-setting during that and subsequent periods of my youth.
There had been a spate of snow-play during the course of which I noticed that one of my companions' hands were becoming uncomfortably chilled from the bare-handling of the snow. Almost automatically, I offered the temporary loan of my mittens. It was the sight of his hands which troubled me; otherwise, as a personal act it was a casual matter. It began a friendship among three of us, he, another boy, and myself.
Those were the only friendships meriting that name until late during my high school years. Intellectually I almost never "felt myself with persons of my age-group during childhood. I was much more at ease with adults. The few friends I acquired during high-school years I met across the chessboard. Some high-school acquaintances later became friends, but that was after we had all become adults.
It is not risking much of an exaggeration to report that I had a childhood, but never a youth.
I can scarcely complain of the ultimate results of that fact. In a sense, I had adult values, outlooks, and thoughts in intellectual life from the time I was twelve or so. If there was a painful aspect to the effect of this in my social life, that was chiefly a consequence of the fact that none of my age-peer-group was traveling a path approximate to mine at the time. My choice was preeminently the correct one.
The only legitimate regret I could have is to think how much better that choice would have been if more of my peers had made the same choice—or, if there had been a school suitable to be termed a modern extension of the principles of the schools developed by the Brothers of the Common Life.
Yet, that old twinge of regret arising to memory once again, I would have been less tough had I not been toughened by^that experience. By tough, I do not mean so much the ability to tolerate abuse, but the toughness not to adapt to the temptation of profferred corruption, in order to avoid or at least minimize difficulties incurred by more rigorous conscience.
I survived socially by making chiefly Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant my principal peers, looking at myself, my thoughts, my commitments to practice in terms of a kind of collectivity of them constructed in my own mind. Empiricism-pragmatism in school experience, anti-intellectual philistinism in more general social experience, and liberalism as I knew it from experience with the AFSC, were the same evils, to which one must make no compromise, which Descartes and Leibniz had fought directly, and which Kant had fought in respect to insisting on the principle of epistemological rigor.
There were three breaking-points which combined to end my youth. These were working, beginning summers at the age of sixteen, finding the university I attended so much a mere continuation of the social and epistemological horrors I had experienced in public schools, and my painful break with my father on military service.
There was a family scene on the latter between my father, my mother and I. I was adamant on volunteering. The war's outbreak had triggered an anger I had accumulated through my acquaintance with refugees coming from Germany and Austria. My father was close to tears at the thought of my breaking with his conscience. I recalled the tears the night his father had died. I bent—temporarily. Months later, having served his conscience, I presented my entry into military service as a fait accompli.
5 A Young Man Of the Age after Borah
In recent years, as my knowledge of Senator Borah has been refreshed and significantly amplified, I can situate the determining environment of my youth and young manhood from that standpoint of reference. It is not exaggerated to characterize the Senator as "the last American Whig." The increasing isolation of Borah, and the effects of that aggravated isolation upon his outlook and work, are an efficient exemplification of the most essential features of what happened to the United States and its maturing new citizens during the 1920s and 1930s.
All of us who were individually imbued with the world-outlook of dedication to generalized scientific and technological progress were unconscious Whigs by prevailing inclination of disposition. Yet, increasingly, especially with the onset of the Great Depression, the leading political institutions, and also the various, principal institutions within which circumstances our lives were immediately shaped, provided no significant accommodation for our organically Whiggish impulses. Liberalism ran amok. If liberalism was not the inherited character of the institutions as entities, liberalism was the erosive force which was in the process of changing those institutions.
The so-called conservative institutions were not generally exceptions to this erosive influence of liberalism. The older Henry Cabot Lodge's biography of Alexander Hamilton* illustrates the point. Hamilton's key writings and acts, most notably his 1791 Report on Manufactures, are not only directly opposite to every argument of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, but Hamilton's correspondence with Bris-sot and Federalist alliance to the Colbertiste circles of Turgot, Vergennes, et al. generally show us the source of the monetary and economic policies of dirigism which the founders of our nation represented, which the American Whigs represented, which Abraham Lincoln represented fully. Yet Lodge could blindly imply and state that Hamilton's knowledge of economics was significantly informed by The Wealth of Nations]
A bit further "right" than the Lodges, we find the ultra-conservative doctrine which defends Tory traitor Andrew Jackson's wrecking of the United States' credit, economic growth, and technological progress through attacks on Hamilton's "dirigist" policies. This continues as conservative dogma today through the influence of a foreign intelligence operation, the Mont Pelerin Society, a pro-feudal propaganda and intelligence institution founded in Switzerland during 1944-1947 for the chief purpose of subverting the United States. At its founding, the Mont Pelerin Society was dedicated to discrediting the conceptions
* Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., Alexander Hamilton, Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1909.
of Hamilton and Carey, as key obstacles to the feudal-Utopian ambitions for world rule by the European feudal-aristocratic families.
The case of Milton Friedman, a leading U.S. associate of the Mont Pelerin Society, is most usefully illustrative. Friedman dates the U.S. currents in economic and monetary thought concurring with his view from 1879. That date is extremely significant, and Friedman makes clear he understands that significance. The year 1879 represents the passage of the Specie Resumption Act, the measure which ruined the credit of the United States, and which placed the U.S. economy at the mercy of Morgan and Rothschild instruments of the City of London.
The Whig potentialities of the United States persisted in two principal, organic forms. Most generally, they were embedded in the widespread American dedication to scientific and technological progress, with emphasis on technological progress. This general identification with progress took a special, more developed form within the management of industries and certain aspects of the organized labor movement and within various professional and other associations. It also took an institutionalized form among our military professionals. From such influential institutions these Whiggish impulses were refracted into the political parties and government, and were more or less influential there. Herbert Hoover's 1928 election as "The Great Engineer" expresses that sort of influence's waning persistence, persisting despite post-1879 British subversion of our economy and post-McKinley subversion of our culture and our political institutions.
Outside hard-core Whiggish impulses within the industrial-management and other elites, there were virtually no institutions available to the ordinary, maturing citizen which were not dominated by either liberal erosion or the libertarian forms of conservative erosion.
The onset of the Great Depression aggravated the problem. The individual, generally had no prospect of realizing technological progress and its correlatives in terms of his daily life. The industries which employed persons during the 1930s depended chiefly on salvaging plant and equipment from pre-1931 investments. Employment involved a kind of salvaging of once-proud skills much in the same manner as old machinery and materials were salvaged from bankrupt firms and so forth for production. We lived in a "zero growth" culture, subsisting, in the net product of our nation, on the redistribution of a shrinking national pie.
A decade later, as the United States began mobilization for the war in 1940 and 1941, the directors of that effort found themselves confronted with depleted machinery, a generation which had lost the skill-potentials of the 1920s, a generation with a depleted outlook on life itself. •
Persons of my generation or slightly younger should be able to recall the asset-stripping processes unleashed in the wake of the 1957 recession. Viewing this process predominantly from a business vantage-point, I was able to observe closely the effects of this process on the outlook and judgments of industrial and other managements; I was sickened by the transformation.
Once-proud industrial firms, suffering principally from lack of modernization in machinery, product, and management practices, came into troubles under pressure of financial institutions allied to a growing population of "raiders." Instead of remedying the basic problem—low social-productivities linked to toleration of obsolescence—the problem itself was aggravated. Capacity was contracted, as asset-stripping provided cash flow to feed financial pyramids; bureaucracies even tended to grow as the number of operatives and grdss output slackened. But for the Kennedy administration's continuation of the NASA and related programs launched under Eisenhower, and the accelerated-depreciation tax-credits, one properly wonders what might have happened during the 1960s.
The policies of the asset-strippers and their Wall Street backers were literally fascist. Instead of remedying obsolescence in plant and machinery through fostering reinvestment of profits into modernization, the revenues generated through financing of circulation of product were diverted into distributed earnings or into feeding the debt-service side of a spiraling debt-equity ratio. If the distributed earnings had flowed significantly into creation of new equity-investment in plant and equipment, into fostering technological progress, the problem would have been less acute. Only government-subsidized aerospace programs and the investment tax-credit programs prevented the process from going more quickly to its logical consequences—collapse.
The slackening of expansion of employment of skilled operatives, itself a reflection of combined plant obsolescence and lack of adequate rates of productive investment, meant a reduced rate of demand for scientists and engineers outside the domain of government-fostered military and aerospace production. In the productive process, the requirement of scientists and engineers is approximately determined by two parameters: first, a ratio per 1,000 operatives; second, a growth of that ratio with technological progress. With relative stagnation in the secular, post-1953 rates of net capital formation in tangible output, and correlated stagnation trends in skilled and semiskilled operatives' employment, only the NASA and related projects, plus National Science Foundation, post-Sputnik programs, kept the rate of employment and training of scientists and engineers from collapsing prior to the post-1966 downward trends.
These shifting prospects respecting quality of employment affected the policies of public and higher institutions of learning, and the attitudes fostered among the young. The influence of the Hutchins-sponsored "Triple Revolution," post-industrial society theses,* and related neo-Fabian rhetoric feeding into the "New Left" and later environmentalist and terrorist recruitments, was fostered by the social conditions associated with especially the post-1957 secular trends in investment in tangible production capacity and output.
The combined experiences of the Great Depression
* The Triple Revolution, Fund for the Republic, 1964.
and postwar stagnation trends are the major, organic features of a moral decay in the quality of our population, and the basis for increased toleration of the decay of our leading institutions. Taking the two summarized developments together in the same overview increases the effectiveness of our insight into each, and into the cumulative, combined effects of both.
These are the general conditions I confronted during youth and young manhood. Armed principally with the conscience I had developed with aid of Leibniz and Kant during my early adolescence, I set forth to find a way to bring the world into agreement with my organically Whig outlook. At first, and properly so, I sought to discover the names and addresses of whatever institutions and persons represented the forces with which I should associate myself. Later, after the developments of my work through 1957-1961, I sought the addresses of those who could be gathered around my leading role.
The Determining Process
This process was not governed by ambition at any point. I have been predominantly shamelessly unambitious throughout my life. This was remarked on frequently, by various observers, throughout my life to date. However, I have been generally hubristic, which sometimes produces effects which may superficially resemble those produced by motives of ambition. The two motives are not only distinct, but opposite in character, and lead overall to different patterns of results. The hubristic person is governed by the determination to contribute to the shaping of the world's development, and hence to acquire and use the sort of power and influence required for that purpose. The emphasis is on producing the desired result in the ordering of affairs and institutions to a predetermined, unchanging purpose.
For example, among my personal adversaries, Henry A. Kissinger is pathologically ambitious, whereas Kissinger's one-time mentor, Fritz Kraemer, was relatively hubristic in an oligarchist's way. To Kraemer, Kissinger or Schlesinger was merely a tool, an instrument to oligarchist ends. Kraemer used such persons', such tools' wholly immoral ambition to effect the desired results, and carefully selected his tools, such as Kissinger or Schlesinger, on the basis of their personal intellectual and moral inadequacies, inadequacies which make such ambitious persons the captives of those who command the policy-making capabilities the tools have no ability to produce within themselves.
The same principles used by Kraemer in selecting Kissinger and Schlesinger as his personal puppets are seen in the selection of U.S. Presidents by the Anglophile faction. Their preferred choice is a marketable figure, whose ambition can be cultivated, but who is so deficient in personal intellectual competencies and knowledge that the President so selected must depend upon coteries of "advisors," who will— it is hoped—effectively control U.S. government policies and actions through that susceptible tool. Truman, Ford, and Carter exemplify such nominees, as does Nixon with significant qualifications. John F. Kennedy essentially fitted the same model; Edward Kennedy is the perfect puppet for British intelligence. Strength of ambition, especially stubborn service to ambition, is the quality the British prize in a U.S. President; strength of powers of judgment, breadth and depth of knowledge, are the qualities the British profoundly abhor in the same office.
The proper capabilities of ruling are the qualities of hubris, not ambition. Show me an ambitious man, and I will thus show you a weak intellect.
I was hubristic because I had no tolerable choice but to be so.
The point is crucial, not only to this autobiographical dissertation, but to understanding all of human history.
The scientific and technological discoveries contributed to human progress are each the products of an individual person's creative-mental processes. Those processes, the possibility of each discovery, depend upon a definite development and informing of the individual's mental development. However, although it is society which creates the individual who discovers, it is the individual who effects the discovery. It is also individuals who assimilate and transmit discoveries. It is individuals who assimilate the benefits of those discoveries into productive and other forms of social practice. In each case along that chain, participation calls upon a definite quality of maturation of individual creative-mental processes. Without an appropriate development of creative-mental processes the student cannot comprehend a discovery contributed by a discoverer. In each case, society produces—or fails to produce—the required quality of individual development. It is the individual who embodies society at each micro-instant of the process, and who is society in practice in the mediation of that process of progress on which society as a whole depends.
This is the meaning of individual freedom. Any other view of freedom as a policy conception is empty or absurd. It is the development of creative-mental powers appropriate to the individual advancement of general progress in scientific and technological power by society, which is the first phase of freedom. Without that development it is fraudulent to speak of freedom. The full cycle of freedom is completed by enabling the realization of the fruits of individual creative-mental development. It is this freedom, embodied in and expressed through individuals, which is the driving force of human-species existence.
Accordingly, truth is directly contrary to those popularized, absurd prejudices which make a qualitative distinction between the public and personal life of the individual. Unfortunately, the distinction is not merely an ignorant prejudice, but a wretched opinion which has been translated into belief and practice in most of our society.
There is a school of opinion which argues that evidence of a predominant practice proves the agreement between such a practice and "human nature." If that argument is consistently extended, it would have to be argued that in a population predominantly afflicted with cholera, syphilis or pneumonic plague, those conditions, too, must be expressive of the, requirements of "human nature." The mere fact that most men and women are alienated, that the public and private segments of their lives are qualitatively distinct, is scarcely evidence that such a dichotomy has any basis in requirements of human nature. It is, rather, evidence of that awful persistence of a disorder, a social disease.
In an individual, like myself, who has risen to significant influence in contributing to the shaping of world affairs, an individual who attracts the special, extensive, malignant attention of the world's most powerful forces for evil, no sensible account of the individual's development can be obtained from the effort to locate the process of his or her development in acts peculiar to only a public, as distinct from personal, side of his character. In fact, the same principles properly apply to every individual life's outcome. The facts concerning an ordinary sort of subject for case-study must tend, indeed, to be defined and organized in such a fashion as to indicate a somewhat contrary set of criteria. That is granted, even emphasized. To account for the outcome, one must dig underneath the appearances, and show how the illusions concerning distinctions between public and private life have in fact impaired his competence to order effectively either facet of his existence. In general, with most persons, either their so-called personal life ruins their public life, or their public life ruins their so-called personal life.
This is no formal generalization, no "ivory-tower" construction. I have reason to weep for each case of a personal acquaintance I have seen ruined in just that indicated way. Show me a person in public life who is ruled by ambition, rather than hubris, and I will thus show you a person whose personal life is either ruined or on the verge of ruin. Show me a person in public life whose public life is strongly influenced by pressures of "family life," and I will show you a person incompetent to conduct public affairs. Only where there is no distinction between the governing purpose and outlook of both facets can there be true competence and joy in either.
All my life, I have sustained an unusual "work drive" because what I desired to accomplish in public facets of my life was the meaning of my personal life, and 1 have achieved joy in my personal life because every contribution in public life contributes directly to giving meaning to each facet of the more intimate, personal facets of my life. I would not tolerate in my public life a purpose inconsistent with the purpose of my life as a whole, and would not tolerate a compartmentalized aspect of personal life at difference in outlook and purpose with those which shaped my public life.
The mind of the healthy individual, the individual sense of identity, is an indivisible whole. The informing and criteria of judgment, the methods of judgment, the purposes of judgment, are properly the same in every aspect of individual life. Your preferences in poetry, music, and so forth are your political character, your character as a corporate executive, your character as a trade-union official, a scientific worker, and so forth. Any attempt to separate any of the elements of judgment from others produces a kind of schizophrenia. Under such, latter conditions, the coherence of the mind is shattered in much the same way as if the motion picture image were interrupted in mid-drama to substitute the image produced by a turning kaleidoscope for the remainder of the presentation.
Thought, judgment, conception, and perception, are formed under the governance of a personal sense of identity. Respecting minds similarly informed, the failure of the one to match the problem-solving capabilities of the other is a lawful problem located in the difference of the controlling sense of identity between the two. Clinically, the case of the failure shows us the sense of identity "losing energy" as a certain aspect of reflection is approached; the mind retreats thus from those "areas" of reflection into areas in which the flow of "energy" from the sense of identity is sustained. Where either crucial areas of reflection for problem solving are blocked off this way, or where the ability to accept the "credibility" of a preconscious insight is similarly blocked off, the relatively sterile personality is defined.
The attempt to divide one's categories of judgment into public and personal sectors, to accept contradictory criteria for each, cripples the creative potentialities of mind in what may be loosely described as a "schizophrenic" way. Clinical schizophrenia is essentially a more extreme expression of this problem.
To bear in on the crucial expression of the problem for the case in point here, if, in school, a student assimilates as knowledge something he or she is instructed to learn, without competently deriving through his or her own thought-processes a synthesis of that concept as a process experienced and verified, then the process of learning continued in contrary ways produces a damage to the conceptual powers of the student. "Drill and grill" in public schools represents one of the more effective ways of destroying the minds of students. The optimal result of such a process is a person who has learned much, and carries a Ph.D. to prove this, but who is incapable of coherent problem-solving thought.
Nonetheless, the critic insists, and rightly so, that the Dewey program, as its worst potential features are exemplified in the doctrines of Ivan Illich, by failing to "oppress" the student into overcoming an infantile set of criteria and methods for thought-formation, also produces lasting impairment of mental powers. The point is: the students' criteria and methods of judgment must be progressively altered through the mediation of informing their minds with facts, experimental facts, and concepts. If the mediation is made an end in itself, without regard to the process it ought to mediate, then we have the mind-destructive drill-and-grill effects. The point of education is not merely to change the opinions of children, but to change their cognitive processes—the criteria and methods of conception formation, of deliberate insight, in a coherent, progressive way.
Through my own philosophical and related studies, coming to a conditional conclusion with a two-year focus on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I developed a set of criteria and methods of judgment
which were superior to those of my teachers and those embodied in the textbooks and so forth to which I was exposed in the processes of education. These criteria and methods I viewed, correctly, as a coherent unity, and as authoritative for any topical area of inquiry. These were accepted as integral to my sense of personal identity, and I considered myself absolutely obliged to be governed by them in every aspect of life, whether that was termed "public" or "personal." Correspondingly, I rejected the assimilation of knowledge except as that assimilation conformed to those criteria and methods. Until I could reproduce a conception by those means, I rejected acceptance of that conception.
To anyone who is familiar with Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, an additional implication of this method is clearly known. The method is not absolutely fixed, nor indifferent to crucial facts which might require its alteration. On the contrary, that provision is the essential feature of the method. It is not a method comparable to the deductive method; it is not a correlative of a fixed set of principles of knowledge. It is a method for transforming criteria and methods, according to definite criteria and methods for accomplishing this. My crucial accomplishments in revolutionizing economics exemplify this.
During the postwar period, I was strongly touched by the Schubert Wanderer, seeking a land which speaks my language. So was my orientation to education and related experiences ordered, especially from my thirteenth and fourteenth years. I sought out educators, writers, and conversational acquaintances who either thought as I did, <fr who seemed to me in reach of being influenced to think as I did: to think as students of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant think.
My hostility to "speed-reading" is associated with this same principle. The point is not how long a time is required to scan a sentence or paragraph visually. The point is how long ought one to think about each concept presented before continuing to the next? "Speed-reading" ought not to be employed for any thing worth reading in the first place. Such a practice must inevitably severely impair the conceptual powers of the mind. The argument that speed-reading does not effect a loss of comprehension of what is read is potentially dangerous nonsense™The school which awards better marks to speed-readers is a school which is educating and testing incompetently. I use speed-reading only for scanning to identify content, for sorting out what requires or merits my reading.
The Education of a Promethean
It is for related reasons that any curriculum vitae of my life has the effect of fallacy of composition to the usual sorts of readers of such documents. The points at which my life intersected with the kinds of institutionalized arrangements usually the principal features of such a listing were either of little direct importance to my development, or affected my development in a manner rather opposite to what identification of the association would ordinarily imply.
Although I have profoundly respected Goethe's extraordinary skill in poetic composition, one poem of Goethe's which touched me'with more than a special sense of admiring amusement was his Prometheus. Making men in my own image was the conscious articulation of my central purpose from approximately 1946. First, one must become adequately qualified to accomplish that purpose. That task, especially as I saw the methodological hopelessness of existing institutions known to me, prescribed assimilating and developing a body of knowledge adequate to the undertaking to come. In the immediate postwar period, I set myself the goal of acquiring the necessary degree of adequacy between my thirty-third and thirty-fifth birthdays.
The result of that approach was the National Caucus of Labor Committees. What was contributed to that organization by me was not, of course, an encyclopedic outline of knowledge in general, but rather two subjects configured in such a way as to represent the kernel and model for an organized assimilation and reformulation of important larger areas of knowledge. The accomplishments of the 1966-1973 period did not begin to come into general public significance until 1974's developments, and were not manifestly significant in global policy-influencing processes until the developments of 1975. Although the organization was further developed in a most significant degree after 1973, it was developed as an organization of Promethean qualities during the 1966-1973 period. That was the organization's youth; what followed was the matriculated organization, the same entity in its matured form, reflecting its earlier, youthful development in its growing potency in the world as a whole.
The emergence of that organization, the creation and qualitative potency of the U.S. Labor Party, is the key to what must replace a curriculum vitae for my case. Anything which contradicts the reality of what the U.S. Labor Party is is clearly an error of judgment, a judgment premised on fallacy of composition.
In a related way, what must be accounted for is the process by which I became the leading political economist of the twentieth century to date.
To define the continuing thread to be followed one must begin essentially with my assimilation of the outlook and method of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant during the interval of my twelfth through sixteenth years, and then trace the elaboration of that commitment into the several discoveries rounded out by 1953. The process then continues into the crucial further developments along the line of that thread in 1960-1961. It then continues into the point I gave the first of my lecture-series presentations during the spring of 1966. The textbook, Dialectical Economics, whose final revisions were completed during the winter and spring of 1973, embodies the contents of the lecture-series and completes a full-cycle in my postwar life, and in the development of the Labor Committees. During 1973, the U.S. Labor Party was born. Shortly after that, the U.S. Labor Party and its collaborators were rather abruptly thrust into the main currents of national and world events. In the
post-1974 period, it is the interrelationship among myself, the matured organization, and the world into -which we were thrust, which determined the rest. I had found the land which speaks my language.
The Effect of the War
World War II had two principal effects upon me, effects similar to those it had on a large proportion of all returning veterans. First, after a prolonged depression, the United States had mobilized for war with prodigious rates of output. The implied lesson was: Could we have not accomplished the same economic growth at will during any point during the Depression? Second, being involved in pulling the rest of the world out of a war we had not caused convinced us of the obligation and right of the United States to intervene in shaping the history of the world generally—rather than waiting for a new, more devastating war to be imposed upon our nation at some later time.
The location in which these facts struck me was the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater. After being withdrawn, by stages, from Mitkynia in Burma, I plunged into Indian political circles—both Anglo-Indian and nationalist independence circles—to determine for myself what U.S. policy toward India should be. Exemplary of that experience was an Indian coolie I encountered on the Calcutta Maidan, asking me if the Americans would send India textile machinery so that the nation could have its own industries.
I did not know that my policy for a U.S. role in what we now term "the developing sector" had been President Roosevelt's, in his quarrel with the evil Winston Churchill, but it was my policy. I was already coming to dislike and distrust Harry S. Truman as a shallow-minded bungler and general incompetent—as subsequent events confirmed.
Into early 1947, I nurtured that view of proper U.S. policy as a credible hope, and aimed my personal development toward contributing to such objectives. In motivating a proposal for an international fostering of nuclear energy as an alternative to the Baruch Plan, during early 1947, I added the motivating argument that such programs were the only means for the adequate development of nations such as India. On that occasion as a student at Northeastern University, my proposal, developed largely through information supplied respecting feasibility by Victor Weisskopf, drew sustained applause from the audience—and some unpleasant harassments from certain faculty and other sources favoring the Baruch Plan.
Later that same year, disgusted with the methodological incompetence of most of my courses, and the general philistinism accompanying them, I departed Northeastern to take a consulting assignment.
Before I left, I outlined my views—I thought quite politely—to the Dean of Students. I spoke of educational policy, matters of method. He turned to his bookshelves in his office, observing that he knew only his field, English literature, and concluded our interview with some polite references to one of his classes in which I had participated earlier. I was more blunt at the meeting during which I presented-my resignation, this being my last opportunity to inform the relevant persons of the destructive practices requiring remedy.
Naturally, I assume a large discrepancy between my role in the situation: that of rebuking them for mismanagement, proposing the consideration of adequate remedies, and their view: of participating merely in an unpleasant proceeding. I have occasionally looked back on that incident with a special sort of amusement. Relevant chapters of Rabelais suggested to me comparable situations. A dialogue of the deaf, perhaps.
During the same year, I wrote to Dwight Eisenhower at Columbia University, urging him to seek nomination for the presidency. I argued the case, referring, although not by name, to the unfortunate, petty, bungling incumbent, and to the lack of adequate leadership of the nation and its visible dangers. He, generously, sent a brief reply, accepting my points as "nonarguable," but informing me generally that other considerations were also involved.
During that year and into the next, the moral quality of the nation and much of its population went downward. The United States of mid-1948 was morally not equal to the same nation of 1946.
We ought to be able to recall the highlights of that period.
By adopting the Bretton Woods agreements, the United States had committed the essential errors of Versailles in a new form. Granted, we did not go so far with "war reparations" as Versailles had gone. We committed every other principled blunder all over again. We rejected the specific proposals of John Maynard Keynes, but we stuck with the Warburg monetarist line.
This folly ruined our management of the war-debt accumulation—which should have been handled as Alexander Hamilton would have handled it. Instead, with collapsed world-trade volumes, scantily nourished by some U.S. subsidies, our Federal Reserve System attempted to sit upon a postwar monetary inflation which, under existing policies, threatened to erupt into an inflationary explosion. Under 1947-1948 policies—Truman government and Federal Reserve—a nasty mood developed within the frustrated population. Truman, during his 1948 campaign, neatly blamed the whole mess on the Republicans of the preceding Congress. The Republicans, swallowing a British monetary line of "fiscal and monetary conservatism," and imagining that the problem could be solved by curbing unions and holding down wages, did deserve every denunciation Truman threw their way. The majority of voters agreed, and Truman was elected. However, Truman was to blame for creating the conditions to which the Republicans and others of that Congress foolishly responded.
The economy was in a "Truman recession" from which it recovered only through government spending in build-up for NATO and the Korean War.
This demoralized the veterans. They had spent the war aiming to return to a depression-free U.S. and proceed to raise families. The failure of the Truman
administration into 1948, the emergence of the Cold War, combined to introduce an epidemic of "every man for himself," each grasping and clutching for some semblance in reality for the dream of which he had been deprived.
Some further elements of background of the period are significant at this point, not because I was directly aware of them at that time, but because they determined the environment which, in turn, affected me.
The breaking-point for me, vis-a-vis Truman administration policy, was Truman's support for the Baruch Plan. From my view, at that time, the policy was absurd, and clearly counterproductive. I thought we should have been exporting as a substitute for the military expenditures of the war, and without nuclear-energy production in India I saw no way of delivering adequate new sources of industrial energy to sustain capital exports there on the scale required.
I did not know, nor would I have adequately understood had I known, the absurd, British-inserted doctrine which was governing both U.S. military-strategic policy and related aspects of foreign policy. The British argument, as reflected in Bertrand Russell's proposal for "preventive nuclear war" against the Soviet Union, was based on the assumption that a decade or more would be required for the Soviets to develop an operational fission, weapon. In line with continuing British geopolitical policy of conquering the Eurasian "heartland," Churchill et al. were determined to get the United States into a war with the war-weakened Soviet Union as quickly as U.S. internal moods could be altered to that end.
The British argument was patently absurd. In retrospective assessment of the information generally available to responsible U.S. sources during that period, we ought not to have been astonished by Soviet development of a fission weapon during the immediate postwar period, nor of the subsequent development of an operational H-bomb prior to U.S. development of such a weapon. In fact, the Soviet scientists had priority over the United States and Britain in launching relevant basic research. By the mere fact of exploding a fission weapon at Hiroshima, we had given away all of the essential secrets of the A-bomb to any nation, such as the Soviet Union, qualified to understand the significance of that explosion. They did not need to repeat the inquiry into the feasibility of such a weapon, as we had done during the war at the outset of our own programs. The lead following from the key Joliot-Curie experiment of the 1930s was crucial.
The mere fact of exploding the uranium bomb over Hiroshima represented sufficient information to enable Soviet scientists to bypass entire phases of U.S. work in developing their own weapon. Their subsequent priority in developing an operational H-bomb eliminated any competent speculation to the effect that the Soviets had in any way depended upon "stealing secrets" from the United States I did not know, as I have said, the contents of the assumptions influencing Truman's strategic policies and related foreign policies. However, I experienced the foolish Baruch Plan, the "preventive war" lunacy, and other derivatives of British arguments and assumptions. I also observed, at close quarters, the way in which the environment of the Cold War effected changes in my peer-group. Truman's policies were destroying the morality of the United States.
During the war, and even during 1946, I observed my age-peers and others shifting toward the world-outlook I found agreeable. After 1946, approximately from the time of the pushing of the Baruch Plan, the shift was reversed.
Prior to the war, I had been emphatically pro-Republican. The first postwar Congress's naked imbecilities had finished for the time my hope for much good for the Republicans. In 1947, a Democratic Eisenhower presidency appeared to me the only credible way out for the nation. I found dissident Henry Wallace brilliantly to the point in his open break with Truman, but the Wallaceite Progressive Party I found contemptible—liberalism run amok. Truman and Trumanism I despised both by its practice and by its political smell: it was bungling, petty philistin-ism afoot.
All of this intersected my experience with institutions generally. In general, everything good in U.S. people as I knew them was something expressed chiefly in private conversations. In such circumstances they consciously expressed their determination to follow a public course of action they believed to be corrupt but demanded in service of expediency. The problem of the people was determined through a problem of the institutions which controlled the policies of public association. In private opinion, people tended to be good; in popular opinion, they were becoming increasingly like a pack of immoral rats.
To those of you who are my own generation, or whose age is in that general vicinity, I am speaking directly of you. Either I knew you, or someone like you, or you were part of a group which went through a similar pattern of shifting conduct during that period. Most of you did precisely what I have summarily described, and for the reasons I have given.
By the middle of 1948, especially in the last phases of the 1948 election campaign, I was thinking in terms of new institutions, and especially small and obscure ones which might contain a handful of exceptional persons, in collaboration with which one might begin to rebuild.
So, at the close of 1948, I decided to join the Socialist Workers Party. I was not impressed with the members I knew; they were intellectually mediocre. One had to begin somewhere.
Most readers can almost be heard saying: "You shouldn't have done that!" Their reasons will vary, but most will concur with that statement at first thought.
If the reader means that the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was a hoax, that is a valid observation. If the reader means that the entire U.S. "left" of the 1930s and 1940s was also a hoax—at least with respect to the organizations, if scarcely all the persons involved—then that, too, is a valid observation. If the reader equates the SWP of 1949 with that of the post-1958 period, or the post-1963 period, then he or she is mistaken on that particular point. If the reader suggests that I should have left the SWP permanently in 1955, an interesting and fruitful argument of that point could be made; I possessed conclusive evidence of its moral character—or want thereof—at that juncture. If the reader deduces from these or similar arguments that I should not have joined in the first place, he or she is wrong.
First of all, I gained invaluable knowledge and other competencies which most political figures have never mastered. I learned not so much from the U.S. "left," but from the effects produced within me by my encounter with that stratum. Furthermore, this knowledge contributes in an important way to giving me specific, essential competencies for defining U.S. foreign and domestic policies which are unapproached in any leading U.S. political figure of whom I have knowledge.
Secondly, the fact that the 1948-1949 SWP was a tiny, pariah organization during the onset of the British intelligence operation known as Senator Joe McCarthy is of no weight whatsoever in any attempted criticism of my decision in the matter. Arguments against small, "irrelevant" organizations per se are adequate proof in themselves that the critic is ignorant of the ABCs of the political process.
Thirdly, it should be understood that I was never a "Marxist socialist" in the sense that U.S. socialist groups of the present century are viewed, nor in the sense that professed American socialists have viewed that term. What the SWP assumed itself to be, and what I thought its dedications ought to make it become, were irreconcilable opposites in fact from the beginning of my association, and this difference became increasingly clear to me from an early point.
To deal with this important aspect of my young manhood, I preface the summary account of that experience with two general, categorical observations. These I present as the matter involved is known to me today. That is not quite the same as I viewed the matter in 1948-1949, or even into the early 1960s. However, it is more efficient to state the matter correctly first, and then to compare my view at critical points with the correct view later developed.
The first of the two categorical points, Marx and Marxism, I subdivide into two sections, the first dealing with Karl Marx, and the second with Marxism. The second categorical point to be made, in the next chapter, following my summary of Marx and Marxism, focuses on the ABCs of political organization.
Karl Marx On Balance
Karl Marx, in this respect somewhat like myself, was a well-developed thinker by the time he completed secondary school in Trier. An 1835 essay, written on assignment for the school director, Johann Hugo Wyttenbach, is adequately indicative evidence of this point. An essay written later by Wyttenbach adds to our insight into the content of Marx's secondary-school education. Wyttenbach correctly reported the principles of the Brothers of the Common Life in defining an effective educational policy. It is not irrelevant to the same point that Wyttenbach had been appointed to head the school during the 1790s, when he was elected as the teacher best qualified to represent jointly the achievements and outlooks of Benjamin Franklin and Immanuel Kant. Wyttenbach was an accomplished intellectual figure of the same specific pedigree as such approximate contemporaries as Schiller and Beethoven.
The unfortunate feature of Marx's development is his strong taint of Anglophilism. This is reflected in his wretchedly false arguments against Henry C. Carey on American history—of which Marx was worse than ignorant. It is reflected in his incompetent view of the French Revolution. It is reflected in his critical respect for Adam Smith and praise for David Ricardo. It is reflected in his opposite-to-correct views on every principal aspect of European history up to 1830.
To assess Marx's intellectual powers as an adult, it is no exaggeration to say that his mental development was considerably inferior to my own, or certainly that of Leibniz. His 1845 "Theses on Feuer-bach" and the "Feuerbach" section of The German Ideology do represent one of the greatest advances in human thought during the nineteenth century, and aspects of those particular discoveries were elaborated in part more adequately in sections of Marx's later writings. Relative to Friedrich Engels, and to all those other personalities with which he is usually directly compared among his contemporaries, Marx justly appears a giant. Furthermore, if the vicious blunders flawing his Capital are taken into account, his work in those volumes does represent an invaluable contribution to human knowledge, in clearing away whole masses of rubbish associated with the British school of political economy, and in reformulating the key features of economic processes in such a way as to provide the starting-point for an actual economic science.
The foregoing assessment of Marx cannot be competently discounted as merely an estimate or opinion on any point. It would be nonsensical to suggest that these statements are, in any part, less than competently established matters of fact.
To term the writer today a "Marxian economist" would be a pathetic absurdity if that term were applied to imply that the writer's economic-science practice is governed by Capital. Relative to the writer's economic science, Capital is a fundamentally flawed historical curiosity. To say that the writer constructed an economic science through correcting Marx's crucial blunders is an accurate, if somewhat an oversimplified view of the matter. If one says that the writer rescued the economic categories of the real (i.e., nonmonetary) economy from the domain, of simultaneous linear equations Marx outlines, and altered those terms to place them in a relativistic physical geometry qualitatively different from Marx's, that is a fairly precise characterization. If one means that this writer, in that fashion, gave competence to a Marxian economics which was incompetent in its preexisting form, then, in that sense, the writer might be usefully regarded as the direct supersessor of Marx in political economy, and in that specific sense a "Marxian economist." This choice of label would also be appropriate insofar as it can be argued that this writer realized the intent of Marx's effort—as Marx underlines his intent in outlining his conception of "Freedom and Necessity" toward the close of Volume III of Capital.
Marx's relevant errors are chiefly as follows.
In philosophical method and outlook, Marx was essentially a Neoplatonic. However, not only did Marx exaggerate the stature of G.W.F. Hegel relative to Hegel's chronological predecessors in philosophy, but he defined the progress of European philosophical thought according to the fraudulent English mythology. He was directly opposite to reality in his appreciation of the historical significance and content of the work of Francis Bacon. That latter blunder reveals Marx's ignorance of European history up to 1830, including the history of European scientific thought.
Marx was credulous to the point of being fanatic in swallowing and regurgitating the English falsification of the history of development of political economy, and based the incompetent side of his analysis of capitalist economy and society as a whole on just that obsessive blunder.
Marx was wrong in regarding the British economy of the early nineteenth century as a reflection of the highest point of advancement of capitalist development. On this point, Henry C. Carey is fully correct, and Karl Marx entirely wrong.
Marx's understanding of the political process was crippled by his efforts to justify the British/Madame de Stael/Lamartine hoax respecting the character of the Jacobin faction and Thermidor in the French Revolution. Marx focused on the crippling flaws of the Jacobin faction, rather than recognizing the essentially "fascist," reactionary character of the Jacobins vis-a-vis the associates of Lafayette, Paine, and the authors of Thermidor.
Marx's worst flaws, as we have identified them so far, flow from his Anglophilic delusions concerning history. His accomplishments, apart from those represented first in the "Theses on Feuerbach" and the "Feuerbach" section of The German Ideology, lie in his analysis of economic doctrines and political phenomena as they represented realities currently before him. Although his critical praise for Adam Smith and David Ricardo as his so-to-speak predecessors is nonsensical in fact, what he accomplished in replacing Smith and Ricardo's nonsense represents, as far as he succeeds, a genuine and profound achievement in economic science's development. Although his view of preceding European (and American) political history is largely absurd, his analysis of current political and related processes is profound, even sometimes masterful, and largely accurate.
There are two principal, devastating flaws in his own economic doctrines as such. The first, relative to the real economic process (as distinct from the monetary process), is exemplified by the dead-end quality of the collection of fragments which his editor, Engels, combined to form the last chapter of Volume II of Capital. The second reflects chiefly his refusal to recognize the combined "feudal" and capitalist composition of the British economy. Thus, he assumed that the monetary processes of Britain were the normal monetary processes appropriate to an industrial-capitalist economy.
On the first point, the error is contrary to Marx's intention. The source of the flaw is Marx's inability to solve the problem according to his stated intent, an inability flowing from his inability to break free of the effort to derive a model of extended reproduction under conditions of technological progress from modifications of a linear model for simple reproduction. That this was the nature of Marx's error on this point was recognized, up to a certain limit, by Rosa Luxemburg in her Accumulation of Capital and Anti-Kritik.
The crucial, intermediary point to be considered in assessing Marx's erroneous views of monetary processes, is the way he applied his otherwise correct insight into the "falling rate of profit" to the special case of a mixed "feudal"-capitalist economy, the British economy. In locating a contradiction between constant prices of capital accumulations and extended reproduction under conditions of technological progress, he went too far in assuming also that the cyclical monetary phenomena of the British economy were fully explained by the way in which the "falling rate of profit" occurs in a capitalist economy maintaining constant historical valuations for past investments. In short, he confused the way the British economy would have functioned had it actually been an industrial-capitalist economy, and the way it actually functioned as a mixed "feudal"-capitalist economy.
To make the point clearer, the following explanatory point is added. The devaluation of the real value of past investments is nothing but a current cost of production in fact. An adequate rate of accelerated depreciation and amortization properly reflects that sort of cost. This added element of cost requires that the rate of growth of gross profits (over current direct costs) provides adequate rates of growth in profit-ratios both to cover such elements of indirect cost and also maintain a secularly rising rate of profit. If technological progress occurs, but at rates less than the required rate, the effect of slower technological progress is to tend to cause a reduction in the rate of profit, even though per capita rates of absolute amounts of profit rise. In other words, under proper rates of technological progress and high rates of conversion of profits into new produc-Mive investment, an industrial-capitalist economy solves the "falling rate" problem in the same manner I outline for the case of socialist economy in my textbook Dialectical Economics.
The same sort of problem becomes categorically insoluble for a rentier form of economy, such as the British model. In other words, a shift of power from the equity of the productive industrial-capitalist and progressive farmer to the parasitical, oligarchist financier-rentier is the essential cause of the insolubility of the problem Marx attributes to capitalism as such.
In American history, the Panic of 1837 was the outgrowth of Andrew Jackson's destruction of the Second National Bank, placing the control of credit in the hands of the New York financier-rentiers. The post-Civil War monetary crises (economic cycles) were caused by the failure to continue Lincoln's credit policies, and placing U.S. credit increasingly in the hands of New York-centered financier-rentier interests allied with the City of London. The monetary crises of later periods were ensured by the Specie Resumption Act of 1879, which placed U.S. credit under the control of Barings, Rothschild, Morgan, et al., just as the Great Depression was the result of establishing the Federal Reserve System (instead of a new National Bank) and U.S. agreement to the Versailles Treaty.
If Alexander Hamilton's policy drafts as Secretary of the Treasury, especially his 1791 Report on Manufactures, are compared with the British system, and if the results of this comparison are juxtaposed to this writer's revolutionary advances in political economy, all of the blunders of Marx's Capital are efficiently located and corrected. The indicated procedure, which this writer has followed, is to retain Marx's algebraic categories for the real economic process, with those qualifying corrections to his definitions required to fit those categories into the relativistic space of the writer's conceptions.
The Disease of 'Leftism'
The myths attached to the French Revolution, myths created by the British and by British agents such as Madame de Stael, have provided the reference-argument for the presently cherished absurdity which defines political currents in terms of linear gradations from ultraright to ultraleft, with a state of liberal mush-headedness viewed as the in-between position. First of all, the Marquis de Lafayette, Paine, and Lazare Carnot, together with Condorcet and, to some extent, Lavoisier, were the "progressive revolutionaries" of that period, none of whom had the slightest intention of lopping off the head of Louis XVI, or of viewing that poor amateur clockmaker or Marie Antoinette as the source of the problems afflicting French society. The exemplary enemies of France were, within domestic limits, the Duke of Orleans, who organized and equipped the mob storming the Bastille, and the Swiss swine Necker, who wrecked French credit, setting up the crisis of 1789 deliberately, and whose salon patronized Robespierre and promulgated Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
The flaw in the Revolution was not Thermidor, but the fact that Thermidorean termination of Robespierre and the Jacobin lunacy was postponed too long. This postponement weakened France to the point that Napoleon Bonaparte's coup d'etat became possible. Napoleon's alliance with Austria then sealed the ultimate doom of France under Napoleon.
The Paris "proletariat" of sansculottes was, in modern terms of reference, a fascist band of storm-troopers, the lumpenized sweepings of displaced rural populations gathered into Paris in search of dole-subsistence. Robespierre was largely under the influence of Necker. Danton and Marat were British agents, trained and directed to their duties by British secret intelligence in London, and coordinated by Shelburne's intelligence agent, Jeremy Bentham. Their assignment was a terrorist operation analogous to British intelligence's deployment of international terrorism today.
It is the Benthamite terrorist doctrine of the 1790s which serves as the doctrine of "leftism" generally to the present date.
The Jacobin Terror was an operation of the British monarchy, of the government of William Pitt the Younger. It was an operation by the leadership of the oligarchist faction of Europe against the republican forces centered around Turgot (deceased), Ver-gennes (deceased), and the Marquis de Lafayette, the allies of the United States. Thus, the "right" and the "extreme left" of the French Revolution were forces of the same political faction.
The function of the "right" versus "left" faction is to ruin the republican cause by splitting the labor movement from the industrial-capitalist forces along "left" versus "right" lines, and to thus impel the industrial-capitalist forces into "right" alliances with the oligarchist faction while impelling the labor movement toward overlap with the lunatic forces of the Benthamite "left."
The real issue, over at least three thousand years of Mediterranean civilization to date, is between the forces committed to generalized scientific and technological forces, and the opposing forces committed to holding back such progress in the interest of maintaining rule of society by the parasitical forces jointly represented by antiprogress feudal aristocrats and rentier-financier interests.
So, the promulgation of the right-left myth has the effect of splitting the humanist (city-builder, republican) forces to the advantage of the oligarchist forces. On this account, most political doctrines taught in political-science courses and practiced in current global and internal U.S. politics are destructive frauds. All political divisions and gradations ordered along right-left lines of distinction are frauds, and the parties which participate in such practices are to that extent frauds, hoaxes.
The industrial-capitalist forces ally with their most deadly enemies, the oligarchist-rentier forces, as an expediency for gaining strength in face of the forces of the "left." In fact, the trade-union forces are the industrial capitalists' proper political allies against both the oligarchist-rentier faction and the Benthamite "left."
Matching, the folly exhibited in the conservative-liberal sodomy characterizing the union of forces within the Republican Party, the socialist movement overall is composed of two irreconcilable currents. The first, including Marx, Luxemburg, and Lenin, is committed to generalized scientific and technological progress, and for the maximum realized profit by industrialized economies. The second, typified by Jeremy Bentham and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, regards industrial capitalism and realization of profits in extended reproduction as intrinsically evil, as "theft" of profit-income which ought to be distributed among workers, etc. The policy of the Maoist regime of China, as emphasized in the extreme by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, exemplifies the latter.
The second current, the Benthamite, is oligarchism with the personality of the feudal-rentier oligarchy concealed—it is not inconsistent that the Mao regime is allied, and has been previously allied, to the British monarchy. The direct role of the firm N. M. Rothschild & Sons in creating and afterward controlling Bakunin's anarchist forces 'as an arm of the British Secret Intelligence Service, exemplifies the character and connections of modern Benthamite leftism.
To the extent that the self-designated socialist forces include humanist-republican socialists, the slogan of "unity of the left" is always a swindle attempted in the specific interests of the profeudal oligarchical factions of the "right."
The Lenin Case
The paradigms for socialist revolution are the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the more evolutionary transformation of the Cuban economy arising chiefly out of the U.S.-coordinated economic warfare against Cuba during 1960-1961. The combined "subjective" and "objective" features of the process of transformation have no resemblance to the generally accepted current explanation of either case.
The theory governing the Russian revolution is given by Lenin. It is that case which enables us to arrive most directly at the proper conclusions—conclusions contrary to any usually given by U.S. socialists and Kremlinologists (among others).
Lenin's policy prior to 1914 was, essentially: either the political labor movement of Russia acts to bring an industrial.capitalist state into being, or, if the capitalist forces refuse to make such a transformation, the political labor movement must make the transformation to a socialist equivalent of an industrial capitalist transformation.
This policy was shaped within Lenin's views before 1905, that is, preceding the events which caused the fall of Count Sergei Wine. Like Czar Alexander II, Witte was committed to the industrial development of Russia, at the expense of the British monarchy and the parasitical landed aristocracy of Russia. The Russian capitalist forces allied to the policies of Count Witte exemplified the possible capitalist alternative to which Lenin was committed in perspective prior to 1914.
Lenin's perspective for the possible shifted in the wake of the outbreak of war. During 1917, the refusal of the Provisional Government to face the issue of rationalization of Russian agriculture, at the expense of foreign financial interests as well as the Russian landed aristocracy, signified that the capitalist forces of Russia were effectively compradores for the City of London and London's French subsidiaries. The Rothschild-centered Societe Anonyme of Paris is exemplary of the French extension of London. Under those circumstances, the failure of the post-February government to face the issue of capitalist transformation was the cause for a series of successive crises, crises which the government could not solve without attacking the land question, which it could not do without breaking with London. Lenin, understanding the predicament, prepared for and directed the Bolshevik coup d'etat.
The Cuba case was different in form, but expressed the same principles. British influences on the U.S. government caused that government to make an issue of principle of prompt compensation for nationalized sugar investments in Cuba at the valuations given by the foreign investors. When Castro et al. resisted this, on the basis of elementary considerations of unbendable self-interests of the Cuban economy, Washington adopted a perspective of conducting a new revolution, against Castro et al.
Castro was not a Kerensky to be superseded by a Lenin; Castro refused to become a Kerensky, and so proceeded, under pressure of escalating actions by Washington and London, toward an approximation of the Bolshevik 1917 tactic, relying increasingly on Soviet aid for Cuban survival.
The virtually unavoidable bungling which spoiled, often hideously, the initial period of both Bolshevik and Castro management of the economies should not obscure what is essential in the two cases. Both transformations placed the economy in the hands of political forces lacking in managerial competences in industries and commerce. The process of developing competent management technicians and administrators, and of developing technicians to replace no-longer-available foreign specialists, was an unavoidably painful one.
That discounted, the general rate of Soviet economic and .related progress since the close of foreign interventions, during the early 1920s, has been comparable to U.S. rates of progress under Federalist and Whig administrations, and otherwise to rates of progress achieved under leadership of the factional forces responsible for the Meiji transformation in Japan.
In general, the point can be made for Cuba. Discounting errors in administrative policies and related matters, Cuba's principal economic problem is that it has established an increased standard of living for the population as a whole much higher than under the pre-1959 regimes. This represents an annual cost increase of significant magnitude. Cut off from foreign capital, and experiencing a drastic reduction in the price of its traditional export-crop outside the privileged, Comecon markets, production of the required margins of additional gross product for both increased total household and infrastructure consumption and for military and capital improvements has been inevitably difficult.
The thrust for realizing generalized scientific and technological progress is the characteristic feature of both the Soviet and Cuban transformations, and on this account represents a different political means for achieving the same objectives as the American Revolution or the Meiji transformation of nineteenth century Japan. Lenin's policy of two alternatives, developed prior to the 1905 crisis, expresses that result as motivating policy.
Lenin and his immediate associates had various dangerous shortcomings in qualifications. Lenin, for example, was a very poor economist relative to Rosa Luxemburg, poor by comparison with E. Preobrazhensky. Such shortcomings were important, but do not define Lenin's character. His character is defined by his choice of Chernyshevski's "tradition"—the tradition of Czar Alexander II, the thrust represented by Count Sergei Witte.
The essential difference between Lenin and Witte was that the latter was directed to effecting the transformation of Russia by developing the government (the Czarist central government) as an instrument in opposition to both the City of London and the parasitical policies and practices of the debt-ridden landed aristocracy of Russia. Witte, like Alexander II, followed the policy of the Machiavellian humanist prince in developing republican policies of transformation. Lenin's policy, correctly so, was that the republican forces of Russia could not, would not effect an industrial-capitalist transformation without the battering-ram of a political labor movement fully independent of other parties.
The principle is summarily this. When industrial labor is organized only on the scale of a particular firm or industry, its awareness of self-interest as an organized self-interest is limited to bettering its conditions of work and life in respect to its economic relationship to the immediate employer or group of employers. When the labor forces are organized as a political force on a national scale, labor's perception of organized self-interest properly undergoes a transformation. In that latter condition, its clear self-interest is for national policies of generalized scientific and technological progress, and for associated high rates of capital formation in productive industry, as well as for technological progress in agriculture.
This distinction is exemplified by the attitude of local trade-union organizations toward unemployed labor, an attitude which treats other labor, especially unemployed labor, as outsiders with respect to negotiations with employers, and even tends to regard such outside elements of the labor-force as antagonists with respect to a particular trade union's relationship to the employer or group of employers with which the union directly deals.
When labor is organized as a whole, its fundamental, organized self-interest is transformed. The process of creating expanded industrial employment, to provide employment for all members of its organization, becomes one aspect of the labor movement's primary self-interest. Since this requires expanded rates of capital formation, the other aspect of primary interest of the labor movement as a whole is high rates of generalized scientific and technological progress, the only circumstance under which advances in rates of social productivity are adequate to maintain both advances in the incomes and working conditions of employed labor, and provide adequate rates of capital formation to assimilate unemployed labor, etc.
This perception is an aspect of Karl Marx's notion of the political class-for-itself. That notion is grounded in the "Feuerbach" section of The German Ideology, articulated in Marx's denunciation of Proudhon (1847), and set forth as policy in The Communist Manifesto. Through a transformation of the consciously preferred form of organization of an independent political labor movement to the notion of an independent political labor movement representing labor of that nation as a whole, two things result.
First, labor's conscious self-interest becomes generalized scientific and technological progress, expressed practically in terms of high rates of capital formation in agriculture and in the production of tangible consumer and capital goods.
Second, the forces of an independent political labor movement who consciously adopt that view represent the most reliable commitment to the republican self-interests of the nation, such that a labor party built around such forces of the labor movement serves as an indispensable force for humanist policies of generalized scientific and technological progress. This force serves in capitalist society as the indispensable, independent political ally of those industrial-capitalist and progressive-farmer forces also dedicated to progress, and as the force adequate to force continuation of such a policy under conditions in which the industrial-capitalists are degraded into puppets of the oligarchist forces.
This was the practice of Benjamin Franklin and his associates in the American Revolution, and the alliance of capitalists, urban labor, and independent progressive farmers (as distinct from oligarchist, slave-owners) was the social composition on which the United States Constitution was adopted and the federal republic established.
This was broadly the basis for the policy of "harmony of interests" of Henry C. Carey, and was the policy of President Abraham Lincoln.
Ironically, although Karl Marx supported Abraham Lincoln's policies on exactly such grounds, he attacked Carey's notion of "harmony of interests." This argument of Marx's reflected chiefly both his ignorance of American history and his credulous, obsessive acceptance of the "British model" mythology. By assuming Britain to be the exemplification of industrial-capitalist development, so denying the mixed, "'feudal''-capitalist character of the British economy since the 1660 Restoration, Marx attributed to industrial-capitalist political forces generally the inherent tendencies of the morally degenerate British capitalists in particular. However, as is predominantly the general case with Marx's work, his incompetent historical view of phenomena gave way to his superior understanding of immediate reality in the case of Lincoln's policies. Marx (and Joseph Wede-meyer) followed Carey's policy during the U.S. Civil War.
On this same point, Lenin was essentially a follower of Karl Marx. His policies continued Marx's errors respecting the historical determination of classes, etc., but, also like Karl Marx's relationship to the Lincoln administration, adapted that erroneous explanation to an appropriate comprehension of necessary practice for the concrete realities confronting him..
Should this writer, then, have gone through his experience with the self-styled Marxist "left"? It is sufficient to contrast the fatal flaw in the outlook and general practice of those Republican and Democratic Party currents which are committed to republican policies of generalized scientific and technological progress.
Under British influences—for example, the foolish toleration of Adam Smith's anticapitalist "free trade" policies—capitalist factions adopt a notion of a "free trade" in labor-power, and follow British "conspiracy law" in opposing the political self-organization of labor-power as a labor movement. Political campaigns-are sustained to coerce the minds of individual labor and trade unions against the notion of a generalized political labor interest. Then, in return for this, the capitalist forces expect labor to support either the Republican or Democratic candidates in behalf of high rates of capital formation.
Lo and behold! The organized labor movement conies significantly under the influence of Fabian bureaucracies such as that of the United Auto Workers today or forces associated with Lane Kirkland or Jacob dayman of the Industrial Union Department in the leadership of the AFL-CIO.
The AFL-CIO's tinkering with support of the original version of the oligarchist, protofascist Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, the UAW bureaucracy's connection to the "New Left" project and to "environmentalism," represent major elements of the social battering-rams against high rates of capital formation—because of the foolish policies toward labor by even the humanist-republican forces of the Republican and Democratic parties.
It is a simple matter of fact that Bakunin's anarchist international was created through Rothschild funding and coordination (primarily), and that it was British intelligence which maintained the anarchist organizations, and employed them as the principal terrorist force of the period from the 1870s into the First World War. It is ironical, but not accidental, that the same Switzerland bases and financial conduits used for anarchist assassins then are providing logistical bases for international terrorism in Europe today.
British operations against Karl Marx and his influence were an outgrowth of Marx's role in the U.S. Civil War—and not the events of the Paris Commune. The Bakunin project, launched through Rothschild's, including Rothschild funding of Bakunin through conduit Alexander Herzen, was a central feature of that effort.
The Bakunin and associated projects for containing Marx—short of the political penalties of martyring him—were complemented by British creation of the Socialist International.
Every continental radical grouping was on the string of financial networks allied to the City of London. The sudden creation of the Bakunin anarchist international was effected through (chiefly) Rothschild networks, which deployed agents under their control, with appropriate funding. In Germany, both the Lassalleans and Eisenachers were under control of different channels of financial networks coordinated from London.
It is to be emphasized that the "left" so controlled by British-centered networks is at best a Hobbesian alliance of "left forces." Bitterly competitive in respect to franchises for "gate receipts," and for favors from above, the various groupings, both competing parties and factions within parties, would chiefly prefer to cut one another's throats rather than ally. The essential form of organization of these parties, leagues, factions, and so forth is not defined by differences of principle, but by the bureaucratically organized following of individual personalities or groups of personalities.
However, the fact that the small seed-crystals of such parties, leagues, circles, factions are deployed to recruit from certain strata and according to certain propaganda and tactical postures has the effect of enslaving the leadership of those groupings to the policy profiles the organizations acquire as "traditions" in that way.
The truth of the matter is reflected in the commonplace position and function of "intellectuals" in such groupings. The relationship of British intelligence agent August Bebel to Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautsky, and associates in the German Social Democracy is paradigmatic.
During recent years, public knowledge has been shocked by the publication of documents proving that August Bebel was a British spy, pure and simple, during the concluding period of his life. What was shocked by these disclosures was nothing but an ingenuousness which had. not already recognized Bebel as a British agent from the standpoint of conclusive evidence provided by Behel's practices and policies as SPD leader. Bebel was working openly for the same geopolitical policies as Lord Milner, Mack-inder and Haushofer. Ebert, Scheidemann, and Noske did not become British agents during the postwar period; they were British agents under British agent Bebel.
The case of Eduard Bernstein exemplifies another important feature of the arrangements.
It is usually cheerfully assumed that Eduard Bernstein came under the influence of the Fabian Society in London, and so became a British agent-of-influ-ence after the death of Friedrich Engels. How naive!
Bernstein was an outright British intelligence operative, even while Engels was alive. This aspect of Bernstein did not begin during the 1890s. If one troubles to trace his career from Germany, via Switzerland, into London, one finds the associations and correlated political evidence of his practice and doctrines which establish his true credentials from his youth.
A competent political-intelligence institution does not plant an agent-in-place into an organization it wishes to influence or control by such means by instructing the plant to overtly wreck the premises from the moment of his entry. Nor does such an institution cultivate a thorough knowledge of the plant's role in the plant's mind from the outset. Rather, usually, a person combining certain inclinations and also subject to efficient strings held by the controller is encouraged to pursue a career in the targeted organization.
There is a parallel to the case of the Nazi organization in this practice. Rudolf Hess, Hermann Goer-ing, Heinrich Himmler, Rosenberg, and so forth, did not spontaneously join the fledging Nazi organization of Bavaria. They were assigned to join it, or encouraged to join it, by top political-intelligence operatives for the ruling house of Bavaria, the Wit-telsbachs.
The Wittelsbachs were British clients and British agents-of-influence. Major-General Professor Karl Haushofer, in cooperation with British agent Houston Chamberlain, selected Hitler to head the Nazi organization. Haushofer directed the writing of Hitler's Mein Kampf, and assigned his own personal aide, Rudolf Hess, to Hitler. Haushofer was nominally a political-intelligence operative for the Wittelsbach House, but with the closest relationship to ruling circles of British intelligence, and so much an agent for British geopolitical doctrines and policies that he was in fact a British agent. All of the inner circle of the original, Bavarian kernel of the Nazi Party were assigned to Hitler by the Wittelsbach political intelligence circles in a manner not too different from Bernstein's entry into the Social Democracy.
The function of a certain sort of agent planted into socialist organizations (in particular) is permanent deep penetration of the leadership of the overall organization or of local or special functions of that organization. This sort of agent, broadly of two general subclassifications and types, is distinguished from other sorts of agents which may be assigned by the same agency. In a socialist organization, the top leadership may be composed of several types of deep-entry agents of several agencies, while various agencies—the same, others, and local police agencies—also have other sorts of agents, including agent-provocateurs, generally swarming about the premises.
Let us look briefly into the minds of the deep-penetration permanent plants who enter leading functions.
As we have noted, these are generally of two classifications. One type would be exemplified by a dedicated FBI recruit assigned to enter and remain permanently in a top position in the organization. The other would be a person of divided world-outlook, usually with attraction to "socialist ideas" and at the same time with contrary controlling family or other personal attachments. An in-between case is the would-be political-intelligence operative who revels operating in the sort of climate the socialist movement represents.
The same principles apply to a different, sort of case, the individual who enters a socialist organization and rises to some position within that organization, who is subsequently recruited by one or another sort of agency, and remains in place under either the control or significant influence of that agency. The one general type may be operating under control of certain personal leverage, without political motivation for his actions in the strict sense" of political. (This may change, subsequently, in an effort to rationalize the arrangements.) Or, an agency may shape a person coming under its influence, by easing the channels to personal political gate-receipts, permitting the person to remain within a "left" ambiance while making life easier, in terms of psychological stress, for that individual.
For example, the easiest way for an agency to corrupt a group of members of a socialist organization is to develop them as a socialist factional op-- position to the leadership, making them agents without immediately confronting them directly with the reality of the process they are undergoing. Factions of that sort, combined with other elements, may he co-deployed to take control of a targeted organization, or may be split out of the organization and redeployed as a group or as individuals to conduct mergers with and entries into other targeted organizations.
I should emphasize that all such cases are familiar to me, both from my knowledge and experience of the "left" generally, and from my experience in dealing with that repertoire of cute tricks as leader of the Labor Committees and chairman of the U.S. Labor Party. Naturally, these methods are by no means limited to "socialist" organization-targets. Every sort of organization is subject to interventions of these sorts.
The function of a deep-entry agent directed to occupy a leading position is both to influence the policies, thinking, and practices of the organization and to serve as a "sleeper" for the contingency of some more drastic sort of agent-role. To perform the function, the deep-entry agent must develop a certain dedication to the organization itself. He or she becomes attached to the assignment, and develops, attachments to those persons who are useful in furthering the purposes of the assignment, whether they are or are not agents. Such an agent will attempt to promote the interest of the organization, while savagely opposing any effort from within or without the organization to influence it toward policies .of an assumed character contrary to the agent's combined assignment and prejudices. Up to the point that such an agent's policy-outlook is confronted in some crucial way, the agent will bear no outward signs of being an agent. This is especially the case in an organization such as the former Communist Party USA or 1948-1961 Socialist Workers Party. •
The SWP Case (1948-1955)
I could not, in all probability, have understood V.I. Lenin or the deeper social-political dynamics within the Soviet and Peking leaderships today but for the way in which I passed through and broke out of the experience of the so-called Marxist left. As I discovered, subsequently, that certain key figures of (for example) the Socialist Workers Party and Communist Parties had been, or had become, various sorts of agents for various agencies—principally after my acquaintance with those organizations earlier—the true magnitude of the fraud of the "Marxist left" became fully clear to me. The significant point is not that the U.S. "Marxist left" is run—and has been run—by various sorts of agents, but that the character of the organizations has been of an "agent" character overall throughout this century. To be given a list of such agents and a summary of their dossiers is valuable secondary information; it is not what is primary. It is the political character of those organizations, which concurs with their susceptibility of agent-control, which is crucial and primary.
The nature of my conflict with the "left" from the beginning was my dedication to what may be summarily termed my Neoplatonic outlook and method, the commitment to republican forms of scientific and technological progress, and the method associated with that commitment, the method developed in me through the influence of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant.
To the extent that the socialist organizations of the 1930s (in particular) had been oriented to the labor movement, those organizations reflected the organic commitments to progress of the most intellectually active strata and persons of the labor movement. Hence, during 1949-1950 the SWP reflected a commitment to the realization of scientific and technological progress which was actually in conflict with the underlying, controlling character of the organization. From moment to moment, as one confronted the worker-strata of the organization, the emphasis on the values of progress was predominant. This persisting moment-to-moment experience gave the impression of an organizational commitment to those same values. Yet whenever the issue of general perspectives and policy was posed in respect to organizational policy, a powerful antiprogress vector was encountered within the organization as a whole.
The formula which expressed this dualism was the argument that technological progress in production under capitalism is contrary to the immediate employment and related interests of working people in particular: "Technological progress is good, but it can be fostered only under socialism." At first glance, this proposition is difficult to refute in experience. The evidence of suppression of technological progress, except as a cost-reduction policy, is considerable in the experience of the labor movement. Technological progress under the rule of the Federal Reserve System (Warburg's oligarchical monetarist policy
institutionalized) is not motivated by extended reproduction, except in wartime mobilizations, but only on competitive or cost-cutting premises. The labor movement does not experience a dirigist sort of technological-progress policy, in which the increase in social productivity and expanded employment are directly coordinated predicates of an extended-reproduction policy.
The problem is that the British versions of socialism coincide on this point with the British versions of capitalist policy.
The worker's orientation toward progress is expressed in respect to production, variously, by the fight against boredom and waste of his time and efforts on the job, by his desire to advance to a job which is more challenging intellectually—in which he has more respect for his mind, as opposed to his muscles—and by a general desire to escape from the miserable trough of labor-intensive routine. Progress and pride in progress are important values among American workers.
Hence, the twentieth century American worker to date desires progress individually, but also fears technological progress as a threat to employment security. It is only as technological progress is proposed in terms of enhanced security through extended reproduction that the worker's ambivalence is relieved. It is only when the issues of a political policy of general economic expansion under conditions of technological progress are posed that the American worker generally expresses unambivalently his deep dedication to technological progress.
That defines, correspondingly, the crucial point at which the true character of the 1948-1954 SWP was made clear to me.
A pair of British intelligence agents in the leadership of the Fourth International, Michel Pablo (Rap-tis) and Pablo's then-adjutant, Ernest Germain (Man-del, ne Mandelbaum), recruited a faction within the SWP around one George Clarke. This faction made a bloc with another group, the latter associated with Bert Cochran. The former grouping was associated with the SWP's political and literary strata, the latter with the SWP's trade-union fraction. In fact, the Cochran group was linked to a Fabian current centered within the UAW, and was violently opposed to all features of the Pablo-Mandel policy except the latter's historical pessimism.
The gist of the joint argument of the Clarke-Cochran forces was that the use of economic analysis as a guide to policy formulation was discredited in fact. At points, this was reduced to such pathetic outbursts as blaming SWP leader James P. Cannon for failing to produce a promised postwar depression. The mood shared by both elements of that coalition was that they "wanted out," and were determined to find the exits, with aid of whatever rationalizations suited that purpose. They found the exits, and fell into the arms of such Fabians as William Appleman Williams, publishing a periodical jointly with Williams for a while before splitting up to go their various separate ways. The Clarke group conducted obscure forums and toyed with acquaintanceships around the National Guardian, while Cochran sought employment as a paid staffer in trade-union activity.
So, at about that point, the sole—although official—representative of the "Fourth International" in the United States was an overtly homosexual "priest" of a tiny, synthetic "Catholic" cult.
In the immediate aftermath of the departure of those dissidents, it became quickly manifest that the arguments of James Cannon's leading supporters against Clarke and Cochran had been empty rhetoric, sheer fraud. This intersected my publication of an article entitled "Automation,"* in which I debunked the mystical exaggerations then afoot concerning automation, reported on the nature of the development, and proposed its study with respect to a qualitative advance in industrial development. The contrary reactions that piece produced around the SWP, combined with my first-hand direct exposure to the national SWP leadership, made clear the pervasive, actual outlook of that leadership—and, hence, of the SWP as an organization.
I reduced my role to one of nominal participation at that point, occupying myself elsewhere until the point I had new, special reasons to intervene in a more active way.
The SWP's expression of ambivalence toward technological progress had proven itself not merely a reflection of the ambivalence among trade unionists generally, but rather something more deep-going and ugly. They were opposed to any successful development under capitalism, on the general grounds that this policy was necessary to further the collapse of capitalism. This, combined with the SWP's antiscien-
* Fourth International, Spring, 1954.
tific outlook, the philistine sort of anti-intellectualism of the leadership—apart from a vulgar sort of Talmudism typified by the pathetic output of George Novack and Joseph Hansen—was evidence of an element of profound misunderstanding in my continuing association with the organization.
However, until I settled upon what to do about this matter, I retained a nominal association.
If one views British socialism not merely as a specific doctrinal current, but as the generality for a spectrum of varieties, then the view of the SWP as a British-socialist organization, or the recognition, that the Imemo circle in Moscow is also a British-socialist grouping, involves no proper conceptual difficulty. The anarchists, the Maoist cults, and the various Fabian and neo-Fabian entities are all of this same common species.
Exemplary of the neo-Fabianism of the SWP was the embrace of the "Triple Revolution" doctrine by semiretired SWP founder James P. Cannon during the 1960s. "Seize it with both hands," was Cannon's proposal to a San Francisco SWP audience (in a tape-recording which I audited). Farrell Dobbs and Tom Kerry, in New York City, were stunned by Cannon's embrace of the doctrine. I was disgusted, but not shocked; I shrugged. Cannon had shocked Dobbs and Kerry by throwing overboard the traditional ambivalence. Kerry and Dobbs longed for a resumption of the old SWP's connection to labor; Cannon had long since given that up.
The actual content of the SWP's brand of socialism had come openly to the surface: Dobbs and Kerry, despite their initial astonishment, soon went along with the change in policy. The "radical youth-lumpen" social orientation of the SWP later moved lawfully into each new production of the Tavistock Clinic's organized political-psychosis particularisms. Marx was soon replaced by R.D. Laing, Ivan Illich, and "primal scream therapy."
Whether in the old SPD under Bebel and Ebert, or the Communist Party USA, or the SWP, there was a symbiotic connection between the British-socialist "redistributionist" outlook and the manifold penetrations of various sorts of agents at various levels.
The Soviet Case
The point is crucial to understanding the Soviet Union today.
The May 1978 Schrmdt-Brezhnev agreements go further than the Rapallo agreements in principle. The May agreements go beyond principles of economic cooperation to resurrections of Leibniz's Great Design policy. There is no real distinction between the two; the first, Rapallo, is properly viewed as an approximation of the recent accords., This reflects one current of world-outlook and policy within the Soviet leadership.
There are others. One such other, typified by the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (Imemo) circle (until recently headed by British triple agent Maclean), is shamelessly British neo-Fabian. This is the most prominent foreign policy agency for the "Bukharinist" currents within the Soviet leadership. The leadership of this current is composed chiefly of either outright British agents or British agents-of-influence, the latter combined forces recently involved in direct cooperation with representatives of British interests in pushing support for the International Monetary Fund and Special Drawing Rights—in direct opposition to the pro-European Monetary Fund monetary and economic policies of the currents led by President Leonid Brezhnev.
Another facet of the problem is represented by the doctrines of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. This Institute's version of "Marxist-Leninist" doctrinal traditions is directly premised on the influence of two subagents of Parvus, N. Bukharin and G. Riazanov, during the 1920s. This institution was penetrated heavily by British intelligence, including British scientists working both as collaborators of Bertrand Russell in British intelligence and otherwise deploying as leading British Communists or "fellow-travelers." It was this connection (as I was recently correctly advised) which invented the nonexistent dedication of Capital I to Charles Darwin, and which shaped the methodology of the Institute into conformity with the axiomatics of British empiricism.
During recent years, U.S. Labor Party intelligence has studied closely the recurring patterns for the case" in which British intelligence issues a line, and within a day or so a coordinate "playback" of the British line issues from Brzezinski and other outlets in the United States, and also from a network of prominent outlets throughout the Warsaw Pact nations. In general, for any particular sort of line issued by British intelligence, one can predict which personalities and/or institutions within East Germany (DDR), the Soviet Union, and so forth will "play back" the line in appropriate "I.D. format," matching the complementary mouthing of the "opposing" U.S. version of the same line by Kissinger, Brzezin-ski, Admiral Turner, the Washington Post, the "Chinese" Science Monitor, and so forth.
The "left" varieties of socialism in the Eastern European countries and Soviet Union, like Maoist varieties of the British doctrine generally, are not only consistently playback currents for British intelligence political operations, but are, not accidentally, the chief conduits within official circles for facilitating the operations of Zionist and other branches of British-centered networks.
The individual or small group entering a large organization with the intent of shaping its policies and general character may generally succeed—or fail—in efforts to add a few phrases, or insert a resolution here and there. Overall, such an effort by itself will fail in its general purpose. If an individual entering an organization in such a way should succeed in rising to a position of power and influence, it will be because he has been transformed in manifest policy-outlook and character by the organization he formerly intended to penetrate.
There are apparent exceptions to this, exceptions which, misunderstood, mislead the careless on this point. The case of British agent Henry A. Kissinger's role inside the Nixon administration is exemplary of such apparent exceptions.
The Kissinger Example
Kissinger, Morton Halperin, Alexander Haig, Daniel Ellsberg, et al. moved into control, variously formally or indirectly, of the U.S. National Security Council with Richard M. Nixon's inauguration as President. Kissinger's group quickly preempted vast powers over the U.S. intelligence apparatus—and hence, policy-perceptions—under the guise of a mere rationalization of procedures. From this vantage-point and with the misuse of this preempted power, Kissinger's group created a controlled psychological environment around the Nixon staff and Nixon himself, manipulating Nixon into abandoning his own policies, and ultimately used the same procedures and methods both to set Nixon up for Watergate and, finally, to manage Nixon's resignation by means which must be plainly described as a "cold coup d'etat."
This operation succeeded not because Kissinger is any sort of "Svengalian" giant, but because he was the agent and tool of the British monarchy's intelligence service. The British monarchy, which controls major elements of the U.S. financial and corporate community, key elements of our nation's trade-union leadership, and the "liberal" faction of the Republican Party as well as the Kennedy machine within the Democratic Party, orchestrated events globally, while feeding its tool, Kissinger, predictions and policy-proposals which corresponded with events London was in the process of bringing into being.
There was nothing particularly original in this sort of operation. In recorded history, this technique was the principal method employed by the cult of Apollo: matching "prophecies" and policy recommendations with orchestrated occurrences to bring governments and principal elements of governments under the influence of the cult in this way.
The British generally are not original; however, Oxford and Cambridge do study history assiduously, to the included purpose of adducing the sort of tricks which have proven most consistently successful over thousands of years. An ancient trick of the cult of Apollo, or a bit of successful skullduggery from Roman history, merely transformed into contemporary costumes and technological bric-a-brac, are the most frequent features of British practice.
Exemplary are the following.
Although Nixon refused to attack President Johnson on the issue of the Vietnam war during his presidential campaigning, it should be stressed that he justified this on the basis of not criticizing the military policies of an incumbent President during a war. Already, key policy-making forces associated with Nixon were determined to disengage from a continuing, no-win war within the shortest possible time, once Nixon was inaugurated. Some indication to that effect was featured in an October 1969 article published under Nixon's by-line in Foreign Affairs, in which Nixon outlined a projected new Southeast Asia policy centered around cooperation with the "Go-South" currents of Japan. The proper policy was to cooperate with Japan to employ the political power and influence of economic-development commerce throughout Southeast Asia, and to end the lunacy of the Vietnam adventure.
Kissinger played upon Nixon's profile, not opposing Nixon's policies directly, but insisting that no agreements with the Soviets be concluded without first making an awesome show of U.S. strategic will to prevail over Moscow globally, and extracting demonstrative concessions from the Soviets on that basis. There were constantly new reasons why such a policy was required, according to Kissinger. Just one more show of strength, and then things will be ready for ending this. Every faction knew the war had to be ended, but Kissinger and London drew out the U.S. involvement until their purposes had been adequately fulfilled.
The development of the "New Left" with aid of the international opposition-movement to the Vietnam war, and the development of the environmentalist and terrorist movements, was included among those British purposes for continuing the war. The development of the' "China option" according to London's geopolitical scheme was also an included reason for continuing the war.
Kissinger, by such means, induced Nixon not only to continue the war, but to escalate it. The invasion of Cambodia was the most notable of those escalations.
The continuation of the war injured the U.S. economy badly, and frustrated the pursuit of the Rogers Plan, as well as Rogers's efforts generally. Rogers was a principal target of London, and therefore of Kissinger.
London had more in view than U.S. and Asian projects in attacking Rogers and the Rogers Plan.
The Rogers Plan, a resurrection of the Atoms for Peace project-policy of the Eisenhower administration, not only provided a basis for ending the endemic threat of new wars in the Middle East; it would have strengthened the Gaullists in France and the republican forces in Italy and West Germany. Although London, in 1976,. was triumphantly confident that the Gaullists were finished and Mitterrand on the way to victory, the Gaullists in France are firmly in power today. Nonetheless, they suffered a severe, temporary setback, together with Italy and the republican forces of West Germany, as a result of London's defeat of Rogers and the Rogers Plan.
The crucial blow London delivered against Rogers was the "Black September" massacre of Palestinians in Jordan. Kissinger, on orders from London, predicted that the Palestinians, acting under Soviet influence, were about to overthrow Hussein of Jordan with Syrian help. Rogers ridiculed such a proposal. The British, who had influence in the Jordan government, controlled key elements among the Palestinians, and had access to an element of Syrian armed forces stationed near the Jordan border, simulated the action they had instructed their agent, Kissinger, to predict. A provocation by London-influenced Palestinians confirmed warnings advanced to Hussein. During the Jordanian army's bloody reprisals against innocent Palestinians for this provocation, the Syrian units in question maneuvered—without Syrian air cover!—as if to attack Jordanian forces. Then, after a gesture without military consequence, the Syrian force withdrew. Rogers was discredited, and Kissinger's credibility was established.
Now London, with Kissinger's complicity, proceeded to set up the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the killing of the Rogers Plan pushed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries into launching the 1973 petroleum crisis and, subsequently, the postwar selective OPEC boycott.
Meanwhile, Daniel Ellsberg had adopted a "left
* Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
cover" for a Kissinger-British deception operation known as the leaking of the "Pentagon Papers." The "Pentagon Papers," a collection of documents available to any relevant U.S. policy-maker, was, in its published form, neither of use to any policy-maker nor a competent representation of those elements of U.S. policy making-which it purported to represent. The project was a RAND Corporation project initiated under the auspices of Kissinger, by Kissinger associate Daniel Ellsberg, and leaked by Ellsberg in cooperation with RAND Corporation associate Noam Chomsky. The leaking itself was handled by British agents-of-influence into press circuits closely associated with U.S. financial interests representing top levels of British intelligence.
Kissinger used this leaking of the "Pentagon Papers" both to organize the "plumbers unit" and to orchestrate a mounting general spy-hysteria around the White House, including the denunciation of his close acquaintance and admirer Marvin Kalb as a "Romanian spy." In fact, Kissinger and his fellow-accomplice Alexander Haig were chiefly responsible for all of the shady affairs of which Nixon was charged in connection with "Watergate." However, a contaminated element of the U.S. Senate briskly, perfunctorily awarded blanket exoneration to Kissinger and Haig, leaving Nixon to ponder exactly who had done what among the actions the Congress and press demanded he explain. Had he fired Kissinger and Haig, and pushed for an exhaustive examination of their roles, he would not have fallen.
A complete, documented account of Kissinger's role in Watergate is given by other sources. The point here is to illustrate how an effective penetration of an organization by a relatively small group does operate.
In the case of a deception operation, such as the case of Kissinger's role at the National Security Council, the success of the penetration operation depends on its being a subsidiary, although important, aspect of an orchestration of apparent reality from outside the penetrated organization. British networks' ability to orchestrate Middle East developments, and to employ controlled or influenced elements of the Warsaw Pact, and China, for playback performances, and also to manipulate the Soviet leadership by means of such entities as Imemo, performing a role analogous to Kissinger's in that situation, are exemplary of the orchestration of a controlled environment. Also important was the fact that the British monarchy had more or less consistently the same line as Kissinger was being instructed to regurgitate.
The key function Kissinger performed at the National Security Cduncil was not merely conduiting British prophecies and policies. Crucial was his ability to manipulate estimates and also the assignments and related policy aspects of the intelligence establishment generally.
There was no systematic, effective counterintelli-gence and other independent U.S. investigation conducted, to reach the White House to the effect of exposing the real story behind the orchestrated events. The principal sources of competent intelligence information and perceptions were exemplified by Rogers. The discrediting of Rogers was therefore the neutralization of all competent foreign-policy intelligence sources with respect to the White House, and also, significantly, with respect to the Congress. Since most of the press and entertainment mass-media were controlled by London agents or influences, Kissinger was crucial in providing almost a totally controlled artificial environment around the White House and Congress. By shaping the orchestration according to the susceptibilities of Nixon's known personal profile, Nixon, entering his second term with one of the largest constituencies a President has enjoyed, was sent down to defeat and general disgrace without realizing what was occurring to him in that process.
There are exceptional cases in which a small group can independently exert influence to change policies and characters of larger organizations. Such circumstances are those which deception operations attempt to simulate.
Imagine the case in which the occurrences impinging upon a large institution or set of institutions are not artificially orchestrated, but are the actual processes of history in motion. If, under such circumstances, a small group not only accurately assesses the nature of this lawful course of developments, but is able to chart the emerging course of events, stating how choices among policy alternatives will more or less efficiently tend to determine which pathways of developments ensue, that relatively small group can exert an unusual influence upon larger groups. That is precisely the nature of the U.S. Labor Party's source of growing influence during recent years.
It should be stressed that no one can ordinarily predict events in the sense of crystal-ball predictions of fatefully inalterable future occurrences. One can predict only the alternative courses of development which flow from selections among alternative policies. Only under very special conditions can a specific event be predicted within a specific time-frame. What can be predicted is how to behave in order to achieve a certain sort of success, and how to behave in order to virtually ensure a succession of failures in a certain kind of unfolding of developments.
Most persons do not like that sort of prediction. Either they demand something more definite, or regard what is offered as too rigorously exacting, or discount the whole business on grounds either that it is not sufficiently definite or too approximately definite. Nonetheless, over successive developments, under conditions of crisis, such a course of public interventions causes the most experienced strata in various branches of public life to realize that the analytical approach being used by the group is of a most useful sort.
Such sorts of growing influence by a small group can occur only under conditions of grave general crises.
During periods of relative stability, leading circles of principal political and other institutions operate by rules of thumb which appear to produce adequate results. During these periods, there appears to be a relatively minimal discrepancy between the consequences one anticipates from use of such rules of thumb and the results actually experienced. This appearance may include contrary elements, elements which are actually harbingers of a future crisis, but such aberrations are generally viewed merely as more or less random aberrations, and not as a trend line of developments toward a crisis.
It was feasible for me, in 1958, to project accurately the postponement of general monetary crises until the middle 1960s or sometime following that, and to also project the general form of a series of successive monetary crises leading toward a new general depression. It was also increasingly feasible, as I refined my efforts, to define the kinds of remedial measures needed to prevent a general depression. However, there was no institution through which I could render that now-validated foresight a policy tool of principal institutions. It was not until the August 1971 breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, even after the 1967-1968 crisis and the 1970 crisis in the United States, that my efforts developed more than a handful of collaborators. It was the crisis of 1973-1974 which enabled the group developed up to 1973 to become increasingly a marginal, if growing, factor in the larger dimensions of policy making.
Up to the point of crises, all general opinion, including the opinion of leading circles, has a monstrous sort of elasticity. It can accommodate all sorts of evidence contrary to its belief without questioning the beliefs themselves. It is only when the mind's order for the foot to kick causes the hand to slap the stomach, and so forth, that such acute frustration prompts an open mind to the suggestion that ordinary belief might possibly include certain small flaws.
The "conservatism" respecting prevailing prejudices is not strictly an individual matter. Prejudices are the characteristics of associations, not of individuals. To deviate from a shared prejudice is to get out of step with the persons with whom one shares such a prejudice. Prejudices generally reflect the binding-forces of organization of institutions. It is generally only as institutions are shaken and already show signs of fracture under the shock of crisis events that the prejudices themselves lose their powerful authority over the members of those institutions.
That principle I learned during childhood and youth. If one can know that one is right in fact and general thrust of method of judgment, and if one finds that one's judgments formed in that way are credible to intelligent peers and others individually, then larger experience exposes most efficiently how associations operate. How often, during childhood and youth, did the proverbial "cock crow thrice" ere I had overheard an acquaintance denying what I knew he or she knew to be a matter of fact.
That sort of combined experience convinces one of two things that are immediately contrary. Generally, human individuals are indeed perfectible in their progress above ignorance and moral bestiality. It is institutionalized relationships which act as the conservative forces perpetuating ignorance and moral bestiality in the form of shared prejudices. It is the creation or alteration of better institutions on which mankind depends to achieve its potential perfectibility.
The problem which most of my readers confronted in their childhood and youth was the consequence of their lack of an educational foundation comparable to that I consolidated with respect to essentials during my adolescence. Unless one can assimilate what Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant signified for me, and replicate that method and criteria of thinking in oneself, one lacks the means to determine independently a quality of knowledge with sufficient assurance of correctness, and with sufficient confirmation of demonstration in experience, to be able to withstand contrary assertions of authority as such or the authority of contrary peer-group opinion.
It is not sufficient to adopt a stubborn set of beliefs. It is indispensable that one master a body of scientific method which repeatedly proves itself to conform to the lawful ordering of the universe in experience. It must be a method and set of criteria which are empirically, demonstrably at one with the reality of the world, which lead to results which are approximately (at least) as predictable as the method presumes to be the case. To believe something strongly proves nothing; one must know with empirical certainty.
To reject authoritative contrary opinion on the basis of one's own stubborn belief (prejudice) is to be merely an egregious fool. One may be occasionally right; a stopped clock is precisely correct twice a day, but it knows not when. To stand against a sea .of contrary opinion, one must have a degree of authority which rises above that of the best proponents of the contrary judgment. Without that, one is either stubborn buckwheat to be broken in the wind, or more flexible grass which will bend whichever way capricious breezes of the moment direct it to point.
Ordinary scientific certainty will not suffice. By ordinary scientific certainty, I mean, of course, formal, deductive forms of theoretical or theoretical-experimental knowledge. I mean a scientific knowledge associated with mastery of the principles of creative-mental generation of new hypotheses which, as a tendency, lead to advancement of ordinary sorts of scientific knowledge—I mean the "science known to the golden souls" of Plato's "Phoenician myths."*
Once one has assimilated such scientific knowledge, that becomes a basis for certainty, the highest quality of authority to be recognized among persons. That certainty serves as an unshakable rock, an absolute world-line of reference, against which all other things are to be measured.
It is from that vantage-point that my judgment governing late 1948 affiliation with the SWP is to be examined
Institutions of 1948
By 1948,1 had developed no settled views of personal authority of the quality I developed by early 1958. I
* Plato, Politeia (Republic).
had no presumption that I must then or later take history personally into my own hands in a significant way. Rather, while postponing expectation of any completed t educational process until sometime between my thirty-third and thirty-fifth years, I was determined to aim that exploratory process of self-development and experience into the most appropriate of the directions available to me.
I had encountered the SWP among other professed socialist (and other) organizations I had explored during 1946 and into "early 1947. A saturation of experience with many pulpit "styles throughout childhood aided me in looking quickly and most efficiently into the inside of the mental processes behind the homilectics of SWP and various kinds of other groups' public presentations. This glaring defect in the groups' characters was complemented by a "wiseacre" sort of philistine's affected cynicism, the use of gossipy thumbnail characterizations in place of conceptual forms of insight or explication. I had had some ongoing, sporadic encounters with various groupings around campus and in veterans' circles. The result of this postwar accumulated experience was to promote my maintaining a comfortable distance from various groupings of assorted "right," "left," and "liberal" profiles into the middle of 1948.
As I have emphasized earlier, by the middle of 1948 I had satisfied myself that there was no viability—as I defined viability—within any of the usual sort of institutions directly or probably accessible to me. The behavior of the population generally coincided with my judgment of the predominant institutions with which the prejudices of public behavior of persons generally were associated. The United States was plunging downhill morally.
It was necessary for me to discover some corner of the social process in which the general moral collapse was being resisted.
Merely because those of you who were adults or more-mature adolescents during that period lived through that process, do not attempt to avoid the truth of the matter. You were, speaking generally, a victim and participant in mass insanity during that period. Much of U.S. politics and social life to the present day is shaped by a continuing effort to excuse, at least in part, your own moral imbecility during that period.
Mass insanity, moral imbecility are not inappropriate terms, not exaggerations, no matter how much you wish to reject the truth of such terms. Your behavior during what is usually termed "the Mc-Carthyism period" is comparable as an historical sociopsychological phenomenon to the spread of flagellantism during the fourteenth century, and to the phenomenon usually cited as comparable during the turn of the 1950s: "witch-hunt." You were, speaking on the average, insane.
The cases of Alger Hiss and the Institute for Pacific Relations are exemplary of the most important features of our insanity during that period. The Institute for Pacific Relations (IPR) was a British intelligence operation, which was engaged at that time in developing the operation presently associated with James R. Schlesinger, Henry A. Kissinger, and others: the British geopolitical doctrine of the "China option." The truth of the Alger Hiss case had similar implications. (Note how Richard Nixon's delusions concerning what he had uncovered in the Hiss case played a key role in blinding and disorienting him during his administration, approximately two decades later.)
The recent uncovering of the "triple agent" roles of Maclean, Philby, and others, the way in which J. Edgar Hoover was blocked and misled—through the intervention of Macmillan and others—the Philby case, exemplifies the nature of the discrepancy between the reality and the assumptions of the 1949-1954 period.
Although I do not, of course, have the complete answers to all the matters of significance during that period, the advantage of more recent knowledge, aided by the intelligence services of several Western nations, enables me to throw light on the essential facts of that period.
There were, without question, bona fide Soviet spies in the United States during the postwar and earlier periods. The case of Colonel Abel is exemplary of the manner in which such top Soviet spies and their networks were recruited and deployed. There is also no doubt, apart from operations such as the Abel operation, that some presumably sympathetic circles around the Communist Party USA were "tapped" for information. However, the assumption of a correlation between Soviet espionage and subversive activities was incompetence and lunacy on two principal grounds: first, technical, and, second, the character of the CPUSA leadership, especially after 1938.
Technically, a government which operated espionage in the manner the public spy-hunters of the late 1940s and 1950s assumed the Soviets to deploy would soon be out of business.
The typical spy is an obscure retail shoe clerk, usually, with a combined psychological and money problem, in which the psychological problem predominates, and in which case the monetary relationship enables the spy's recruiters and controllers to divert attention from the manner in which they actually, psychologically control their agent. Such an agent is preferably an obscure person. He is bright, but infantile and socially inept' to the effect that he cannot develop the social potentialities of his intelligence in employment, etc. He is also paranoid, a "Walter Mitty," who has a built-in disposition for maintaining an effective cover. He is usually a "mother's boy" into adulthood, who enters the workaday outside world as a "world of strangers," and who at the same time conceals, if poorly, the fact of his incestuous impulses from his mother and himself. His psycho-profile represents a built-in predisposition for rather effective espionage covert roles, a disposition which his recruiter and controller merely enhance.
There are other types, but the principles applicable to those types have the same effect as the gray little incestuous retail shoe clerk.
Sex is a principal commodity in the blackmailing of potential spies recruited by most services, with homosexuality heading the list in defining "security risks" on this account. The "closet homosexual" is the epitome of the security risk on this account. Financial blackmail is also most significant. Entrapment of a recruit to espionage by these levers is exemplary of the process.
Another variant is a strong paranoid reaction to a sense of "betrayal" by agencies of the government which the espionage recruit betrays. The latter operates by placing personal considerations above the realities of the adult, social world, and places his or her personal grievance above all other considerations, to the effect of operating against his government with motivations of compulsive self-righteousness.
The general counterintelligence method for detecting and capturing such spies is that outlined by Edgar Allan Poe's C. Auguste Dupin.
The complementary side of espionage, the sort in which a Communist sympathizer is "tapped" for service, is ordinarily not "hard espionage"—stealing secrets and so forth—but the collection of public information, including specialized political, economic and social information.
Exemplary of that latter sort of activity, in one part, is the continued functioning of a so-called KGB unit within the leadership of the Communist Party USA, a unit which overlaps the nominal CPUSA leadership, and which is linked directly to the associates of Georgii Arbatov and the Imemo networks and factions within the Soviet Union today. This, according to cross-checked information received, was established in 1938 by Canadian-based arms of British intelligence with consent of the FBI and U.S. State Department. This unit was significant in the U.S.' side of British intelligence's assassination of L.D. Trotsky in Mexico in 1940. To the present date, that element of the CPUSA has been continuously under the control of British secret-intelligence networks.
This unit performs such services as profiling and rating key U.S. and Canadian personalities for Soviet posture toward such individuals, and is the center for development and transmission of other public information to Soviet circles. The nature of this unit's activities has been corroborated during the current period, including "playback" of Institute for Policy Studies sources from Moscow and East Germany in denunciations of this writer and the U.S. Labor Party by official and semi-official Soviet and East German sources. The conduits for such defamatory actions, using Institute for Policy Studies-generated slanders in "I.D. format," have been those Soviet elements directly associated with Arbatov and Imemo, and East German channels which are parts of the same known "Bukharinite" network in Eastern Europe.
The date 1938 is a point of inflection in the history of the Communist International. During that year, the last holdouts among leading figures of the Paris apparat of the Communist International were recruited to British intelligence. British intelligence also controlled the so-called Red Orchestra networks from their formation—a formation which followed a cleanup of the regular Communist International intelligence networks. This fact is relevant to Stalin's dissolution of the Comintern during the war, an entity which was so contaminated from his standpoint that he attached certain advantages to offering his wartime capitalist allies such a political "concession."
Despite the significance of 1938 as a point of inflection, there was massive British-centered intelligence penetration and significant control of Comintern parties from their inception. The Anglo-Dutch control of Bukharin and circles associated with him within the Soviet Union was the most prominent of the currents within the Comintern linking such British-network-controlled elements to co-thinkers in Moscow itself. Much of the leadership of the original Communist Party USA was made up of persons who were, to varying degrees of wittingness of this fact, under control of those British-centered networks. As we have noted earlier, the entire twentieth-century U.S. and Canadian "left" was not only oriented toward some aspect of the spectrum of British socialism; in this environment of the end of World War I, the formation of the Communist Party USA represented no significant break with British socialism, but rather an adaptation of British socialism to a Bolshevik cover. British agents and agents-of-influ-ence from the Socialist Party of America, the International Workers of the World, and other groups were carried into the leadership of the CPUSA in this way.
Most Communists were not witting accomplices of British intelligence networks. Rather, they were in part the targets of a British-designed operation intended to "vacuum" potential communists from the general environment, and to shape the activities and orientation of such captured groups and individuals to uses predominantly in the perceived interest of British networks' operations.
Hence, even to the extent that genuine Soviet and Soviet-coordinated operatives tapped individual Communists and Communist sympathizers for incidental routine or special favors, the Soviet operatives were operating in a fish pond controlled by British networks, thus performing their activities "secretly" before the peepholes in a British-networks-run political peep-show.
The role of the Communist Party circles was at a premium during the World War II period of the "Communist Political Association" (CPA), when that organization provided invaluable "playback" potentialities vis-a-vis a wartime U.S. ally, Stalin, who was possessed by outstanding practical concerns for U.S. aid and for the internal U.S. political climate fostering such aid. The British accommodated to this reality in shaping CP activities.
As for the "average" Communist or Communist sympathizer, it should be emphasized that the trout in a trout farm does not know that his seemingly normal conditions of life are a trout farm. He did not know that his ideology and party policy were predominantly shaped by British networks. Hence, as the Cold War mood developed in the United States, such poor fish had not the slightest sensibility of what in fact was happening to them.
The Communist or Communist sympathizer was by no means" the only such dupe. Although I am not prepared to judge General Donovan's assessment of the situation during and following the war, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), among other branches of service, was duped generally in a manner analogous to the Communists.
The British spun off the "Special Operations Executive" (SOE) from the Secret Intelligence Service presumably in order to create a liaison arm of British intelligence with the emerging intelligence institutions of the United States, such as OSS, and as an interface with J. Edgar Hoover's FBI and the U.S. drug-intelligence apparatus. This arrangement served the invaluable included function, from the British standpoint, of preventing the United States from penetrating into British Secret Intelligence Service circles proper.
SOE was as much a British intelligence operation against the United States as it was an arm of collaboration with the United States. SOE represented a British-built maze used for training of U.S. operatives and agencies. OSS and other agencies mastered the maze the British constructed for them, and thus conditioned themselves to overlook the fact that the British intelligence services had not only constructed the maze, but managed it. So, the OSS, in particular, was a poor, dumb trout, happily swimming in a British-owned and -managed trout farm. The arts of "deception warfare" which the British SOE taught the OSS were in fact a part of a massive "deception warfare" operation against the United States.
When Jimmy Byrnes's dupe Harry S. Truman fell into Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" policy, the United States was miserably "screwed." The fact of this "screwing" produced painful effects which could not be concealed from the U.S.'s institutions and population. Had Roosevelt been alive, the source of the problem might have been more or less correctly perceived to have been Britain. Under Truman's British-designed policy, Britain was the U.S.'s closest strategic ally. Hence, it was axiomatic that either the United States broke its special relationship to Britain—in favor, for example, of de Gaulle, or every evil the British imposed upon the United States had to be misattributed to a non-British origin. The Soviet Union and the "Communist conspiracy" became the explanation offered for everything down to family practices of which nosy neighbors disapproved.
The overtones of a threatened new war, and a kind of war which Hiroshima and Nagasaki signaled, were the most prominent of the fears generally provoked during that period. The sensuous expression of, those fears was mediated chiefly through the disruptive effects of both the postwar inflation (in which people's savings were betrayed, pay-rates betrayed, and so forth), and the "fiscal and credit austerity" employed jointly by the government and Federal Reserve System to foster unemployment. The public mind, aided by the news media, fostered a cathexis of the nuclear-war fears to the immediate, sensuous sense of frustration experienced in the daily life of the ordinary citizen.
The resulting, fear-laden hysteria, and the failure to attribute the problems to their actual source, produced the demand for a scapegoat, to be blamed for a manifest wartime and postwar betrayal of the interests for which the United States had presumably fought during World War II. The irrationality of the assessment of the problem, carried into a fruitless practice, produced mass insanity. This mass insanity was directly comparable as a lawful sociological phenomenon to the eruption of the flagellant epidemic in Europe during the fourteenth century or the eruption of psychotic cults in southern Italy following the Hapsburg looting of Italy beginning the early sixteenth century, or the intensification of such psychoses in forms such as "tarantismo" following Nelson's rape of southern Italy during the course of the Napoleonic wars. The term "witch-hunt" for the prevailing state of mind in the United States during that period is no exaggeration.
The failure of the U.S. intelligence and security agencies (for example, the CIA, the FBI) to comprehend the "triple agent" aspects of the Maclean, Philby, Blake, and other cases exemplifies the specific sort of blindness which SOE experience and Truman policies induced into the mandate and outlook of such agencies during the postwar period.
This appreciation of. the situation is no "mere opinion." The facts and judgment are massively documented from primary and authoritative secondary sources of that period.
After 1960, a growing number of circles within and outside the U.S. intelligence community realized that the United States was somehow being betrayed consistently under four Presidents, beginning with Kennedy, and were obliged by existing circumstances to exclude the Soviet Union and any sort of "Communist conspiracy" from the search for the mysterious agency principally mediating such a consistent betrayal. Although most of these patriotic circles have continued, to the present time, in measuring the betrayal of the United States in respect to relative Soviet advantages, it is nonetheless clear that some other major agency, not Soviet or Soviet-controlled, is responsible for this. The popularization of the misleading allegations that Henry A. Kissinger has been a Soviet-influenced agent represents an attempt to correlate the facts of betrayal with the "Soviet adversary" posture.
The essential error of concerned persons respecting the post-1960 period is rooted in their failure to see the root of the de facto treason in the administration of Harry S. Truman.
It was essential for me, by 1948, to separate my own well-grounded contempt for the Communist Party USA from the popular anti-Communist hysteria. I did not then understand generally the political-strategic realities which I have employed in outlining the period here; I knew, rather, the clinical insanity whose progress I observed firsthand in the moral degradation of nearly all of my friends and acquaintances. I needed to act, to secure my own conduct and criteria of judgment to some sort of rock, to prevent myself from being carried down the stream of ongoing moral imbecility.
Before mid-1948 I would have had nothing to do with a commitment to the Socialist Workers Party. After mid-1948, its criticisms of the Communist Party, combined with its principled hostility to the witch-hunt, overrode my earlier contempt for the poor intellectual quality of the SWP. An encounter with touring SWP candidate Grace Carlson during autumn of that year was almost decisive. Although I was not impressed by the general contents of her address, I was impressed by her nonphilistinism during the address and the ensuing discussion-period. This presented me with what appeared to be a sample of the SWP leadership contrary to the poor impression made by SWPers I had known earlier.
It is not accidental that late 1952 and 1953 were the happiest periods of my association with the SWP, in the conduct of an open, public campaign of counterattack against Senator Joe McCarthy. This was the only significant endeavor the SWP ever undertook in my experience or subsequent observation of it. It was a campaign which coincided entirely with the essential reasons for my association with it.
To afford a competent insight into the relevant aspects of my association with the SWP, it is unavoidable to refer to some of the personalities I knew during the 1950s. It is adequate that I refer to several ordinary members from Massachusetts who made a net favorable impression of a relevant sort upon me during the early period of association, and three leaders of the SWP who, apart from SWP founder James P. Cannon, merit my adverse criticism of them in connection with the point at hand.
My first contact with the SWP was through an army acquaintance, Donald Morrill. Don was bright and had certain competencies, but was, throughout my acquaintance with him, stuck emotionally somewhere in adolescence, with a boyish sort of shamefaced personal warmth, and unable to do more than bluff his way, rather transparently, over an incurable political shallowness coinciding with his dilettantish approach to most topics. Yet he was a good friend in general, and he and his wife Sue were good human beings of the sort for whom one works properly to build a better order of the world's affairs.
The first contact who impressed me as having some depth of political seriousness to him was Stanley Lippman. He was the de facto political leader of the Lynn group during 1948-1949, and the only among three brothers who had his feet on the ground. His shortcoming, which chiefly prevented him from developing above a generally dilettantish level of knowledge, was an intellectual and political laziness, whose debilitating intellectual effects he covered over with a pose of world-wise cynicism. However, this, too, is to criticize a friend. He and his wife, Mary, are good human beings, a part of the humanity in whose interests I work, but who are unable to find those special qualities needed to make much of a contribution to that effort.
The Lynn member of the greatest personal depth was Benjamin Fishman. I suspect that Ben's father, an Eastern European Jewish emigre who retained his
* Bund association, helped to contribute to Ben's qualities. The older Fishman was generally a lovable personality, but with a serious, fighting quality as well.
Ben, like the family, had been associated with the region's tannery industry, centered in the Peabody-Salem area. Ben had been a president of his tannery workers' union, and a member of the local region's trade-union council. He had been inducted into the U.S. Army Air Force at the upper-limit of age-eligibility early during the war, serving at (I believe) some sergeant's rank in the ground-maintenance crews during the war. As the tanneries had collapsed during the postwar period, he became an apprentice electrician, enduring the indignities of that status (for his age) to secure his journeyman's qualifications and (I believe) later his master's qualifications.
Ben typified in that respect the stratum which the SWP presumably was defined to represent.
There were various, older-generation SWP members who did, in one fashion or another, correspond to the same stratum. They were usually highly skilled working men, often with leading skills as operatives or technicians in several fields, who often—under pressures of transfers for organizing assignments or effectively analogous job problems—undertook a new skill during mature years, usually quickly becoming outstanding working men or technicians in that new form of employment. Their other principal distinctions were emotional maturity, and national impulses and qualities for leadership in any appropriate circumstance. Although poorly educated politically, they had a combined maturity and experience which usually made them proficient in the tactical aspects of a situation.
Ben, typical of this stratum, was well read and well informed generally. Although he was not well edu-. cated politically, he approached policy-problems with a seriousness and sure-footed cautiousness concerning his provisional judgments. He was modest, but personally self-confident of his capabilities to reach a competent decision on any policy question, provided adequate resources were made available to him. Once he came to a conclusion, he was coolly tough. His self-confidence was reflected in the quality of his easy sense of humor. He was a noble human being of real personal depth.
* The most significant of the SWP personalities in the Boston area was Lawrence P. Trainor.
I was belatedly informed of his death during the summer of 1975. Three of my closest friends of young manhood—F. Porter Sargent, Felice A. Manna, and Larry Trainor—died that year. I was saddened by that chiefly for their families' sake, and by being deprived of the opportunity' to share with them developments which would have, in one aspect or another, both gratified them and improved their retrospective view of crucial aspects of their own past lives.
I last visited Larry in 1972, for about an hour during the course of a visit to Boston. He was still the good human being I had known years earlier.
By 1972 Larry, already in retirement from his trade as skilled hand typesetter, had faced the reality of what the SWP had become, confiding points I shall not mention here because I promised him then I would never publicize them. For reason of old personal loyalties, complicated by compensating residues of habituated blindnesses, and for the sake of his family, Larry maintained his loyalty to the SWP, or rather to what he believed the SWP had formerly been, to the last.
Larry's political life I know from direct observation and from what he reported for political reasons to those he attempted to influence. The highlights of that merit reporting here, both to the immediate purpose of indicating my judgment of Larry then and now, and, with the side-benefit of affording readers a better insight into some of the best persons caught up into the American socialist organizations during the 1930s.
According to Larry's account, during the late 1920s he had been a Boston Irish youth on the verge of degraded lumpenization and, probably, alcoholism at the point he "became political." In later life, he feared "hard liquor," and pointed to his occasional deviations from that rule as evidence of his potential to become an alcoholic. He enjoyed beer, but was suspicious of the political qualities of persons who indulged in cocktails. He had, that is to say, a certain quotient of carried-forward Boston Irish working-class prejudices, and a personal and public style which"I found in agreement with political and non-political sorts of Irish-Americans of the same stratum.
The "Trotskyist" organizations of the early 1930s were generally quaint, and the Boston version was among the quaintest. At the point Larry attempted to bring a group of his associates into the organization, the Boston organization was an "underground" personal barony of Dr. Antoinette Konikow, a famous obstetrician leaning toward the Clara Zetkin side of feminism. Although an eccentric tyrant, Antoinette Konikow was possessed of a degree of literary competence in political matters far in excess of such national Trotskyist leaders as James P. Cannon or Max Schachtman. Larry ostensibly benefited from the better side of her influence, although he was not blind to her eccentricities. He and his wife later named their first child after her.
I have every reason to accept Larry's self-characterization of his political commitment at close to face value. He viewed political life as rescuing him from personal degradation, and saw personal degradation as the pit yawning to swallow him should he abandon politics. His psychological insights into other persons, discounting carried-forward Boston-Irish prejudices against "blue-blood intellectual youth" and "petty-boobs" generally, were generally based on accurate criteria. Except as his prejudices colored his judgment, he was accurate in his understanding of the way in which corrupt influences of personal life affected persons' characters and were reflected in political judgments and conduct. This insight coincided exactly with the method he employed for judging the ongoing conflicts within himself, present and past. Apart from prejudices, he was not only personally honest but rigorously so. It was on this point that Larry's and my own mind found a reference-point for closest agreement.
A summary of his personal history during the decade or so prior to my meeting him is relevant to the general point.
From Boston, he had moved to New York to fill a need in the SWP's printshop there. During the war, he had been assigned as a field political organizer (always on short rations), principally to Seattle, Washington, and Buffalo, New York. He had returned to" Boston shortly before my association with the SWP, with wife, child, and a relatively monstrous load of accumulated personal debts. He resumed his printing craft, suffering a personal life of reduced circumstances while unloading his debt-burdens.
He was a dedicated professional. He and Ben Fishman together typified the best of the spectrum of SWP members from the 1930s. They represented the best side of a stratum termed the SWP's "proletarian kernel."
But for my encounter with Larry, I would have left the SWP by no later than early 1950. The shallowness of the intellectual life was given practical expression for me by the wretchedness of the SWP's trade-union policies. In addition to the Boston group's role, I had met with Farrell Dobbs and with Bert Cochran on 1949 SWP trade-union policies. Dobbs was clean and competent, but apolitical; Cochran was slick and cynically unprincipled.
Nonetheless, even the collaboration with Larry during 1950 was chiefly time-serving. I took a miserable sort of job, traveling principally through the Mississippi Valley and southwest, to work matters out within myself, concentrating privately on the study of Cantor, whose work had already teased my interest in respect to my own developing thoughts about the conceptual problems of political economy. It was when I returned, in mid-1952, with the beginnings of the solution settled, that my closest collaboration with Larry developed, continuing into spring 1954. Larry's mishandling of a group of Harvard youth, attracted to discussions through the campaign against Senator Joe McCarthy, reflected a difference Larry and I could not resolve. This was Larry's weakest side, the extension of his carried-forward youthful prejudices into political practice.
That was also approximately the point of the completion of a consulting assignment—at least to the point at which the firm was above breakeven at last, and the ownership was reluctant to go further. I prepared to accept the first appropriate new consulting assignment which located me in New York City. At the point I had completed the ongoing assignment, I accepted the first offer, convenient at the moment because of my combined wish to be involved in the SWP's national center and also more convenient because of my impending marriage.
After collaboration with Larry, the national leadership of the SWP was a plunge downward. I reduced my association to nominal forms during the spring of 1955. I did not resume any significant degree of activity until 1958, at which point I had far different outlook and reasons for involvement than had existed during the 1948-1949 period.
Exemplary of the SWP leadership problems were the cases of Joseph Hansen and George Novack, significant because they presumed to be and were represented as epitomizing the "intellectual side" of the leadership. Both were personally arrogant and unlikable, with no competence in content or method to what they represented as their particular expertise. They were frauds pure and simple on this account.
I have privileged background information corroborating my best independent assessment of Farrell Dobbs's background, and its relevance to his generally apolitical quality as an SWP leader. Nonetheless, that can be passed over; it is the apolitical quality which is crucial.
The incident which casts the best retrospective light on the SWP's history as a whole is the previously mentioned address given by SWP founder James P. Cannon during the early 1960s to a San Francisco audience. The point of Cannon's address was a recommendation to "seize with both hands" the "Triple Revolution" Committee's postindustrial society theses. Cut free from a base in the trade-union strata, and reoriented to the "New Left" ferment of the early 1960s, the essential political character of the SWP leading circles came into the open. It was British socialism, an antitechnology, "redistribution-ist" version of socialism.
At the time of Cannon's address, Dobbs and Tom Kerry were astonished, even shocked. Later, they adapted to the policy, as the SWP around "youth leader" Jack Barnes proceeded to adopt various forms of Tavistockian particularist "radicalism," including Janov's "primal scream therapy," as a replacement for the labor orientation of the old SWP. Dobbs's own characterization of the SWP, in his 1972 Teamster Rebellion, is relevant:
As the political vanguard of the class, the revolutionary party constitutes a bridge in historic consciousness for the workers. It absorbs the lessons of the class struggle, victories as well as defeats, preserving them as part of its revolutionary heritage. The party's cadres are the mechanism through which this "class memory" is infused into the labor struggles on the given contemporary scene, [p.52].
Dobbs's expressed view merely caricatures the outlook otherwise dominant in the SWP leadership generally. Their conception of the labor movement was one of spontaneous struggles arising as an epi-phenomenon of the "horny hand of labor." By assimilating that metaphysical quality of the "horny hand of labor," chiefly through embedding members of socialist organizations in the shops for a minimum of five years ("before opening their mouths"), the socialist organization's "colonists" were able to merge the tactical formulas of "accumulated experience" of earlier periods of labor ferment with the spontaneous, grievance-motivated insurgencies of the present.
Men such as Dobbs were deeply hostile to Karl Marx in practice. To them, Marx supplied a description of the economic pulsations of capitalist economy, which assured the "colonists" buried in the labor movement of a coming new series of spontaneous labor struggles, and which otherwise provided a consistent reference-point for arguing the inevitability of the grievances workers must suffer at capitalist hands. The latter was generally represented as "broadening and deepening the workers' spontaneous class-struggle consciousness." By approximately 1948-1949 the SWP leadership generally had abandoned confidence in Marx's usefulness for the work of economic analysis, and confined its favorable view of Marx's theory to its muckraking potentialities and as a part of the "tradition" of the "movement's" past. Any effort to assess the necessary consciousness and role of the labor movement programmatically from the vantage-point of any scientific standpoint, Marxist or otherwise, Dobbs and others viewed with embittered hostility.
Their view of the labor movement was essentially tactical, and was in agreement with the axiomatics of British, "redistributionist" socialism.
By virtue of their institutional self-identification with the Bolshevik Revolution of "Lenin and Trotsky," they cultivated as long as Stalin was alive a "political" outward posture of criticism of the Soviet Union and Stalinism from the vantage-point of a closely meshed doctrine concerning "Leninism." Their "Marxism" was chiefly focused on this aspect of the propaganda posture of the SWP.
After the promulgation of the Khrushchev address to the Soviet Twentieth Congress, and in the wake of the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the SWP lost its raison d'etre as a "Trotskyist" organization, and the effort to maintain the closely meshed argument vis-a-vis Stalinism was abandoned. The first open rupture between Peking and Moscow, accompanied by the first phases of the "New Left" ferment's "regroup-ment" preliminaries, catalyzed the abandonment of the old "theoretical" propagandistic identity of the SWP's exterior. The purely tactical outlook, caricatured in a relative extreme by Dobbs, appeared stripped of its former externalities of theoretical pretensions.
The sociological orientation, toward "New Left" ferment, shifted the application of the tactical heritages from the labor movement to new social strata. This was not an axiomatic change in the character of the SWP, but rather its essential quality, unhinged from inhibitions of both the cultivation of anti-Stalinist theoretical pretenses and the requirements of adaptation to the labor movement. Inevitably, in due course, the SWP of the 1960s became lawfully and increasingly protofascist.
Larry Trainor, Ben Fishman, and others of the sort I have indicated to that effect were the positive reality of the old SWP of the 1948-1954 period. They rightly despised the policies and practices of the Communist Party USA, the Schachtmanites, and so forth, understood the essential immorality of the liberals generally, and were opposed to the immorality exemplified by McCarthyism. That past association I could never regret, morally or intellectually. Allowing for the inadequacies of their outlook and practice, they were morally right vis-a-vis the predominant currents of their time. We stood together, and rather well, against the stream of collective lunacy about us then. The fact that I made and honored that choice in practice has been a necessary part of the cultivation of the strength I have carried into subsequent periods.
However, the institution to which we were commonly attached, as was represented by the SWP leadership itself, was a fraud, a quality it shared in common with all American socialist organizations of the twentieth century up through that period. The discrepancy between the same outlook which I had brought to selecting the SWP in late 1948 and the different determination of a course of development ordered by the SWP as a whole brought me near to a break with an active role in that organization at several points—early 1950, 1951, early 1955. Only my attachment to individuals such as Larry Trainor and others prevented a complete break in 1955, and prompted me to attempt to salvage something from the SWP, despite my deepening contempt for its leadership and general character, in connection with my 1958 project.
As for Larry and others for whom I continued to enjoy respect and affection, I could not permit myself to be dragged down by their backwardness on vital issues. In the end, I have vindicated the essential commitment we shared in common at the turn of the 1950s.
Lessons of Experience
From the SWP experience, I gained two important specific benefits.
First, by pitting myself against the intellectual and related pretensions and policies of the SWP (and alternative socialist groupings), I mastered every relevant aspect of Marx and other principal features of socialist history. Solving this aspect of the matter enabled me later to trace out the political-intelligence operations which had chiefly defined the history of the socialist movement from the 1860s, and thus to establish a well-grounded point of reference for unraveling the mysteries of British-centered (and pre-British oligarchist) intelligence operations generally.
Second, the focus on the problem of the historical efficiency of undertakings launched through small organizations has been an indispensable part of the skills developed variously by myself and my immediate associates during recent years.
At the same time, by gauging myself against the association, by examining how that association variously did and did not agree with my essential commitments of philosophical outlook, I was considerably enriched in my capacity to discover what I must do, and to become able to define a course of .action independent of any set of pregiven criteria.
8 The Emerging Maturity of Reason
The 1954-1955 weaning away from the SWP affected my first wife and me differently. For her, embittered by the decay for a different reason than I, the result was simply to move away from political life toward a liberalism informed by her approximate decade of experience with the SWP. For me, it was a matter of superseding a useless sort of mediocrity.
She, increasingly, perceived me as embodying a potentially brilliant business career, and resorted, increasingly, to her impressions of her family background, and to current impressions guided by that perceived background, to attempt to guide my policies to that end. For me, income and position were merely conveniences; it was the problem-solving aspect of consulting which gratified me.
A notable, if simmering, conflict was already developing by the time of the August 1956 birth of our son.
By spring 1957, the conflict within the marriage was becoming severe on account of the acceleration of our differences in outlook, method of judgment, and direction. My limited active involvements in the SWP during 1958, 1959, and 1960 were an important, complementary feature of the process which ended the marriage. She was opposed not only to my occasional involvement with the SWP, but also to my determination to continue a consulting practice— even, on the latter account, to the point of sabotaging my business affairs at a number of points by intervening with associates. She was particularly embittered against my research work.
Under those circumstances several developments killed the marriage.
The most crucial was the matter of a former Freedom Rider, Griswold. He had been passed to me for personal counseling by an acquaintance. He had visited me periodically, and had progressed to the point of developing a resume and securing a more suitable form of employment. An intruded household scene, during which my first wife carelessly included savage complaints against my "uncompensated" help to Griswold, so profoundly disturbed him that I never heard from him again—until being informed, some months later, of his suicide. That news "killed my last strong feeling" for the marriage. It was not the incident itself, or merely that it served as a sort of last straw to an accumulation over several years. It exemplified the irreconcilable difference between two opposite views of being human and alive.
That aspect of experience was most useful in separating me from the last residual carryovers of adolescent weaknesses, in establishing a deepening ruthlessness toward any aspect of personal life which corrupted the dictate of conscience in respect to the duties of public life. My first wife's developing view was that personal family life, as she defined it, was primary, and that that ought to determine public life. My own view was opposite. The breaking up of the marriage put the conflict between the two views to a test.
Since then, she has gone on to become "successful" in a manner consistent with her views, and I according to my own.
Just as the individual in society is the mediation of the historical process, so the individual event sometimes embodies within itself the concentrated expression of an entire process, and in that way transmits an importance way beyond the apparent content of the incident taken by itself.
That decision, and associated actions, to permit nothing but my public purpose to govern my course of action and life, is the breaking-point in my "emotional life" which provided the necessary complement to the developments in my intellectual life. Since 1963, as I separated myself from then-vestigal association with a computer-applications entity I had founded in 1959, my course of action has been a steady march into the present realities.
Building a Seed-Crystal
The most important thing about people is not what they do or think at a given moment, but the direction of intellectual and moral development of which they are manifestly capable under appropriate circumstances. The determination of this potentiality does not lie entirely within themselves as abstractable independent individuals. They are social persons, with definite social circumstances, and governed by the shared prejudices of those associations.
As individuals reach the age of approximately twenty-five in our culture, the "threshold values" which fix their associations in respect to personal circumstances rise rapidly, such that it is far more difficult for such persons to free themselves from the embedded prejudices of their established associations. One sometimes speaks of "hostages to circumstance."
Hence, the possibility of developing new institutions' seed-crystals depends, unfortunately, not entirely upon the validity of one's policies or power of one's arguments. It depends upon reaching an exceptional stratum of young people among those under twenty-five years of age. Only when, through the development and deployment of such a seed-crystal, one can catalyze a process of crisis to the effect of exceeding the "threshold values" of generally established institutions, can one alter the circumstances such that older persons generally are aided to reflect their potential for moral and intellectual development free of the preexisting prejudices of established associations.
This works either for good or for evil.
It is 'the manifest institutional mobility of youth which is the crucial consideration in initiating new seed-crystal formations for either good or evil. The "New Left" generally, the promotion of the rock-drug culture, are exemplary of the work of evil. To my knowledge, the establishment of the Labor Committees and subsequent development of the U.S. Labor Party is the only notable seed-crystal institutional development for good among youth during the past decade.
The ordinary, pragmatic course of action in political work is to employ what might be described as a "marketing approach" to organization of forces. On one level or another, having predetermined the sort of population one has targeted for recruitment and influencing, the short-term results of the effort are regarded as the test of the process, and anticipation of the factors which might more probably evoke most immediate such favorable response are the basis for the experienced political organizer's design of the effort. Not overlooked, in most cases, is what sort of effort will attract media coverage, patronage, and financial backing most rapidly.
The opposite approach is to proceed from knowledge of the method and criteria which an organization must acquire, and to shape one's approach to selectively exclude, in effect, all but those persons who will most probably come into efficient agreement with the policies represented. Usually, this approach cannot, inherently, produce the numerical results of the former; it yields something far better, if much smaller.
If my own approach was the latter, from 1963 onwards, it was not simply the latter. It was the fruit of my 1952-1961 work in economic science and subsumed matters, including a definite strategic programmatic conjunctural view of the specific purpose for which the organization was being created and developed. The purpose was to develop an organization dedicated to implementing that strategic perspective according to the governance of the criteria and method established in the course of developing such a perspective. The purpose, from the outset, was to create an instrument—perhaps a small, but effective instrument, to become the "little wheel" which moved the "big wheels""in the process of shaping the future course of history.
If the organization had, at any juncture, adopted criteria, methods and perspectives different in any degree from that I had contributed, I would have left the organization more or less immediately. The organization would have rendered itself useless at such a juncture.
The approach was consciously Promethean, in the sense illustrated by Goethe's poem. The political method employed was the aforementioned class-series of approximately one semester's duration, incorporating the material later published in my textbook, Dialectical Economics. The targeted area of population was the youth ferment "around the "New Left." The actual target, within that larger population, was the exceptional graduate student or undergraduate who would respond to the required concentration-span and intensity of the course—whose mind and moral commitment moved significantly, and in correlated fashion, in the directions embedded in the course.
The further initial shaping of the organization assembled from the repeated class-series was accomplished by adopting political projects within the material means of the organization, deploying those projects at the fringes of the "New Left" generally, and situating the members into moral confrontation in practice with the opposing or skewly different moral directions and premises of "New Left" and other strata generally. Those who could not withstand the counterpressures of "New Left" and other peer-groups tended to be automatically self-weeded-out. Selective recruitment and selective development were the rule.
This "laboratory" approach to political implementation of course-content was accompanied by an emphasis on original research work as the normal basis for developing and implementing policy for tactical practice.
Many of the recruits were well assimilated into university life, and thus "achievers" within classrooms; here they were shaped methodologically by persons and currents whose (chiefly empiricist) methods and criteria were contrary to those of my own course. To develop such recruits—to aid them to free themselves from the authority of such contrary intellectual currents—it was indispensable to establish standards of scholarship qualitatively more exacting than those standard for graduate schools, to enable those members to progress rapidly to a point of qualified competence, to base their methodological criticism of university course content on an included mastery of the material content of such courses. Since most academic instruction is monstrously inefficient pedagogically, or adapted to the relatively intellectually lazy and uninspired student, this procedure was not at all beyond reach for the superior qualities of achievement of the typical recruit.
Since I had cumulatively mastered a variety of fields in such terms over preceding decades, I was often able to aid directly in steering such processes. Usually, outside my own classes, I avoided substituting myself for the academic professor, but merely put in a few motivating initial suggestions and intervened periodically, and chiefly "Socratically," unless the direction of results being pursued warranted a more pointed sort of criticism. The object, after all, was to direct the members to replicate my own experience in the self-ordered development of the mind, to develop as quickly as feasible both competence and self-sufficiency in knowing the basis for and authority of such competencies.
One of the peculiar advantages of this approach, during the last half of the 1960s and early 1970s, was that the youth strata of that period were divided principally into three categories as students. There were the "traditional students," dwindling in number, concentrating on passing the courses and gaining the degrees. There was a large and growing anarchist current which was antiknowledge, desiring "culturally relevant radical basket-weaving" or analogous courses as a replacement for any sort of real educational process. Our own policy was to go beyond the flaws of existing university pedagogical and course-content policy, to a corrected and more rigorous program governed by a shifted set of motivating criteria.
Accordingly, we put ourselves on the side of being critical (even extremely critical) supporters of the educational process against the "crazies" and other "New Left" deschooling currents. This situated us sociologically where we wished to be, associated with the strata in which promising intellects were to be found, and spearheading a policy of defense of the classroom against the anarchists. By defending the classroom where the policies of ordinary classroom institutions could not defend themselves politically, we laid the basis for a continuing recruitment and assimilation process into 1973.
The point of our tactical approach to the university was that education must be task-oriented in a specific way. The world is in crisis. The task of science is programmatically defined properly in broad terms by the tasks of development. For those tasks we have existing formal knowledge, which is to be learned, and knowledge we must develop, which the young must qualify themselves to create. By gauging this side of the work of the organization against the university, the organization became a new kind of university.
It became in fact an academy on the model of Plato's and in the conceptions of Leibniz. The academy—or the university organized according to Pla-tonic/Neoplatonic academy principles—is essentially both an active political-intelligence center, a political institution in the world's affairs, and a research center. The British, working the anti-Platonic side of the street, have long employed Cambridge and Oxford Universities as model anti-academies, as the political-intelligence centers for the Secret Intelligence Service. Into the 1860s, there were universities in the United States, such as Union College, which were organized according to Platonic principles. West Point was conceived as an academy in that sense.
In the wake of the August 1971 crisis of the Bretton Woods system, the development of the political-intelligence and operations-intelligence functions of the Labor Committees crystallized earlier developments converging upon such changes in institutionalized forms. The qualitative intensification of tasks at the onset of 1974 accelerated the development of political-intelligence capabilities previously institutionalized following September 1971.
As of January 31, 1974, the U.S. Labor Party and its immediate collaborators were dedicated to the work of proceeding toward the early, eminently practicable direct intervention of the organization in shaping, increasingly, the policy perceptions of major institutions which, in turn, shape current world history.
The "Golden Snake" proposal introduced into an election campaign in the Federal Republic of Germany during spring 1974, an effort accompanying our intervention against the continued "Watergat-ing" of President Nixon, launched that new period of activity.
The conception first developed in 1952, given programmatic expression as a strategic perspective in 1958, had become an instrument, governed by those principles, in a practical effort to shape the course of current history. The fuller elaboration of the "Golden Snake" proposal, as the "International Development Bank" proposal of 1975, has had in fact an increasing significance in the shaping of world history, both among our growing numbers of allies and in the increasing wrath of our adversaries.
Good Versus Evil
The combination of developed political-intelligence methods and cumulative studies by the organization culminated in qualitative breakthroughs during 1977. The work initiated by the director of intelligence, Criton Zoakos, first on Ibn Sina and then on the significance of the fight between Plato and Aristotle, afforded us crucial historical benchmarks, through aid of which we were able to unravel the key features of Mediterranean-centered history over a span of approximately three thousand years. With this enhancement of our knowledge, we were able to recognize an earlier direct awareness of the same historical facts by leading European currents up until the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, and also a previous continuing knowledge to the same effect among the leading U.S. Whigs of the first half of the last century.
These developments coincided with and intersected developments in our experience with the British up through May-June 1977.
Immediately following the signs of growing popularity of the International Development Bank brochure among "Third World" and other governmental circles, beginning May 1975, British intelligence and financial circles initiated openings with us, which' they continued on a friendly basis into late 1976 and broke off entirely almost within a twenty-four-hour period during spring 1977.
By summer 1977, I was the second name on a Baader-Meinhof "hit list" otherwise including the late Jurgen Porito and Hanns-Martin Schleyer. It was my provisional evaluation of the Ponto assassination, forwarded to U.S. intelligence circles, which prompted investigations quickly leading to discovery of my name on the same list, and to subsequent coordinated efforts of three Western intelligence agencies, efforts largely responsible for saving my life at that time.
The correlation among these various developments was direct. May-June 1977 was the point of overt launching of British efforts to bring down the U.S. dollar and to block efforts to set up a new world monetary system. Outside French circles allied to Jacques Rueff, Ponto was the most significant European figure contributing to the process of developing a new monetary system. Ponto and Rueffs work dovetailed with the significant influence associated principally with me around the International Development Bank conceptions. I was regarded by the British as a "potential danger" chiefly on that account—as I am at this point of writing—and thus they aimed at eliminating me in the course of any handy general terrorist deployment, providing it could be handled in such a way as not to increase my perceived political importance through "martyrdom."
Since all international terrorism is deployed by networks coordinated by the British monarchy—at least what is properly termed international terrorism, as distinct from ordinary assassination activities—the correlation between the turn in overt British policy and the Baader-Meinhof assassination list was direct and most plain.
As Grivas emphasized during a RAND Corporation seminar during the early 1960s, it is a basic error to saturate a point of interest with covert and similar special operations. With respect to the U.S. Labor Party and its collaborators, the British-centered forces had committed precisely the error against which Grivas warned. The depth of saturation of covert operations against us had invalidated the covert character of the operations, and had in fact exposed the direct connections among various features of their formerly covert networks to our observation.
It was not only we who benefited so by the British blunder. The assassination of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, as part of the "Kissinger scenario" for that nation, made the nature of international terrorism so blatantly obvious that diplomatic and other political considerations no longer deterred major political parties from recognizing openly, as a matter of policy-perception, what was formerly (usually) discreetly recognized to be the case only by certain intelligence and security services. The point made by top Italian intelligence specialist Giannettini in a publicized 1974 report,* that Israeli intelligence had coordinated international terrorism since 1969, could be no longer overlooked. Furthermore, it was understood, and correctly so, that the Zionist organizations' coordinationsof terrorism is only a feature of those Zionist agencies' subordinate role to the "Black" Maltese networks centered in the British monarchy.
Once the political will to face reality was established, and intelligence and security agencies given appropriate mandates, it was not long before relevant direct evidence began accumulating in large batches. Since this represented an acknowledgment of the U.S. Labor Party's direction of investigation of terrorism since 1975, we were integrated into the general process of political-intelligence evaluations of information being accumulated.
The renewal of assassination projects against this writer, coupled with internationally coordinated financial warfare and other harassments against the writer's associates, beginning May 1978, involved the same intelligence error, but on a larger scale, by the British-centered forces as the 1977 operations. Since these forces coincided in respect of operational con-
* New Solidarity International Press Service, Executive Intelligence Review, Vol. V, No. 16, April 25-May 1, 1978 and Vol. V, No. 17, May 2-8, 1978, "Dossier San Marco," Parts 1 and 2, by Guide Giannettini.
nections among them with the forces deployed against the Bremen European Community agreements of July 1978 and the Schmidt-Brezhnev treaties of May 1978, a cross-gridding was a relatively easy matter.
The discovered dominant function of the "Black" networks of the Maltese Order provided the most efficient means for tracing the direct, unbroken links between today's British-Maltese-Zionist forces of evil and the ancient oligarchist faction which the New Testament identifies as the "Whore of Babylon." The Colonna family of Rome, a hard-core element of today's Whore of Babylon, illustrates the point. This family traces itself (authentically) back to the family of Julius Caesar, not only biologically, but in an unbroken continuity of family traditions of policy.
The key role of the cult of Isis and Osiris in the doctrine of the "Black" Maltese innermost circles is also indicative. The cult of Isis and Osiris is a syncretic form of the Phrygian cult of Dionysus, the former created by Aristotle's Peripatetics in Ptolemaic Egypt after their expulsion from Athens. This cult, together with the Stoic cults also created by the Peripatetics, are the unbroken tradition of the "Christians who are not Christians" from centuries before the birth of Christ. These cults were created as extensions of the ancient cult of Apollo, which controlled Rome during the historically known period of the Roman republic and the early period of the Empire, being superseded outwardly by the Stoics. The Colonna family tradition is directly linked to the Whore of Babylon's ancient forms and policies.
The cult of Apollo was the political-intelligence agency for the Western Division of the Persian Empire. This cult had three principal facets to its operations. It was a prophesying cult (its "religious" side), using prophecy and pagan's superstitious rituals (for example, astrology) as an instrument of political control of governments and political factions under its influence. It was also the principal usurer of the Mediterranean. It was otherwise a full-spectrum intelligence and intelligence-operations agency.
The development of the cult of Apollo for this function was directed by the ancient Babylonian priesthood, and shaped to emulate their policies and functions in the Western Division of Mediterranean civilization. Hence, the appropriateness of the New Testament name "The Whore of Babylon" for the force the Christian apostles identified as the agency of Satan incarnate on earth, the cult of Apollo with its associated cult of Isis and Osiris.
Aristotle was a leading agent for the cult of Apollo. During their Ptolemaic period, the Peripatetics were the debt-collectors of the cult of Apollo for the Mediterranean. That is the significance of the British Secret Intelligence Service's (Ashmole's) incorporation of the cult of Isis and Osiris into the revised, Scottish Rite of British Freemasonry. That is the significance of the Aristotle Society in England today. Oxford and Cambridge do not suffer the credulousness of misinformed persons concerning Aristotle; they are well informed of the truth, and adopt the name of Aristotle with full, shameless awareness of the evil with which they are so associating themselves.
The sheer mass of interconnected financial warfare, harassment, and other attacks on the writer and his associates, a high-intensity, coordinated international deployment, extending into the highest layers of trade unions, corporate boardrooms, leading financial circles, key strata of political parties of various nations, and to the foreign minister and head of government or head of state level of various nations, produced the basis for knowledge of the most valuable quality. Since we had not only powerful enemies, but also some powerful institutions not unfriendly to us, our investigations were aided with invaluable findings we were able to readily crosscheck.
Not only are the writer's would-be assassins the most powerful financial interest in the world (pending the development of the new world monetary system), but they control the international illegal drug traffic, control international terrorism, control-the "environmentalist" forces internationally, and have been to date the main force of evil for at least approximately three thousand years.
With this knowledge in hand, and direct, documented knowledge of what these forces presently control and have controlled during (notably) the writer's lifetime, I can look back on my experience with institutions over my life and understand the process through which I have lived in a fresh and more profound way.
This is not to suggest that all of the institutions I have confronted were instruments of the "Black" Maltese networks. Rather, most of those institutions existed, as I did, in an environment significantly shaped by "Black" Maltese-controlled institutions.
Most of the institutions and persons which have mediated that which I have opposed in the course of my own development were, as I was, mere victims of the same environment which I suffered; the evil they sometimes transmitted to me or to others was the evil imposed upon them, rather than something original to them.
There is the other side of the historical picture, a side which must also be considered to situate my life to date.
The enemy forces over thousands of years to date have been principally composed of an organic alliance among a parasitical landed oligarchy and a financial oligarchy dedicated to usury (as distinct from banking in behalf of productive, technologically advanced investments). Being a numerical minority, these forces, the oligarchical faction, have relied upon mobilizing the most antiprogress currents of rural and pastoral backwardness against those forces dedicated to scientific and technological progress. The oligarchists have consistently supplemented such rural and pastoral rabbles of ignorant fanatics with a demented urban force recruited and developed from among both lumpenized urban strata and susceptible layers of youth. The Phrygian cult of Dionysus, precursor of Marat's sansculottes, and of today's Maoists, anarchists, rock-drug culturists, and terrorists, has been a consistent model tool of oligarchist policy over centuries.
The opposing force is generally known as humanist or city-builders, and otherwise known as Platonics or Neoplatonics. Today, "Neoplatonic humanism" is the most appropriate name for this current—the same current represented by apostolic Christianity.
The humanists are properly so termed, and the oligarchists and "environmentalists" properly termed bestialists, because of the basis on which humanists define social policy.
The empirical distinction between the human species and all lower forms of life is expressed thermo-dynamically by a rising rate of per capita energy throughput as a secular trend accompanying successful branches of human existence to date. This rate not only rises secularly, but at exponential rates.
This increase is not only in the rate of energy per capita, but in the ratio of "free energy" available per capita (after deducting for higher, rising rates of energy consumption). This free energy is the material basis for expanding populations and for transforming the society to higher forms of development.
That increase is effected through innovations contributed by individuals. Such innovations are the predicates of a larger, subsuming process of general scientific and technological progress. The source of this process is the development of the creative-mental potentials of the human individual, principally through society, but also through the individual's own self-development of those powers. It is the scientific and technological advancement of society which creates the objective, social preconditions for new qualities of general advancement in the creative-mental powers of the individual members of a population.
No lower form of life can replicate this as a species.
Increased negentropy among lower species occurs only through biological differentiation into more advanced varieties and species. Only man can secularly advance the negentropic parameters of his species' existence within the biological framework of his own species-nature.
Thus, for a society to agree with the requirements of human existence, it must be a form of society which not only fosters generalized scientific and technological progress, but which must accompany that with consistent improvements in the education and material conditions of life of its individual members. To realize the benefits of individual discoveries, and of individual assimilation and transmission of new knowledge for improved social practice, the society must provide individuals with definite kinds of liberties to this effect.
This policy is known as humanism, because it is only a nation which fosters generalized scientific and technological progress as its fundamental, constitutional commitment and definition of national interest, which is in accord with the requirements of human existence.
A society dominated by or tolerating an "environmentalist" or "zero-growth" or "Malthusian" policy is a bestialist society. By adopting as a goal a halt to technological progress, it degrades man to a fixed mode of productive work and life over successive generations, thus bringing man's moral condition into resemblance to that of cattle. By suppressing that which distinguishes man as human, man's developable creative-mental powers, and by giving no social, practical value to that which distinguishes man as human—his power for scientific and technological progress—man's moral condition converges upon that of talking cattle.
When man is human—when, that is, he lives in a nation governed by fundamental dedications to scientific and technological progress, the value he places upon himself is universal. The discovery and transmission of beneficial new knowledge, knowledge increasing man's power over the ordering of the universe, is of universal benefit to present and future generations of the society as a whole. This potentiality in each other individual also makes each such individual potentially of universal value to every other person.
This, the recognition in concept and in practice of the existence and universal importance of the creative-mental potentialities of each individual person, is the basis for the notion of the human soul. That is the manifest quality of the individual which absolutely distinguishes man from the lower beasts, and which binds'the human race together in the love of one another's soul. That recognition is the only basis for morality among persons.
If man esteems himself in practice as a talking animal, then only his individual sensual appetites are real to him. A Hobbesian, Lockean world-outlook, the immoral outlook of bestialized man, appears to him as "human nature."
If man is truly human, not only moral, but conscious of the proper ordering of the human condition, such a person locates his or her personal identity in the universal implications of his or her existence. There is no superstition attached to this. The increase of man's power over nature, through increased mastery of the lawful ordering of the universe, is a demonstration of the perfectibility of human knowledge, and a demonstration which defines what is and what is not a contribution of universal and also concrete value to the human species as a whole. From this vantage-point, my identity is properly not my biological identity as such, but the employment of my biological existence to effect contributions which are of universal value in such concrete terms of reference. I may be a scientist, a teacher, who transmits essential knowledge, a skilled workman, who transforms new knowledge into practice for human benefit. It is morally the same thing. I am universal in my social identity, my personal identity. It is that, and that alone, which makes my living worthwhile to society, and therefore to me.
To be corrupt, to be evil, is to repudiate the conscience of a true human being for sake of sensual gratifications of personal or family life. As the British Psychological Warfare Executive defined its practice during World War II, the art of corruption is to bring out "the dirty dog" in the individual. The cult of "rock music," the drug-culture, the various par-ticularist sodomies and "radical" fads esteemed by today's SWP, are each an expressed definition of mankind and human practice which is bestial in its content and evil in its implications. At root, "environmentalism" is pure evil.
The practice of parasitical landlordism by oligarchies, the practice of usurious tax-farming by financial oligarchies, are practices in direct opposition to the allocation of society's "free energy" to the realization of scientific and technological progress. To the extent that a society commits itself to progress, it will not tolerate a diversion of its "free energy" away from the equivalent of capital formation in technologically advanced forms of expanded production in industry, agriculture, and so forth. Hence, the oligarchists over thousands of years have recognized that the city-builders' or humanists' policies have been the deadly enemy of the very existence of an oligarchist rule over society.
For this reason, the oligarchist faction has been consistently dedicated to evil—to "environmental-ism." It has invoked the brutish barbarians from rural and pastoral strata against scientific and technological progress, and has produced Dionysian and related cults of urban slum and youth strata as "environmentalist" and terrorist battering-rams against the political institutions of humanist progress.
Within the ranks of nominal Christianity, the distinction between good and evil is epitomized by the opposition of New Testament, apostolic Christianity to Old Testament "fundamentalism."
Because the literary sources of Judaism were syn-cretized under the supervision of Babylonian priests after David and Solomon, introducing elements of Hesiodic bestiality entirely alien to city-builder King Solomon, Philo of Alexandria and other Jewish humanists attempted to purge Judaism of bestiality by means of Neoplatonic commentaries. Saint Paul, dealing with the same problem, emphasizes emphatically the "New Dispensation" of Christ, warning Christians against the "concision." Christianity rejected any aspect of the "Old Testament" which conflicted with the teachings of the New.
Just as Judaism has been divided over thousands of years into a degraded, bestialist doctrine and a humanist current, so the forces associated with the heirs of the cult of Apollo have attempted to degrade Christianity. The case of schismatic, fascist Archbishop LeFebvre today exemplifies both that policy, and a direct sponsorship by the most evil of the "Black" nobility of Italy. Since the 1660 English Restoration, the English-speaking world has been plagued with varieties of "Old Testament" fundamentalism best suited to the most bestialized of backward rural strata and lumpenized urban populations. The "revivals" of this Satanism parading as "Christianity" are Dionysiac emotional orgies of sensualism, sometimes going over to enactment of the evil evoked within the mind by these atrocities. "Pentacostalist" orgies, often producing habituated forms of psychotic babbling, are exemplary of this sort of hideous practice.
The potency of the Old Testament for this purpose arises from the vestiges of the doctrines embedded in Judaism under the supervision of the Babylonian priesthood, just as the most evil of the religious fanatics among Jews generally employ the corresponding sources for justifying criminal practices against non-Jewish populations of the Middle East.
That and related knowledge of the division between good and evil enable me to look back into the earliest portions of my conscious life, and to understand each part of the path I have traveled to the present point, including the role of the influence of Christianity in giving direction to the process of development guiding me through my adolescent assimilation of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant.
I know at last, in full measure, who I am and how I came to be what I am.
The 'Golden Soul'
My crucial intellectual achievement in life to date has been to enable a more efficient, practicable comprehension of the significance of the "golden soul" in Plato's Politeia (Republic), to bring within reach what some scholars nervously identify as the "hidden knowledge" of Plato's and key Neoplatonic writings.
I was already on the track of this knowledge during the late 1940s, and made a qualitative step toward direct mastery in connection with my insight into Cantor's notion of the transfinite by 1952. I have referred to this near the outset of this book, and shall now outline the point from a somewhat different vantage point.
The ordinary view of mathematical physics assumes that the geometric forms directly subsuming mathematical expressions are in direct correspondence with the lawful ordering of the universe. Even James Clerk Maxwell, at the outset of an 1877 booklet, emphasizes that this cannot be the case— Maxwell was not always so scrupulously honest, especially when the British pogrom against "continental science" was in his view. The name of physical science is ordinarily given to the simplest sort of abstraction of physical processes, a particle-centered notion of inorganic physics, and accounts neither for living processes as living processes, nor the empirical reality of the creative-mental processes, which, in turn, could not be adequately comprehended merely from the standpoint of an organic physics which directly considered living processes as living processes.
Hence, in a Riemann-Cantor ordering of universal reality, we have empirical knowledge presently divided into three distinct qualities: inorganic physics, organic physics, and creative-mental processes. Using denotations which signify transfinite orderings (not geometric "dimensionalities"), we must, for obvious reasons, order these in order of higher with respect to lower. Hence, we give these the denotations n, n+ 1, n+2.
From the paleontological history of the earth, we know empirically that n+l emerged from n, and n+ 2 from n+l. We know that n+\ is efficient with respect to n, and that n+2 is efficient with respect to both n and n+l.
The account so given coincides exactly with the implications of Riemann's famous habilitation paper,* and with our present information respecting
* Riemann, Bernhard, On the Hypotheses upon which Geometry is Based, 1854.
the manner in which Riemann developed that astonishing breakthrough. The universe corresponding to such empirical knowledge as we have outlined is Riemannian, in the sense that it is governed by a primary principle of self-development represented by a principle N, which implies an evolutionary ordering («+l). Cantor's development of the transfmite aids us in directly conceptualizing this sort of collection of nested, efficiently connected manifolds.
For related reasons, it is clear that Einstein did not in fact comprehend Riemannian relativistic spatial notions, and we see directly why the Einstein-Weyl program must fail inherently to define a unified field.
All of this ought to be clear to existing knowledge, at least so far as the formal aspects of the argument are concerned. The difficulty lies in superseding formal comprehension of the matter to advance to seeing the points involved directly, not only as rigorous formal description of the matter.
If a child, say of between twelve and sixteen, has been properly educated in philosophy, that child has a superior specific sort of potential for becoming able to overcome the difficulty of seeing the point of the matter directly.
Let us now use the denotations of n,, «2> n3, . . . to designate successive states of general knowledge of the practical ordering of the universe, as knowledge associated with successive, qualitative layers of human scientific and technological advances in practice marks off such successive phases.
Ordinarily, in presenting scientific knowledge in textbook and related fashion, the student is learning an axiomatic system, which is essentially fixed in that quality. The progress of knowledge in such instruction is occupied with deriving more complex constructions and also with extending the breadth of application of knowledge without any change in the axiomatic structure of knowledge.
In the case we are presenting, we are concentrating on the supersession of one axiomatic system of knowledge by a more advanced axiomatic system. In this work, applied to the study of successive such transformations, we are focusing not upon the axiomatic structure of any one system of knowledge, but rather on the process represented by their succession: we are, so to speak, abstracting the process of succession from the succession itself. What we are so doing is to abstract a concentrated expression for the effective course of creative-mental activity in generating more advanced axiomatic systems of knowledge in general.
We are focusing upon what Plato defines as the higher hypothesis.* It is an experimental hypothesis respecting what criteria and methods of formation of hypotheses in particular produce crucial advances in the body of scientific knowledge. The experimental field is the study of the transformation of successive axiomatic systems by crucial hypotheses which effect efficient advances in knowledge in general.
Rigorous philosophical study, as exemplified by tracing the accomplishments of Riemann and Cantor
* Cf. Timaeus.
to their roots in Kant, Leibniz, Descartes, Kepler, and Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, affords us—especially if we include Cusa's treatment of Archimedes's work—precisely the sort of study which enables us to focus on the matter of the higher hypothesis as an empirical object of inquiry. This is, in fact, the source of the conception producing Riemann's crucial conception in the habilitation paper, and also the source of Cantor's development of the transfinite conception.
Now, let us turn our attention, for a moment, in another direction of inquiry. Study of the way in which crucial paradoxes in the axiomatic structure of each successive system of knowledge in particular define the limits of that system, informs us that no system of knowledge in particular is in efficient correspondence with the underlying lawful ordering of the universe. However, the process of successive supersession of such systems is a process of perfection which corresponds to qualitative advances in man's knowledgeable power over the laws of the universe. Therefore, the adducing of the higher hypothesis defines for us a principle which is in agreement with the fundamental ordering of the universe, since its direction of self-development is that of a deliberately increasing power over the laws of the universe.
The moment this point is grasped, the upside-downness of prevailing notions of science is underlined beyond dispute. We must reverse our approach, abandoning all notions of ontological elementarity of discrete particles, and make the process corresponding to the higher hypothesis the primary, elementary fact of the ordering of the universe.
This is precisely the solution I discovered for the otherwise insoluble paradoxes of political economy. It was necessary only to make a self-developing negentropy (as I have outlined it earlier in this book) the only primary parameter of economic processes, and to define this in terms of the ratios represented by the productive labor-force taken as a whole with respect to the population as a whole. By abandoning all notions of elementarity associated with the individual commodity or with the unit of productive labor, the axiomatic fallacy in Marx's Capital was properly defined and corrected.
Marx's inability to solve the connection between simple reproduction and extended reproduction for the necessary case of technological progress did not correspond to his intent, as that intent is set forth in the "Feuerbach" section of The German Ideology or in the Freedom-Necessity summary included in the concluding section of Vol. Ill of Capital. The paradox, the error, was a hereditary (axiomatic) blunder embedded in the construction of the notions of relative and absolute value for labor-power of a given social productivity. Once labor-power is defined as necessarily a self-developing social productivity, which mediates its development through technological advances in the productive process, one sees directly the crucial inconsistency which lies at the basis for Marx's error.
If one merely considers what sort of relativistic
physical space is defined by my radical change in the primary datum of economic science, the deeper implications of the discovery of 1952 are—with proper encouragement—brought into view.
Naturally, I owe it to Karl Marx to have pointed to that principle of historic freedom/necessity which he himself overlooked in the indicated aspects of his own work. I could adduce the significance of that from Marx's writings (Section VII of Vol. Ill of Capital was my original encounter with that notion) because my education had been grounded most emphatically in the methodological connections among Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. I could abstract the notion of the higher hypothesis as a primary reality, a governing elementarity.
The "trick" is to be able to grasp self-development characteristics as primary, elementary, with the same conscious credibility as conceptions as is ordinarily attached to notions of discrete elementarily. Instead of the homogeneous thing, the discrete elementarity of formal constructions, one must recognize as primary a process which, from the standpoint of formal-logical prejudice, is viewed as a complex construct. It is necessary to consider why the mind ordinarily refuses to grasp the notion of a self-developing process as the primary empirical reality, the ontolog-ical elementarity, so to speak.
The study of the transformation of successive, successively more advanced systems of knowledge, together with the correlatives of such advances in respect of society's productive and related practice, demonstrates directly and conclusively that it is only the self-developing process, the self-subsisting positive, which is in perfectible correspondence with the actual lawful ordering of the universe. Why not then accept the reality of that empirical fact?
The mind refuses to grasp such a concept—unless the sense of personal identity is developed in a certain way. One must associate one's unit of action, the activity one associates directly with one's self, with the higher hypothesis, with the creative-mental revolutionary development of knowledge, and must view the world in the set of terms of references of the higher hypothesis.
That required condition is what Plato signifies by the "golden soul."
The difficulty of the educated person is that he or she is usually merely a "silver soul" at best. He or she is educated in an axiomatic form of knowledge (at best), but not in the higher hypothesis.
This is not merely a matter of education, but is also a moral outlook on the world. Only the individual who is totally committed to public life from a Neoplatonic humanist standpoint, and who has thus superseded the infantile self-image of individual sensuous, family-centered life as a primary moral reality, can locate his or her sense of personal identity in respect to universal acts which are concretely universal acts and consciously motivated as intended universal acts.
The "silver soul" is a person whose rule by scientific knowledge (in the sense of a specific system) awards his public life so governed a certain determined universality of importance and corresponding moral qualities. However, the dichotomy between public and personal life represents the lodestone of his infantile, family-centered personal self, apart from public life, attached to his public self in such a way that the sense of personal identity which bridges the two conditions must be agreeable to both conditions, and hence cannot be the sense of identity of a "golden soul."
This does not mean that the "golden souls" have no personal life, but rather that their personal lives are ordered as a sharing among persons of their dedication to a Neoplatonic-humanist ordering to public life. Personal life is exemplified by activity such as Beethoven's music, or other art of persons who were "golden souls" in the governing and internal features of their art. It means that there is no moral dichotomy between the standards and interests of public and personal life, that the Neoplatonic standards and interests of public life rule in personal life.
At the lowest level, below the "silver souls," are the "bronze" or "iron" souls, the poor donkeys, the poor sheep, whose consciousness is dominated by the infantile world-outlook of individual sensuous life.
The objective of my life is to contribute to bringing men and women out of the wretched condition of sensuous donkeys and incompletely human "silver souls," to contribute to making of our species a race of "golden souls." To this end, I, like all my city-builder predecessors, work to commit our race to Neoplatonic humanist policies of generalized scientific and technological progress, and to policies of education, culture, and opportunity for realizing contributions of the creative individual powers to the general benefit of humanity.
The war in which I am presently engaged against the forces of the Whore of Babylon, against the heirs of Aristotle, is not a war merely for some particular policy, but a battle for that Great Design under which sovereign nations dedicated to generalized scientific and technological progress form a powerful alliance to crush the remaining power of the oligarch-ist faction, to rid our planet of that faction. This is but a necessary precondition for securing the^human-ity of ourselves and our posterity. It is a necessary step which must prevail if man is to acquire that environment of policy and institutions he requires to rid himself of bestiality, to rise above donkeyness and the wretched arrogance of mere learning, to becoming truly human, a "golden soul."
Each step taken is properly a universalized individual act to but that fundamental end.
I need not speak more of Christianity. I now know those innermost secrets of the apostles, as only a "golden soul" can know them. I know the secret of Islam, of humanist Judaism. Need of beliefs I relegate to the silver and bronze souls, who have need of them. Until you progress to the state of mind which I seek for you and your descendants, the beautiful truth of the matter must remain the special knowledge of the "golden souls." It is your attainment of that, and nothing else, to which my life is ultimately dedicated.
If the new monetary system is firmly established, the Whore of Babylon—the Queen of England— defeated, the Great Design implemented, then inasmuch as I have contributed some special part to that end, I have succeeded in everything essential to me. Once that process is set securely into motion, the future of humanity is secured.